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Peasant Agriculture and Export Trade:
Currant Viticulture in Southern Greece, 1830-1893

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Introduction

a. The peasantry in recent Greek historiography.

The views of Greek historians on the conditions of existence and the strategy of peasant families tend to converge around a set of assumptions that may be depicted as following:

- The peasantry held virtual control over large part of the land it cultivated. A great part of this land consisted of "National Estates" - that is, of land which before 1830 belonged to the Porte and to Ottoman subjects and after that date became property of the Greek state. Until 1871, any individual, as well as peasant families, might occupy and cultivate part of this land, by paying a relatively low rent, proportional to gross output, as a "right of usufruct" to the Treasury. Although the legal framework was unclear and liable to changes, regular occupants of this land might sell, rent, give as a dowry or even mortgage their rights on it. Thus, rights of occupancy on national land were *de facto* almost as strong as rights of property.[1]

-Ownership of large estates represented an exceptional and

[1]See Petmezas [1990], pp.10-46; E. Karousou [1989]; also Vergopoulos [1976] pp.116 ff., Tsoukalas [1977] p.94, Dertilis [1984] p.51, McGrew [1971] pp.458-459 and pp.461-462; Franghiadis [1986].

rather marginal situation; the wealthy and powerful strata of the population were mainly oriented towards commerce, money-lending, political and administrative careers, and showed a relative indifference towards the prospect of acquisition and exploitation of agricultural estate property.[2]

-The massive sale of "National Estates", organized according to the law of 1871, which gave priority to long-standing occupants, permitted a further consolidation of the peasants' position. It is commonly held that long-standing occupants became full proprietors of the land they traditionally cultivated.[3]

-Peasant farms, which represented the prevalent type of productive unit in Greek agriculture, were "target producers" oriented towards subsistence. This they sought through a varying combination of activities, including production of foodstuffs for home consumption, occasional wage-labour, and highly commercialized crops, such as currant viticulture, growing of cotton or tobacco.[4] These latter were a supplementary opportunity for further

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[2]See eg. McGrew [1985] p.218-224, G. B. Dertilis "Les capitaux entre l'industrialisation et ses alternatives" in Dertilis (ed) [1988] p.215, Petmezas [1990] p.35.

[3]Same references as n.1 above.

[4]Dertilis p.202 and 206; Pizanias [1988] p.30 and [1985]; Petmezas [1990], p.180.

differentiation of activities - differentiation which contributed to the security of household income[5]- and a way to face monetary needs, aggravated by the usurious interest rates charged by money-lenders on their advances to the peasantry.[6]

b. The main questions.

This is not the place to go into the indisputable merits of the model emerging from these propositions.[7] The thesis rather in hand aims at questioning the applicability of this set of assumptions to those parts of Greek agriculture which specialized in market production for export, and in particular to the regions which experienced the spectacular expansion of currant viticulture, by far the most important case of market oriented agricultural production in 19th century Greece.

This is not of course a marginal issue. The currant

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[5]Dertilis *op.cit* p.202.

[6]See Petmezas [1990] p.180.

[7]Among them, one might refer that it synthesizes with accuracy the research so far accomplished and the existing literature, while at the same time avoiding the over-theorization typical of the discussions of the 1970s. These attempted to apply general interpretative schemes, but were supported by scanty evidence. I refer in particular to the works by political scientists such as Vergopoulos [1975], Tsoukalas [1977] and Mouzelis [1978], who dealt with the periodization of capitalism in the Greek social formation, the integration of Greece (and of Greek agriculture in particular) into the international capitalist system, and the reasons for the underdevelopment of the Greek economy. In contrast, the above set of assumptions stimulates research because it refers to concrete structures and behaviours, which are verifiable by empirical investigation.

"sector" included a considerable part of the Greek territory and population, and a still more considerable part of Greek agricultural production, and at the same time it directly involved a large number of other regions, which established intense demographic and economic exchanges with the currant growing provinces. If the reservations proposed here are judged valid, some frequent assumptions of Greek historiography will need thorough revision.

Anybody who tries to interpret the expansion of currant viticulture in 19th century Peloponnese by adopting the model outlined above is faced with a serious problem: it is difficult to understand how, if cash crops were just one among several activities of peasant families seeking subsistence, currant trade could have advanced so rapidly and have assumed such impressive dimensions. This is particularly the case if one bears in mind that currant expansion implied deep changes in the traditional structures of Greek agriculture: the colonisation of the previously deserted and marshy coastal plains of the Peloponnese, the creation of new villages in the lowlands and enlargement of those already existing, the relative decrease of grain production and increasing imports of cereals.

Moreover, currant growing was a long-term investment, since the plant gave fruit several years after planting. It

involved land reclamation, security of property rights, farm consolidation, infrastructure, buildings, wells, threshing-floors, ware-houses. How could these changes occur in the framework of an agriculture which did not show any tendency to alter its predominantly peasant character? Who supplied the long-term credit required? And finally, who undertook the risks arising from investment, from cultivation and commercialization of a crop where the market was not only characterized by profit opportunities, but also by instability and recurrent cyclical crises?

c. Recent literature on the topic.

Ch. Agriantoni referred briefly to currant expansion in her thesis on Greek industrialization, completed in 1984.[8] In her account, full of insight, she pointed out that the history of the currant trade, which was intimately connected with deep changes within the peasantry, still remained to be written.[9]

In the last three years, several important contributions on the topic have been published.[10] However, no answer was

[8]See Agriantoni [1986] pp.62-72 and pp.273-280.

[9]*ibidem*, p.68.

[10]N. Bakounakis [1988] and "La vigne et la ville: qui finance la culture?" in G. Dertilis (ed.) [1988], P. Pizanias [1988], D.K. Psihogios [1986] and [1987]. All of these accounts were incidentally published when the present (continued...)

provided to the above presented questions.

In his book on the city of Patras, N. Bakounakis deals mainly with the formation of the group of leading merchant families and their relations with politics and politicians. In his paper on "*La vigne et la ville*", he shows the deep involvement of Patras merchants in the financial organization of currant cultivation. But although he notes both the long-term character of investment in the creation of currant vineyards and the exclusively short-term character of loans and advances by the merchants to the growers, he does not explain how this evident contradiction was resolved.[11] On the other hand, he hints that it was considerations of profitability which led the peasants to specialize in currant viticulture;[12] but he does not proceed further in that direction because, as he rightly points out, the study of the prevalent type of vineyard property and of exploitation would require lengthy research in notarial archives.[13]

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[10](...continued)
research was well advanced. I cannot account fully for the work of Th. Kalafatis, because although the author kindly permitted me to consult some of his papers, I was unable to obtain a full version of his unpublished thesis. The part of the work I have so far consulted furnished me with precious information, especially on the organization of trade, which I refer to extensively in the text.

[11]p.84-85 and p.85 respectively.

[12]*ibidem*, p.90:"*... les paysans s'efforcent de pratiquer surtout la culture du raisin sec, parce qu'elle est rémunératrice, au moins à moyen terme, du fait de la conjoncture favorable du commerce international jusqu'en 1892.*"

[13]Cfr. *ibidem* p.84: "*J'utilise le terme de "cultivateur" et non pas de "propriétaire", car le système d'acquisition et de possession des terres est compliqué et directement lié au crédit à court, à moyen et à long terme par le biais du faire-valoir direct, du système de métayage, des locations en nature et* (continued...)

P. Pizanias analyzes some aspects of the formation of European demand for currants, with decisive repercussions on the evolution of Greek production. Although he admits that it is not easy to reconcile the impressive expansion of currant viticulture with the supplementary role assigned to market production by peasant families in their effort to guarantee subsistence,[14] he avoids confronting this difficulty, which is in any case somewhat marginal to the orientation of his research.

In contrast, the role of the peasantry in currant expansion occupies the central part of the work of D. K. Psihogios.[15] Psihogios starts from the assumption that peasant families aimed at subsistence through autarky, and particularly that they tried to provide for their food by cultivating their own grain. According to this view, any market involvement of the peasantry could only be a result of sheer dearth and of coercion. Since many of the questions dealt by the author are very similar to those discussed here

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[13](...continued)
des baux emphytéotiques. Une typologie de la propriété et de l'exploitation ne serait possible, en l'absence des cadastres, qu'au prix d'une longue recherche dans les archives notariales. *Une telle recherche permettrait également une comparaison à une échelle plus large, par example avec l'emphytéose italienne et/ou avec le contrat catalan de défrichement viticole, dit rabassa morta*" (emphasis added).

[14]A view which he strongly supports: see Pizanias [1988] p.30 and Pizanias [1985].

[15]"*The central question [that the present study] wishes to answer is, in brief, the following:* why the 19th century peasant becomes a commodity producer and why is he later constrained to migrate to the USA?" (Psihogios [1987] p.11).

(although the answers are quite different), Psihogios's arguments are reviewed into greater detail below.[16]

d. Division into chapters.

The first chapter of the thesis tries to establish the advanced degree of peasant specialization in currant viticulture and its decisive impact in shaping Peloponnesian agriculture. This objective is pursued by discussing data on population growth, aggregate, regional and per capita figures for currant production and exports, cereal production and imports.

The second chapter deals with landed property and the distribution of the "National Estates". Discussion draws largely on detailed nominative research in the archives of the small town of Amalias - once an important centre of currant production and trade - which was undertaken specifically to provide new evidence on these crucial questions.

Chapters three, four and five examine respectively: the commercialization of the crop and the organization of currant trade, the problems relating to the creation of currant vineyards, the technology and mode of cultivation. Particular

[16]Chapter VI, pp.249-253.

implied in the exposition. First of all, the Turkish conquest in the XV century and four hundred years of Ottoman domination deprived Greek history of the reality of native aristocracy and allowed the ascending merchant strata to occupy the summit of social hierarchy.[17] Moreover, the War of Independence culminated in the establishment of a state characterized by a liberal-bourgeois legal framework, and this, together with the fact that the revolutionary army was massively recruited from the peasantry, swept away any possibility of the continuation of social relations of production based on extra-economic coercion. In other words, by 1830, the requisites for the operation of markets were fully present. The question as to whether these markets functioned, and how, is one of a different order.

On the other hand, taxation, another typical case of intense interaction between the state and the economy, does not seem to have played any particularly important role in the currant sector. Since very early on, taxes on currant production took the form of a fixed export duty and tended to decrease, probably because the government had no intention to create difficulties for a trade which provided the bulk of the foreign exchange needed by the Greek economy - and the government itself. Moreover, currants were a natural monopoly

[17]See G. B. Dertilis, "Structuration sociale et spécificités historiques (XVIIIe - XXe siècles)" in Dertilis (ed) [1988], pp.11-32.

attention is paid to the distribution of costs, risks and benefits between merchants, wealthy farm owners and peasant families and an attempt is made to outline the strategies of each party as they derive from their mutual agreements. The bulk of the evidence used in these chapters comes from local archives and from the "Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece".

Chapter six proposes a model of interpretation for the strategies of peasant families relating to the expansion of currant viticulture, based on an analysis of the institution of the dowry. This section is based almost exclusively on a reinterpretation of published material.

e. The apparent absence of the State.

The reader will notice that although the thesis deals mainly with relations between social classes and groups, there is practically no explicit reference to the state. This is not because I do not consider politics to be relevant to the subject, but rather because of the difficulty of establishing the relations between the state and social classes, the state and the economy at the actual stage of development of historical research in Greece.

But let me make here a few necessary suggestions which are

of the Peloponnese and did not face close competition on the British market. As a result, the export duty, physically paid by exporters, burdened consumer prices rather than growers. At the same time, this cannot be assumed to have had a perceptible influence on consumption, since the British tariff on currants was several times higher.

It may thus be suggested that the low fiscal burden borne by currant cultivation rather stimulated its development, because it incited the movement to it of resources from more heavily taxed sectors of agriculture - namely cerealiculture. But this cannot be considered as a major factor for currant expansion. The main advantage of the latter lay not in low fiscal burden but in strong international demand.

In contrast with taxation, the distribution of the "National Estates" was a political act with a very decisive positive impact on the development of the currant trade. It offered the opportunity for those wishing to invest in currant vineyards to acquire full property rights on land - secure ownership on the land was a very important requisite for the undertaking of such an expensive and long-term investment - at a moment when, after four decades of currant expansion, it is probable that no more privately owned land was any more available for sale in the currant growing

provinces.[18]

At the same time, the law "On the distribution of the National Estates" of 1871 offers a clear example of how difficult it is to interpret political actions when empirical verifications of their social and economic impact are unavailable. As noted above, the prevalent assumption is that peasants were the main beneficiaries of the distribution. I should add that this was also my original working hypothesis for the case of Amalias, soon to be rejected during research in the archives. Someone who takes this assumption for granted will try to find political reasons for the allegedly pro-peasant character of the law. If, on the other hand, the accentuated concentration of the distributed national lands in the hands of the local elite in Amalias were to prove to have been the case in many other regions as well - such a verification would of course require a great deal of exhausting research - then any effort to interpret the political reasons underlying the distribution would start from quite different premises.[19]

It is not part of my intentions to deny the necessity for works trying to analyze Greek 19th century politics, but

[18]It should be noted that a net distinction is proposed here between land in general, which was undoubtedly available throughout the 19th century, and privately owned land.

[19]As the reader will notice in the respective chapter, my view is not that distribution worked necessarily *against* the interests of the peasantry.

rather to give a warning against this kind of ambiguities. I hope that the conclusions of the thesis may be useful to research on the Greek State and social structure, at least as a stimulus for discussion. The hope that this should be so was one of the reasons which pushed me to undertake the study.


KÉRKIRA
CORFÙ
IONIAN ISLANDS
Trikala
Larisa
Kardhitsa
Vólos
Pálamas
Sofádhes
Fárkala
Almiros
Pagasitikos Kólpos
AEGEAN SEA
SPORÁDHES
Skiathos
Skópelos
Alónnisos
SKÓPELOS
VORIAI
LÉSVOS
LESBOS
Mithimna
Andissa
Eressos
Polikhnitos
Ayiassos
Párga
Thesprotikón
Árta
Préveza
Amvrakikós Kólpos
Levkás
LEVKÁS
Karpenísion
Lamia
Stilis
Istiaia
Loutrá Aidhipsoú
Skíros
Linariá
SKÍROS
Agrínion
Vrakhós Varássova
Livanátes
Aidhipsós
ÉVVOIA
Psakhná
Khalkís
Aliveri
Eretria
Thívai
Skála Oropoú
Erithrai
ATTIKÍ
Marathón
Akharnai
Kithira Kólpos
Megara
Salamis
ATHÍNAI
ATHENS
Petalión
Piraiévs
Korópion
Kavaléa
Gávrion
ÁNDROS
Andros
Panormos
TÍNOS
Tinos
Ermoúpolis
Mikonos
MÝKONOS
Armenistís
Kíthnos
KÍTHNOS
SÉRIFOS
Sérifos
KIKLÁDHES
CYCLADES
Páros
PÁROS
Náxos
NÁXOS
Artemón
SÍFNOS
Amorgós
KÍMOLOS
MÍLOS
Sikínos
Ios
FOLÉGANDROS
Thíra
THÍRA
Fiskárdhon
ITHAKI
KEFALLINIA
Lixourion
Argostólion
Aitolikón
Náfpaktos
Patrai
Aiyion
Korinthiakós Kólpos
Gulf of Corinth
Kato Achaia
Lekhaina
Gastoúni
Amalias
Pínios
PELOPÓNNISOS
PELOPONNESUS
Zákinthos
ZÁKINTHOS
Kerion
Kiparissiakós Kólpos
Kiparissia
Filiatrá
Gargaliánoi
Messíni
Pilos
Methóni
Koróni
Messiniakós Kólpos
SKHIZA
ÁKRA AKRÍTAS
Kalámai
Sparti
Mirtóön
Pélagos
Yithion
Molaoi
Monemvasía
Lakonikós Kólpos
Yerolimin
Neápolis
ÁKRA MALÉA
AKRA TAINARON
KÍTHIRA
Kithira
Argolikós Kólpos
Nápolion
Tripolis
Argos
Mikínai
Dhimitsána
Leonidhion
Kranidhion
Idhra
SPETSAI
Saronikós Kólpos
Aiyina
Palaia Epidhavros
Kórinthos
Kiato
Xylokastro
Killini
Zevgolatio
Kalavrita
Aigio
Diakofton
Meligalás
Karitaina
Andritsaina
Tripotamia
Amfissa
Arakhova
Livadhia
Galaxidhion
Naupaktos
Mesolongi
Agrinion
Astakos
Vonitsa
Amfilokhía
Tekhnití Límni Kopaïdhos
Tekhnití Límni Kastoriás
Tekhnití Límni Trikhonídhos
Tekhnití Límni Pamvótidhos
Tekhnití Límni Kremaston
Vólos
Pagasitikos Kólpos
Sporádhes
Skíros
Evvoia
Khalkís
Khíos
Mestá
Psará
Palaiá Psará
Volissos
Gulpinar
Baba Burnu
Mithimna
Andissa
Eressos
Polikhnitos
Ayiassos
Priamio
Ayvalik
Dikeli
Aliaga
Foça
Menemen
Kemalpaşa
Bergama
Dikili
Ayvalık
Edremit
Burhaniye
Ayvalık
Altınoluk
Akçay
Gülpınar
Bababurnu
Mithimna
Andissa
Eressos
Polikhnitos
Ayiassos
Priamio
Khíos
Mestá
Psará
Palaiá Psará
Volissos

Chapter I. Expansion of currant viticulture, internal agricultural colonization and peasant specialization.

"*The economy of the great sea expanses takes [the plains] to its service and condemns them to producing crops for exports*".[1]

Fernand Braudel could very well have included the expansion of currant viticulture in Southern Greece in his famous account of the process of colonization of the Mediterranean plains: the lucrative prospects of currant production for export, mainly to England, was a major incentive for the inhabitants of the Peloponnesian highlands and of the Ionian Islands to settle in the fertile but marshy coastal plains of the North and West of the peninsula. This process, considered by Chr. Agriantoni as "*the main event of the Greek 19th century*",[2] corresponded perfectly to the phenomenon studied on a Mediterranean-scale by the French historian.[3]

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[1]F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean...*, p.84.

[2]According to Chr. Agriantoni (*Oi aparhes tis ekviomihanisis ...*, p.63): "*the currant-vine provided the main motive force for the internal agricultural colonization; it attracted to the plain the population of the highlands, who had previously lived off traditional pastoral and manufactural activities. This movement has been a long term process which occupied the whole of the Greek 19th century and was in reality its main event.*"

[3]The colonization of the Mediterranean plains was often connected to the development of some export-oriented crop. Among the examples are madder, introduced to the County of Avignon in the eighteenth century, for which low-lying regions were drained and the last marshes eliminated; the cotton and tobacco which led to the improvement of the plain of Salonica in the early 20th century; the vines which in 1900 made the Algerian Mitidja healthy, after (continued...)

The impressive expansion of currant growing during the 19th century was a response to the quick rise of European, and particularly British demand for fruit, brought about by the "Industrial Revolution" - or rather by the possibility it offered to wider strata of English society to diversify their diet.[4] By a fortunate coincidence, the currant turned out to

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[3](...continued)
centuries of unaccomplished efforts. "*There is little room for doubt*", suggests Braudel; "*the land improvement schemes of the plains could only be financed by an influx of big profits from trade, long-term and large-scale trade*" (F. Braudel, *ibidem*, chapter one: "The peninsulas: mountains, plateaux and plains", vol.1, pp.25-102).

[4]The currant was grown in the Peloponnese and the Ionian Islands from the Middle Ages at the latest. "Currant" comes from "Corinth", the gulf of Corinth being the traditional origin of the plant (see *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on historical principles*). Winchester College , for example, included currants in its annual purchases of provisions in as early as 1393. Considered as a precious and luxury product, "*they were used by the Warden and for feasting during Election and Audit weeks, for puddings on fast days and during Lent*" (see Lord Beveridge & others [1939] p.74).
The first to describe the currant-vine as a distinctive plant, different from the common grape-vine, was the French botanist Bauhin in the 16th century (see M. Lamprinidis [1905], p.4). "*Vitis Corinthia sive apyrena*" he called it , pointing to its main and precious characteristic, i.e. that berries of currant grapes are seedless and therefore are particularly good for consumption in a dried state.
The first important expansion of currant cultivation occurred during the second Venetian occupation of the Peloponnese (1686-1715), helped by the colonization, drainage and irrigation policies followed by the Venetian administration (see Xavier Scrofani Sicilien, *Voyage en Grèce fait en 1794-1795*, vol.3, p.126, P. Topping [1974]; "A report on the economic and political situation in the Peloponnese at 1692", *Efimeris Ellinikis Georgias*, n.18, 1/10/1861; Sp. Lampros [1900]. Also, M. Lamprinidis [1905] p.7, who states that F. Grimani, Procuratore Generale of the Peloponnese from 1705 to 1708, in a report to the Doge of Venice, described his efforts to propagate currant growing).
It was only towards the end of the 18th century, however, that the currant trade started to develop at an accelerated pace. By that time currant consumption in Britain ceased to be restricted to the aristocracy, and started to enter the pudding of the ascending middle class; at a later date it would even conquer a place in the diet of the British labouring classes (see Hairetis [1883], p.481; according to S.Xenos [1883], p.390, popular consumption started from the 1860s). Before the spread of modern techniques for conservation and transport of fresh fruit, the non-perishable and easily transportable currant was a very desirable commodity for British market and diet, traditionally poor in fruit.
England was by far the most important consumer of currants throughout the history of the currant trade. The only period which does not fall under this rule were the years 1878-1892. Following two years of low currant prices, 1877 and 1878, French industrialists found it profitable to substitute currants for grapes in wine and cognac production. Grapes were in great scarcity after the devastation of the French vineyards by the "phylloxera vastatrix" disease which started to propagate in 1866 (see Postel-Vinay, Endettement et production agricole ...
Exports to France took enormous dimensions, absorbed in the 1880s more than one third of the production and exceeded occasionally even british consumption
(continued...)

be a natural monopoly of Southern Greece, not exposed to competition from other countries enjoying lower interest rates, where labour was cheaper and more abundant and where better infrastructure existed.[5] The desirability of the small

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[4](...continued)
itself. Sustained demand and prices resulted in an unprecedented wave of expansion of vineyards. But the euphoria was not going to last for long. The reduction of French imports in 1893 threw the currant sector into a terrible overproduction crisis, from which it never resumed. The increase of currant production during the 1880s was so formidable, that after the loss of the French market its export became impossible, even at prices below cost.
Still, hardly can one blame the "french interval" alone for the definitive stagnation of the currant sector. The rate of currant growth in the 1880s was one of the highest ever recorded; yet it was by no means much higher than those of the previous periods: currant production and exports multiplied by 2.5 between 1830 and 1845, by 2.0 between 1845 and 1860, increased 50% between 1860 and 1875 and multiplied again by 2.5 in 1875-1890. Had world currant consumption advanced with the same pace in the 20th century as in the 19th, the sector would have resumed some ten or twenty years after the dramatic events of the early 1890s. But this was not the case, mainly because of the new techniques of conservation and refrigeration of fresh fruit which spread in the last decades of the 19th century and finally rendered currants obsolete as an item of popular consumption. The well-known commercial house of Messinezis, established in London, reported in 1895 that "*the possibility of further expansion of currant consumption by the labouring classes is rather limited, because currants fail to compete with tinned fruits or jams, ready to eat. Currants need to be baked, and baking means expenditure and time which the labouring classes, working all day, cannot afford. Hence they prefer ready-made foods.*" (quoted in the yearly edition of the Ministry of Finance on the export trade of 1895).
On the other hand, the phylloxera disease in France should by no means be considered to have had any significant effect on Greek currant production before 1878. In particular, I think that the impressive expansion of currant vineyards in 1870-1878 (and of production until 1884, since new vineyards need about seven years to produce fruit) was completely unconnected from the destruction of French vines. First, because before 1878, France imported only trifling quantities of Greek currants. Moreover, before 1877, French imports from the two other countries which produced raisins, namely Turkey and Spain, represented less than 14% of average Greek currant exports (for data on French imports, see Pizanias [1988], table 3.3, p.74). This quantity was as important as might be the variation of the Greek crop from one year to the following one. As a result, France does not seem to have stimulated the expansion of Greek production before 1878 not even through any indirect influence on international prices of similar products.

[5]Attempts to transplant the currant vine to other parts of Greece failed, because "*although the plants have, in some cases, thriven well enough, the fruit produced has been found to contain a seed in almost every berry.*" In other parts of the world, "*attempts have been likewise made to grow the seedless currant for commercial purposes; in the Cape of Good Hope and in California only have they been partially successful, but neither in colour, flavour, aroma, or sweetness can the fruit produced in those countries be compared to the Greek currant. The Morea, and the islands of Zante, Cephalonia, Santa Maura and a small portion of Acarnania and Aetolia, therefore, enjoy, practically, a natural monopoly of this article ...*" (BRCREP 1894). This monopoly was finally broken in the early 20th century, when Australia managed to produce currants and also started to export them (see G. Charitakis [1931] p.78).

seedless grape in European markets therefore resulted in the presence of numerous vessels in Patras at the time of the harvest, willing to buy the crop at rewarding prices.

Greek historiography has often been tempted by the idea of blaming currant monoculture as one of the factors responsible for the lost opportunities of national development. This argument is closely connected to the belief that industrial "take-off" was the only path leading to an advantageous integration with the international economy and that the absorption by any other sector of resources which could have been committed to the secondary sector was a bad thing. Moreover, from this point of view, the development of an agricultural sector not producing foodstuffs is considered to have been still more negative because it did not facilitate the reproduction of an urban proletariat, which would in its turn have supported the development of the secondary sector.

However, economic development is not (only) a question of the availability of a "critical mass" of resources; it depends, rather, on the socio-economic structures which influence the strategies of the principal social agents. There is no convincing reason of accepting that, if resources were not committed to currant expansion, they would have been employed in a better way. On the contrary, it may be argued

that specialization in a luxury export item was fully rational, since Greece not only possessed a "comparative advantage", but also held the international monopoly over the production of currant raisins.

The absolute advantage of Greece in the production of currants contrasted sharply with its comparative disadvantage in most other branches of agricultural production. Cereal cultivation, in particular, suffered from low levels of rainfall, lack of fodder, of animal power and manure.[6] Increasing specialization of Greek agriculture in currant viticulture may thus be considered to have been a reasonable response to the opportunities offered by its integration with the international market, since the revenue from currant exports allowed Greek society to import increasing quantities of cereals, the production of which would have probably been a waste of resources.

In anticipation of one of the main conclusions of the present thesis, it can on the contrary be argued that it was not currant production in itself which limited the prospects of national development, but that it was rather the socio-economic structures of the Greek society, and in particular the predominance of merchant capitalism, which reduced the

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[6] In the early 19th century "*les paysans opprimés ne font aucun usage des engrais, si ce n' est que pour fertiliser la vigne de Corinthe, qui est l' arbuste par excellence du pays*" (Pouqueville [1827], p.248-249).

benefits that might have accrued from currant expansion.

A. Growth of production, establishment of migrants in the plains and specialization in currant viticulture.

a. Growth of currant production, 1830-1893.

Currant production in the Peloponnese multiplied 64 times in the course of 63 years. In 1830, date of creation of the Greek state, it amounted to 5,161 thousands of Venetian litres.[7] By 1893, when the long golden era of currant trade,

graph I.1. Total production of the Peloponnese, 1830-1893.



[7] 1,000 Venetian litres are equal to 478 kg.

lasting more than 60 years, was brought to an end by a severe and protracted overproduction crisis, it had already reached 334,000 thousand litres.[8]

From 1830 to 1839, currant production developed, at a mean annual rate of 5.89%. Part of this increase was doubtlessly to the gradual reconstruction of the vineyards destroyed during the War of the Independence, which had left intact only the vineyards of the province of Aigion. But by 1842, all pre-revolutionary records of currant production were surpassed and between 1839 and 1851, the average rate of increase reached 15.17%.

In 1852 and for five years afterwards the crop was almost completely destroyed by the "*oidium tuckeri*" disease, from which it started to recover in 1856, thanks to the application of sulphur. Four years later, in 1860, production again reached and surpassed its pre-1852 levels. From 1860 until 1893, it continued to increase at an average annual rate of 4.5%.[9]

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[8]Currant crops have always been the object of detailed observation and meticulous recording: accurate information on the volume of the crop was precious to Greek and foreign merchants employing their capital in the currant trade. Sales and purchases were regulated on the basis of the quantity of fruit available for export and prices were heavily influenced by crop variations. The most accurate series of total currant production of the Peloponnese are those presented by Pizanias [1988], table 1, pp.128-131, reproduced in appendix II, p.315, below. Cross-checking of this data with information supplied by the annual British consular reports from Patras for the period 1857-1916, a source not used by Pizanias, confirmed the validity of the latter series, with variations of less than ±1%.

[9]Only currant seasons yielding abundant crops are considered relevant for the estimation of the pace of currant expansion. In fact, currant planting represents a permanent investment; once performed, it requires fixed yearly amounts of land,

(continued...)

TABLE I.1. Distribution of currant production of the Peloponnese (main currant producing regions).

Region	Production (10^6 Ven.lts.)			share of total production of the Peloponnese		
	1860	1878	1888	1860	1878	1888
North[a]	37.05	49.37	73	50.15%	29.74%	23.62%
West[b]	31.4	89.37	156	42.5%	53.84%	50.49%
South[c]	5.43	27.24	80	7.35%	16.41%	25.89%
TOTAL	73.88	165.98	309	100%	100%	100%

a.Patras, Aigialeia, Corinth.
b.Ilia, Trifilia.
c.Pilia, Messinia, Calamata.

Sources: see appendix IV, p.317, below.

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[c](...continued)
labour and capital input. Crop reductions used to be the outcome of unfavourable weather or disease, factors that might heavily influence yields but did not diminish the volume of necessary inputs and expenses. On the other hand, we know that currant cultivation expanded continuously during the entire period 1830-1893 and that only following the onset of the severe overproduction crisis of the late 19th century in 1893 was there any decrease of the total surface of vineyards. It would therefore be misleading to include bad harvests in our calculations concerning the productive effort involved in currant expansion - e.g. by using the method of moving averages. In effect, calculations were based on the following 28 annual crops, chosen out of a total of 64 currant seasons of the period 1830-1893: 1830, 1835, 1839, 1840, 1842, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851, 1860, 1863, 1866, 1867, 1871, 1876, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1889, 1891, 1893. The criterion for their selection has been simply that they exceeded the crop of any previous year. Considering single currant seasons, this method may represent an underestimation: crop increases used to be the combined effect of (a)favourable weather conditions and (b)extended planting in the previous twelve years (i.e. the time required for the currant plant to reach its *maximum* productivity). The fact that a given crop exceeded that of any previous year did not necessarily imply that it represented the full output of the vineyards that had already reached maturity. However, distortion becomes insignificant when considering series extending over several years.

b. The geography of currant expansion.

During the first decades of the 19th century, vineyard acreage increased mainly in the old currant producing provinces of the northern Peloponnese, Patras, Aigialeia and Corinth.[10] In those regions, producing the most sought after and expensive quality of currants, almost every inch of land suitable to currant cultivation was destined to surrender, sooner or later, to the profitable monoculture. In the territory of the municipality of Patras currant vineyards rose from 400 hectares in 1833 (5,12% of cultivated land), to 3,179 ha in 1861 (43,12% of cultivated land).[11]

By the late 1840s, the spread of currant vineyards started to shift westward. Helped by the introduction of the *ring-cutting* technique, which increased productivity per unit area and rendered feasible the planting of currant vines in rich and humid soils, currant cultivation expanded at quick rates in the large and fertile plains of Ilia and Trifilia.[12] In the

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[10]According to Hairetis [1883] (p.388), before the revolution of 1821, the currant-vine was cultivated only in the provinces of Patras, Aigion and Corinth. Xavier Scrofani Sicilien, speaking about the currant crop of 1794, mentions only the provinces of Patras, Aigion (Aigion, Diakopto, Akrata), Corinth (Corinth, Xilokastron), and as a minor centre Glarentza, in the peninsula of Chlemoutsi (quoted by Lamprinidis [1905]).

[11]See Bakounakis [1988], table 5, p.137.

[12]According to Hairetis, (*I kalliergeia tis stafidampelou ...*, p.99) "*ring-cutting was introduced in the Peloponnese from the island of Zante in 1848. At the beginning it was secretly applied only by some workers coming from this island. But neighbouring growers did not delay in discovering the secret of success, which spread quickly and was imitated by most farmers in all currant producing provinces. Thus, land until then considered totally unfit to currant*

(continued...)

western Peloponnese, the rhythm of planting was particularly rapid in the 1850s, when the *oidium* disease attacked the vineyards and pushed currant prices to exorbitant levels, leaving relatively intact the crop of Ilia.[13] In 1860, 49.85% of the fruit produced in the main currant growing regions of the Peloponnese was grown in provinces where the currant vine had been almost unknown prior to 1840. In 1878, Ilia and Trifilia alone produced 53.84% of the total currant crop of northern, western and southern provinces of the Peloponnese (see table I.1).

The main impulse of the delayed but spectacular currant expansion in southern Peloponnese was due to the demand from French wine producers, after the destruction of French vineyards by the *phylloxera* disease; the French market, which opened to Greek currants from 1879 to 1892, showed a marked

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[12](...continued)
cultivation, because of its very fertility, was without delay planted with currant vines, virtually as soon as ring-cutting was introduced. The neighbouring Ilia is an unfeigned witness. Before the adoption of the new technique, currant growing in that province was unthinkable and its fertile plains produced cereals in abundance. After the application of ring-cutting, all those plains were covered with currant vines; nowadays, in quantitative terms, Ilia has become the capital of currant production". This version of the introduction of ring-cutting cannot of course be adopted without reservation. It should also be mentioned that a book entitled "*On the ring-cutting of plants and of the currant vine in particular*" was published in Nauplion in the late 1840s. Unfortunately, I did not manage to discover any copy of it in any of the main libraries of Athens. On further details concerning the *ring-cutting technique*, see p.213, chapter V, below.

[13]The attacks of the oidium disease were less severe in the vineyards planted on heavy and wet soils such as those in the western Peloponnese, which were also the first to recover after the application of sulphur. In the meantime, producers of the western Peloponnese were able to make good profits from the high prices prevalent due to the deficiency of supply. For figures of regional production in 1855, see appendix IV, p.317.

preference for the fruit of the southern provinces, because although of low quality, it was cheap and fitted industrial purposes perfectly. Thus, even with a considerable time lag, after 1879 southern Peloponnese followed closely the example of the northern and western provinces of the peninsula. In the 1880s, the most rapid currant expansion occurred in Pilia, Kalamata and Messinia; as noted in table I.1, their share in total currant production of northern, western and southern provinces of the Peloponnese passed from 16.41% in 1878 to 25.89% in 1888.

c. Evolution of productivity and acreage of currant vineyards.

Currant cultivation varied with locality, according to the nature of the soil, irrigation and rainfall, fruit quality and price quotations on the market. It also changed over time following the adoption of innovations. The most important technical development throughout the 19th century was the above mentioned technique of *ring-cutting*, introduced in the late 1840s.

Notwithstanding regional and temporal variation, the main technological features of currant agriculture remained, however, unaltered across the centuries: the long time -

usually not less than seven years[14]- that elapsed between planting and full fruiting of the vine; the attentive care required all the year round, which almost approached real gardening; the persistently manual character of the most labour intensive operations, hoeing and harvesting, concentrated in limited periods of the year, early spring and August respectively.

After the adoption of *ring-cutting* - which brought about a "once and for all" increase of yields - any further increase of production involved further spread of currant vineyards. It is true that the growing participation of the western and southern provinces tended to raise the ratio of total production to aggregate vineyard acreage of the Peloponnese, since vineyards planted in those fertile plains, although the gave lower quality fruit, were much more productive than those of the ancient currant growing regions of the northern Peloponnese.[15] But average yields do not seem to have considerably improved over time. Most probably, this

[14]According to Asdrachas [1982], p.169, in the dry island of Zante, the currant-vine needed no less than fourteen years until coming to its full bearing. The information dates from late 18th century.

[15]There was an inverse relation between currant vine productivity and fruit quality, caused by the influence of the humidity of the soil. Dry and light soils of northern Peloponnese produced less but sweeter fruit; the more one moved to the south, the more abundant but poorer in saccharine was the fruit of the currant vine. Seven thousand Venetian litres per hectare in Ilia against five hundred in Patras was the estimate offered by the *Journal of Greek Agriculture*, (n.2, November 1855, p.77). In 1903, the estimate of A. Th. Nomikos was also 5,000 litres per ha for Patras and 1,000 or more for Trifilia and Calamata - which is a rather exaggerated figure (A.Th. Nomikos, *A proposal for the solution of the currant question*, Athens 1903, unpublished report, HANBG, "currant", file 6). See also Hairetis [1883], p.10, Agriantoni [1986], p.278,367; BRCREP 1879.

effect was strongly counteracted by the diminishing productivity of earlier vineyards which started to grow old.[16]

Estimates of currant vineyard acreage are available for 1860, (15,306 ha), for 1871 (22,848 ha) for 1875 (29,138 ha), for 1881 (41,206 ha) and for 1888 (53,000 ha).[17] By a fortunate coincidence, the harvests of 1860, 1871, 1881 and 1888, happened also to be good, and therefore representative of the productive capacity of vineyards, which raised to 5,155 litres per ha in 1860, to 5,873 in 1871, to 5,409 in 1881 and to 5,381 in 1888. Presumably, after 1860, average vineyard productivity varied only slightly over time - since part of the variation presented by the above figures might be put down to different climatic conditions. Thus, in 1860-1888, aggregate currant production and total planted surface

[16]See n.13, p.172, chapter IV, below.

[17]Unlike the very satisfactory state of currant production series, a legacy owed to the specific historical reasons discussed in n.8 above, statistics on the extension of currant vineyards are rare and present serious inconsistencies. 19th century observers usually calculated vineyard surface on the basis of output, assuming an unchanged average productivity. Although studies on the technological conditions of currant cultivation and accounts of production of individual vineyards tend to confirm this assumption, only estimates which have been the result of direct surface calculations are of any use to our purposes here. The older one is was the one supplied by the "agricultural census" of 1860 (Spiliotakis [1864]). Those of 1870 and 1875 are reported by the head of the greek statistical services Mansolas (Mansolas [1876], Apografikai..., p.18) who obtained the information from a "*detailed inquiry undertaken with the assistance of the municipal authorities and under the control of the public finance authorities*"(ibidem, p.4). The estimate for 1870 is indirectly deduced by the information that the figure for 1875 includes 6,290 ha planted in the previous 5 years. For 1881, see Théry [1905] pp.116-118. For 1888, see Pizanias [1988], table 1.1, p.31. The last two figures refer to the total currant vineyard surface of Greece, including that of the Ionian Islands. For the purposes of the present study, they have been corrected so as to include only the Peloponnesian vineyards. Corrections were based on figures for 1860 and 1875, which include separate data for Peloponnesian and Ionian currant acreage, as well as on the information about the evolution of Ionian currant production.

increased at practically the same pace: the volume of the crop rose by 4.70% yearly, while vineyards expanded at an average annual rate of 4.54%.

d. Participation of currant exports in Greek foreign trade and agricultural production.

In spite its rapid increase, vineyard acreage is only an indirect index of the revolutionary impact of currant growth on the Peloponnesian economy. Currant cultivation represented an intensive use of the land, its most typical aspect being the considerable amount of labour invested per unit area, both for planting and cultivating the vines. It is characteristic in this respect that vineyards were valued at least seven and a half times the price of the land on which they were planted.[18]

Although covering a relatively modest part of total cultivated land, the output of currant viticulture represented a very important share not only of Peloponnesian agricultural production and exports, but also of total production and exports of the entire kingdom. As early as in

[18]Land prices in the coastal plains of the Peloponnese moved between 400 and 1000 drachmas per ha, according to locality and endowment with irrigation facilities (see National Land Cession Registers and the Official Gadget of the Greek Government *F.E.K.*). The respective figures for an hectare planted with currant vines was 3,000 to 12,000 drachmas (see BRCREP 1859 and chapter IV, p.185, below).

1860, currants represented 12.3% of the estimated value of the total agricultural production of Greece (marketed and non-marketed), though at the same time currant vineyards covered only 2.06% of cultivated land.[19]

Currant exports alone represented no less than 54% of total exports of the kingdom in the period 1851-1892,[20] being for Greece by far the most important article of international trade.[21] In 1865, they represented 43.3% of total Greek exports, reaching the record level of 79.4% in 1877. Even in the period 1881-1892 - not strictly comparable with that of 1865-1880 because from 1881 total Greek exports included the exports of the new provinces Thessaly and Arta - currant exports never dropped below 50% of total Greek exports, often reaching levels as high as 70%.[22]

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[19]See Pizanias [1988], table III, p.134 and Spiliotakis [1864]. According to calculations of Petmezas [1985], based on Spiliotakis [1864] and Kostis [1987], total cultivated land of the Peloponnese (including fallow land) was 419,500 ha in 1860 and 459,100 in 1911.

[20]See appendix V, p.319, below.

[21]It would not by any means be an overstatement to say that currant production and currant exports were practically synonymous terms throughout the 19th century (see appendix III, p.316 below). As long as markets could be found, not a single sound grain of currant fruit ever escaped export, even when the crop was sold at prices barely covering cultivation expenses. Until 1893, any discrepancy between the volume of currant production and exports is to be attributed either to the part of the crop remaining for export in the following season, or to the part of the crop included in the production statistics but finally discovered to be totally unsaleable and useful only for local distillation purposes. Currant exports developed at the same impressive pace as currant production, and passed from 111,340 Venetian litres in 1865 to 378,095 litres in 1891. The above figures refer to the entire currant production of Greece, because currant exports were recorded only at the national level; it is therefore impossible to treat Peloponnesian currants separately from Ionian ones.

[22]See Pizanias [1988], table III, pp.134-135.

Lack of data does not permit an assessment of the proportion of currant exports to total agricultural production and to the total exports of the Peloponnese. Bakounakis, basing his calculations on data supplied by the French consular correspondence, estimates that in the period 1833-1859, currant exports represented 78% of total Peloponnesian exports.[23] Most probably, after 1860, this share was still greater.

e. Currant expansion and agricultural colonization.

As noted above, an even more important and long-lasting impact of the ascendancy of currant monoculture on the fortunes of the peninsula was the vigorous trend of in-migration and permanent settlement of peasant families in the currant producing regions. The provinces of Achaia and Ilia, deserted and lacking any form of agriculture when W.M. Leake visited them in the early 19th century,[24] gradually became the broadest area of dense population in the Peloponnese. As stated by the *Geographical Handbook* of the British Naval Intelligence Division, "*the growth of population on these maritime plains has been phenomenal, increasing by over 300%*

[23]Bakounakis [1988], table 13, p.157.

[24]W.M. Leake [1830] (p.11-12).

from 1838 to 1938. This has been due almost entirely to the development of the currant trade".[25]

Between 1861 and 1888, the population of the coastal lowlands of Northern, Western and Southern Peloponnese[26] increased at an average yearly rate of 1.87%, against 0.9% that was the corresponding figure for the rest of the Peloponnese.[27] Between 1861 and 1896, no single province of the Peloponnese increased its population at a rate even equal to that of the provinces involved in currant production. These latter presented growth rates ranging between 1.97% (for Ilia) and 1.51% (Messini), when the eastern (non currant-producing) lowland provinces varied between 1.45% (Limira Epidauros) and 0.53% (Nauplia), and the highland and insular provinces between 1.29% (Mantineia) and 0.03% (Troizin). The only currant growing province which presented a relatively low annual rate of population growth in 1861-

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[25]See Naval Intelligence Division [1945], vol.3, p.17. This process of internal colonization, the origins of which can be traced back to the 18th century and was already important by the end of it, continued well into the 20th century. According to Baxevanis [1972], p.28, in 1900 70% of the population of the Peloponnese still resided in areas above 1000 feet elevation; in 1961, 61% lived below 600 feet. By the mid-twentieth century, geographers could refer to the Peloponnese as an empty shell, its population scattered around the coast and its interior mountains empty (Kayser and Thompson [1964], p.203).

[26]Constituting the set of regions previously defined for the estimation of the degree of peasant specialisation in currant viticulture (see n.b, table I.2).

[27]The average natural rate of population growth during the 19th century was estimated by the demographer Valaoras [1960], p.128, at 1.5%. As suggested in note 29, reliable and detailed estimations of natality and mortality in 19th century Greece are totally lacking. This figure is used here as a rough indication, not taking into account regional or more detailed temporal variations.

1896 was Olimpia (1.23%).[28]

As indicated by 19th-century statistics of natural movement of population, the higher rate of population growth in currant growing provinces was by no means due to higher natality or lower mortality than in other regions of the peninsula;[29] the difference between the two sets of figures indicates rather the continuous resettlement of families from the arid and overpopulated highlands of the Peloponnese to the previously desert and marshy northern, western and southern coastal plains.[30]

A concrete instance of the process of colonization connected with the expansion of currant viticulture is provided by the fact that many of the peasants appearing as currant growers, share-croppers or planters of currant vineyards in a substantial sample of contracts dating from 1877-1882, in the small town of Amalias,[31] were recorded as natives of the Ionian Islands (Zante and Cephalonia) or of mountainous provinces of the Peloponnese (Mantineia, Gortinia, Calavrita). This fact clearly indicates that these

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[28]See table I.4, below.

[29]These statistics are avowedly defective because they register only a part of the births and deaths which actually occurred. However, there is no reason to believe that any systematic difference in the perfection of registration existed in different provinces. Based on this reasonable assumption, S. Petmezas proceeded to the elaboration of in-migration trends, generally confirming the pattern proposed here (see S. Petmezas [1990], table 3.5, p.100).

[30]See also M. Stammatoyannopoulou [1985].

[31]See below, chapters IV, V and VI.

people had only very recently settled in the region, expressly in order to seek occupation in the currant sector.[32]

f. The monocultural character of currant cultivation.

According to model estimates presented in table I.2, the proportion of total population (urban dwellers included) of the coastal lowlands of northern, western and southern Peloponnese required to produce the currant crop was 15.95% in 1860, 24.61% in 1878 and 37.18% in 1888.[33]

Taken as such, these figures constitute the minimum starting-point for the calculation of the degree of specialisation of peasant population in the currant producing regions. Many coastal lowland villages included in the calculations were not actually producing any currants at all, but the lack of a list of the currant-producing villages has

[32]See eg. cn.2185-1/9/1877 (Zante), cn.xxxx-11/9/1877 (Cephalonia), cn.2216-4/9/1877 (Kalavrita), cn.2374-9/10/1877 (Gortinia), cn.2423-17/10/1877 (Mantineia), cn.2585-13/11/1877 (Cephalonia), cn.2790-2/1/1878 (Cephalonia), cn.2837-20/1/1878 (Gortinia), cn.4528-3/7/1879 (Cephalonia), cn.4598-12/8/1879 (Kalavrita), cn.4633-22/8/1879 (Kalavrita), cn.4638-27/8/1879 (Gortinia), cn.4648-30/8/1879 (Gortinia), cn.8769-5/8/1882 (Kalavrita), cn.8843-23/8/1882 (Zante), cn.8873-26/8/1882 (Zante).

[33]Needless to say, these estimates do not have pretensions of precision. They are rather intended to supply an indication of the order of magnitude of the monocultural character assumed by currant viticulture in the 19th century Peloponnese.

Table I.2. Estimated proportion of the population needed to produce the currant crop: coastal lowlands of northern, western and southern Peloponnese.

(1)	year	1860-61	1878-79	1888-89
(2)	production (Ven. lts)[a]	73,800,000	165,980,000	309,000,000
(3)	population[b]	209,413	291,008	360,426
(4)	productivity[c] (litres per ha)	5,155	5,409[e]	5,381
(5)	maximum per capita production: (4)*15/3.5[d]	2,209	2,318	2,306
(6)	population needed (2)/(4)	33,409	71,605	133,998
(7)	as a proportion (6)/(3)%	15.95%	24.61%	37.18%

a.See table I.1, above.
b.As "coastal lowlands of the Peloponnese" were considered the following administrative divisions: from the province of Corinth, the demos Eurostinis, Trikalon, Sikionos, Korintion, Perahoras; from the province of Patras, the demos Patreon, Dimis, Erineou; the entire province of Aigialeia; the entire province of Ilia, except for the demos of Lampeia; the entire province of Messini; the entire province of Kalamata except for the demos Alagonias; the entire province of Pilia; the entire province of Tifilia; the entire province of Olimpia, except for the demos of Andritsaina (see Houliarakis [1974], censuses of 1861, 1879 and 1889).
c.See above, p.27.
d.According to model estimates, a peasant family with two adult members could farm up to 3 ha of currant vineyard (see below chapter V, p.235); the maximum output of each grower was therefore equal to the produce of 1.5 ha of vineyard. According to the censuses of the 19th century, males between 15 and 64 years old, defined here as forming the active male population, represented one out of every 3.5 Greeks (see Valaoras [1960] p.128). Thus, in order to arrive at an approximate estimate of the maximum average per capita currant output, the produce of 1.5 ha must be divided by 3.5.
e.Data of 1881.

unfortunately made it necessary to employ higher levels of aggregation.

Furthermore, obviously not all of the population was peasants, given the considerable degree of urbanisation, partly due to the flourishing currant commerce: six out of

the eight Peloponnesian towns counting over 5,000 inhabitants in the census of 1879, were centres of currant trade (Patras, Pirgos, Kalamata, Aigio, Messini and Filiatra).

It is also more reasonable to assume that not all currant producers were fully employed in currant cultivation, and that many peasant families, instead of farming the maximum possible acreage of vineyards, calculated at 3 ha for a family with two male adult members, were farming 1.5 or 2.0 ha, spending the rest of their time in other crops or occupations. Consequently, currant growers were still more numerous than it is assumed in table I.2.

In the light of these observations, it is clear that currant viticulture assumed progressively a monocultural character, and became the main occupation of a very large part of the Peloponnesian peasantry.[34]

[34]This conclusion runs counter to the assumption of recent Greek historiography that peasant families sought subsistence through differentiation of activities (cfr. above, p.3 of the introduction). For a more detailed discussion, see chapter VI, below.

B. Currant specialisation, cereal production and peasant consumption.

All 19th-century observers agree and lament that increasing specialisation of the limited resources of Peloponnesian agriculture into currant production led to a neglect of the other staple crops of the peninsula. Among these, cereal production, the traditional hard core of peasant agriculture and the basis of the everyday subsistence of the population, appears to have perceptibly decreased, especially in terms of per capita yields. The resulting deficit was covered with increasing imports of Black Sea and Danubian wheat, which absorbed considerable part of the earnings from currant exports.[35]

However true these observations may be, it should be noted that the pessimistic tone of contemporary commentators is not entirely justified. Any shift of resources from cereal to currant cultivation increased the productivity of agriculture, since, under the natural and social conditions prevalent in the Greek countryside, currants were produced much more competitively than grain. Peasant specialisation in currant growing at the expense of cereal production is a

[35]See eg. BRCREP 1866: "*Specie is very rare at Patras ... except at the shipping season for currants ... The gold finds its way eastward where it is wanted to send to Turkey and the Black Sea to purchase produce.*"

typical case of advancing division of labour combined with the development of commercialisation of both production and consumption.

Furthermore, increasing cereal imports were due not only to the decrease of per capita cereal output, but also to the improvement in the living conditions of the peasantry. Specialisation of peasant families in currant viticulture increased the productivity of their labour and their income, permitting them to eat more bread. Not that peasants baked much of the imported cereals; but now they were left free to consume a greater part of the grain they kept producing, since they could pay their debts and taxes with the monetary income from the currant cultivation. Thus, it was to a great extent the cities, who had previously covered their needs from the tributes of the peasantry, who were now obliged to import more grain for their consumption.[36]

[36]D. K. Psihogios [1987], p.81 and graph I.6.1, detects an inverse association between level of taxation of grain production and grain imports; although this accounted only for a small part of the rapid increase of imports, it indicates that the peasantry did not market the part of its grain production not delivered to tax collectors, but preferred to use it for its own consumption.

a. Evolution of total Greek cereal production, imports and consumption.

The reported decrease in the trend of per capita cereal production of the currant-growing provinces cannot be verified by statistical elaborations based on regional figures alone. The only 19th century figures at provincial level are those offered by the agricultural census of 1860[37] and no other regional figures are available until 1911. But in the last years of the 19th century, cereal cultivation is reported to have increased considerably, in order to counterbalance the loss of revenue caused by the long currant-crisis which started in 1893.[38] It is therefore not possible to assess correctly the decline of cereal production during the "classical era" of currant trade (1830-1893) by using data of 1911.

On the other hand, several published estimates of national

[37]See Spiliotakis [1864].

[38]The British consul at Patras reported in 1903 that although in former times two thirds of bread-stuffs were usually imported, during the preceding few years the import had greatly diminished; in 1903 it was estimated that only one third of required cereals would need to be imported, due to the reclamation of fallow and waste lands. As he stated, on the basis of his own observations, "*thousands of acres of land, marsh and forest in the plain of Acheloos, in the district of Missolonghi, Lepanto and Elis, which, being unsuitable for the currant plant, had been allowed to lie fallow for generations, forming the favourite resort of innumerable woodcock, snipe and wild fowl,have now been reclaimed, drained and put under cereal, tobacco and other crops by the peasantry*" (BRCREP 1903).

Table I.3. Total and per capita cereal production, imports and consumption of Greece.[a]

	year	1854	1858	1860	1873	1875	1887	1900-1901
				(1000 koila)				
(1)	production	8,247	8,420	9,513	9,935	11,624	14,091	18,182
(2)	imports	891	690	1,410	3,083	3,773	6,897	6,349
(3)	consumption	9,138	9,110	10,923	13,018	15,397	20,988	24,531
(4)	population (* 1000)	1,044	1,076	1,090	1,528	1,577	1,817	2,117
				(koila[b] per capita)				
(5)	(1)/(4)	7.90	7.82	8.73	6.50	7.40	7.75	8.60
(6)	(2)/(4)	0.85	0.64	1.29	2.00	2.40	3.80	3.00
(7)	(3)/(4)	8.75	8.46	10.02	8.50	9.80	11.55	11.60

Sources: For cereal production and import figures: Agriantoni [1986] p.362; Sinarelli [1984] p.368; Psihogios [1987] pp.28-41. Population figures of the respective years are projections based on the censuses of population of 1853, 1856, 1861, 1870, 1879, 1889, 1896, 1907.

a.Figures on cereal consumption are the sum of locally produced and imported cereals. For the years 1854, 1858 and 1860, exports of cereals to the Ionian Islands are subtracted from the figures. We do not have any information on significant cereal exports from Greece after 1864, date of the annexation of the Ionian Islands, which were deficitary in cereals; consequently, we may presume that both Greek and imported grains were consumed locally.
Production and population of the provinces of Thessaly and Arta, annexed to Greece in 1881, are subtracted from the respective figures for 1887 and 1900-01. Figures of Thessalian cereal production are taken from Agriantoni [1986] p.286. All figures therefore refer to the pre-1881 Greek frontiers.
Figures for 1887 and 1900-01 probably slightly underestimate consumption because they do not include the quantities of Thessalian cereals exported to Greece. After 1881, the latter was no longer recorded under the heading of imports of the Greek Kingdom, simply because Thessaly became a part of it.

b.One koilo was equal to approximately 28.17 kg.

cereal production exist for the period 1854-1887, and even if they do not form any particularly continuous and reliable set of statistics, they do offer a general idea of the evolution of national cereal production. It is therefore more

convenient to put the available fragmentary and indirect data on cereal production of the currant producing regions against the general framework offered by aggregate national data.

Table I.3 presents all the information which is available on total national and per capita cereal production. Changes in per capita figures of production during the period 1854-1887 (line 5) look

rather insignificant and might have been the result of conjunctural variations of yields. However, it seems that in reality the trend was slightly towards a decrease: we know, for example, that the crop of 1860 (9,513,000 koila,giving 8.73 koila per inhabitant) was considered rather unsatisfactory by contemporary standards, though fifteen years later, the good crop of 1875 could not supply more than 7.4 koila per inhabitant.[39] Presumably, either productivity fell dramatically between 1860 and 1875, or, more probably, sowed surface decreased considerably relative to the population. On the other hand, a net improvement seems to have occurred at the end of the century, and per capita yields in 1900-1901, for example, reached 8.6 koila.

Notwithstanding the relative decrease in per capita cereal production observed between 1854 and 1875, the per capita quantity of cereals available for consumption (line 7) did

[39]Cfr. Psihogios [1987] p.36.

not diminish, thanks to increasing imports from the Black Sea ports of Russia and the Danube.[40] Moreover, after 1873, consumption figures tended to increase and in 1887 and 1900-1901 they appear decisively higher: without doubt, this tendency indicates that a sensible improvement in the living conditions of the population took place over time.[41]

b. Decline of cereal production and rising Peloponnesian imports.

The slight decrease in the average national figures of per capita cereal production conceals more important regional differentiations.[42] As early as in the 1830s, the province of Patras, in large part covered by currant vineyards, was obliged to have recourse to the surpluses of Ilia and Aetolia in order to cover its needs in grain; but the port of Patras could still export some quantities of cereals produced in these latter provinces. In 1834 the value of these exports amounted to 226,081 drachmas. The detailed table of commerce

[40]D.K. Psihogios *op.cit*, omits altogether the imports from his calculations of the quantity available for local consumption and therefore concludes that falling per capita yields led to decreasing consumption.

[41]A similar trend towards improving living conditions was detected by Christina Agriantoni in the increasing share of wheat consumption in relation to other, lower qualities of cereals. She estimated that per capita wheat consumption increased from 3 koila per capita in 1851/1853 to 4,2 koila in 1875 (see Agriantoni [1986]).

[42]*ibidem*, p.133.

of that port for 1838 did not yet include cereals among the imported articles and in 1841 there were still some exports of wheat, although amounting to only 12,500 drachmas. But by the late 1840s, cereals had already become an ordinary object of importation.

In 1853-1854, cereal imports to Patras still represented minor values and quantities: the average value for those two years amounted to 22,000 drachmas. And in 1859 the British consul could still report that "*the quantity of the grain produced on the western side of the Morea is rather more than is required for its consumption ... In 1858 about 20,000 quarters were exported to the Ionian Islands*".[43] However, in that same year 1859, Alexander Koumoundouros, minister of finance, reported that wheat production of the Peloponnese had decreased considerably in comparison to 1848.[44] By 1861-

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[43]See BRCREP 1859. Grain imports constituted an important element for the nutritive balance of the Ionian population, the first to devote their productive efforts entirely to currant monoculture. Local British authorities reported in 1850 that facilities were afforded "*to those labourers from the Southern Islands who emigrate to the Morea and Candia during the harvest, and return at its close, bringing with them considerable quantities of grain.*"(BRCREP Ionian Islands 1850). In 1864, the British consul at Cephalonia stated that "*the grain raised in the island is of the most ordinary description, and does not, one year with another, yield more than a five months' supply to the rural population, among whom it is most chiefly consumed; but the supply is eked out in the case of the labouring classes, who migrate in thousands to the opposite continent of Greece during the spring and autumn in search of employment, and bring back the fruit of their earnings in the shape of grain, of which each labourer is allowed to introduce twenty kilos duty free.*" (BRCREP Cephalonia 1864). Similar information is supplied by the British consul at Zante in his account for 1865: "*The grain grown in the island is good, and suffices for about three months, being principally consumed by the rural population. But the labouring classes usually subsist for two months more on the corn which they receive in the Morea in exchange for their labour during spring and autumn ...*"(BRCREP Zante 1865).

[44]See A. Koumoundouros, *Suppression de l'échelle mobile en Grèce*, 1859, p.18, referred by Agriantoni [1986], p.133.

1862, cereal imports to Patras amounted to 324,000 francs, 10 times the respective figure of 1853-1854.[45]

From 1866, the increase of cereal imports to Patras became impressive. According to the calculations of Ch. Agriantoni,[46] there was a further multiplication by 10 until 1879-1880 (3.3 million drachmas on the average), and the yearly rate of increase amounted to 8.8% from 1866/68 to 1888/90 (in triennial averages), reaching 15% for the shorter period of 1866/68 to 1874/76. These rates were much higher than the respective national figures, which amounted to 3.6% yearly from 1866/68 to 1888/90 in value and 3.4% in volume.

As noted above, increasing cereal imports to Patras were necessary in order to cater for increasing per capita consumption and to counterbalance the decline of local production, which accelerated in the last few years of the "classical era" of currant expansion, when specialisation in currant monoculture reached its maximum level. In 1892, consul Wood wrote that "*cereals produced in the Morea only suffice for 2 months or 3 months' consumption. The remaining requirements are principally imported from Russia, the Danube, and elsewhere, which is a great drain on the*

[45]This and the immediately preceding paragraphs are heavily indebted to Bakounakis [1988] p.138 and Agriantoni [1986] pp.131-134. Both authors draw their information from the French consular correspondence.

[46]Agriantoni [1986] p.134.

resources of the country." According to the consul, it was much to be desired that "*greater thought and attention be directed towards the growing of cereals in this district; but ... the peasantry have devoted all their energies to the growing of currants, and all other branches of industry and husbandry are neglected.*"[47] And again, in 1894: "*although most kinds of cereals are grown in the Morea, the quantity does not nearly suffice for local consumption, and about 2/3 of the required supply are imported from the Russian and Danubian Black Sea ports.*"[48] And in 1895: "*The inhabitants of the Morea instead of growing cereals for their own consumption ... import very large quantities of wheat from Russia and Turkey, and maize, barley and oats from other parts of Greece.*" Had they not given themselves entirely to currant growing, the consul stated, the inhabitants of the Peloponnese would have easily ensured grain sufficiency.[49] But, as suggested above, one may seriously doubt whether the consul's views were more correct than those of the Peloponnesian peasants, who had several strong reasons for dedicating their efforts to the expansion of the profitable monoculture.

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[47]BRCREP 1892.

[48]BRCREP 1894.

[49]BRCREP 1895.

c. Tax receipts as an index for regional variation of cereal production.

A further indication of the inverse relation between currant specialisation and evolution of cereal and other non-currant agricultural production is offered by the examination of the provincial land-tax receipts, a useful alternative indirect index for the evaluation of agricultural production when no direct estimates are available.

After the establishment of the Greek State and until 1880, Greek agricultural taxation was based on two direct taxes which were proportional to gross production, namely the land tax and the "right of usufruct of the National Estates". By contrast, currant production was subjected almost exclusively to a special duty imposed on its export.[50] Therefore, the receipts of direct taxation reflect the development of non-currant agricultural production alone.

Provincial receipts of direct agricultural taxation are

[50]This was as far as state taxation was concerned. There were other, municipal, duties on currants, but the respective receipts do not appear on the state accounts.

both available and comparable for the period 1856-1874.[51] Those of the currant growing provinces of Ilia and Aigialeia, of the non-currant growing Mantineia, Megalopolis, Lakedaimon, as well as those of Pilia - Pilia is considered here together with the non-currant growing provinces, since it was not yet specialized in currant production,[52] - are presented in graph I.2 and I.3. Graph I.2 represents the trend of total land-tax and "usufruct right" receipts and graph I.3 represents the trend of the respective per capita figures.[53]

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[51]Tax receipts, collectable, collected and due are reported separately for each provincial public treasury and each tax in the yearly official edition "Accounts of the Greek State". "Accounts" available for the period under discussion here are those of the years 1856, 1858, 1859, 1861, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1871, 1873 and 1874.

[52]In Pilia currant culture started to become really important only after 1878 (see appendix IV, p.317 below).

[53]All calculations are based on collectable tax receipts and not on those actually collected: it is irrelevant for our present purposes which part of receipts "due" was actually paid on time.
Figures are available for the years: 1856, 1858, 1859, 1861, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1874. Land-tax or "tithe" rates changed as follows: 10% up to 1860, 9% for 1861, 5% from 1862 to 1866, 8% from 1867 to 1875, 7% from 1876 until the abolition of the tithe by the prime-minister Trikoupis in 1880 (see Franghiadis [1986] p.31). The "right of usufruct" was a kind of rent on state-owned cultivated land (see chapter II, below) and represented 15% of gross production throughout the period. In order to render tax comparable receipts of different years and from different provinces, it has been assumed that the share of cultivated national land to total cultivated land in each province was as in the census of 1860 (Spiliotakis [1864]). Both land-tax and usufruct provincial receipts appear together in the State accounts under a single article. Thus, a different weighted relationship of tax receipts to total agricultural production had to be calculated for each province, according to different percentages of national to total cultivated land, and for each period according to its different "tithe" rate: e.g. for the period up to 1860, when the "tithe" represented 10% of gross product, it was assumed that in the province of Ilia, where national land amounted to about 2/3 of total cultivated land, tax receipts were *(2/3 * 0.15) + 0.10 = 0.20* (2/3*15% for the "right of usufruct" and 10% for the tithe); that is, overall tax receipts for Ilia, as they appear in the State budget for the years 1856, 1858 and 1859 are considered to be one fifth of gross agricultural product of the province. Calculations of this sort are no longer possible after the distribution of the national lands to private hands, as this led to the gradual disappearance of the usufruct tax. However, although the
(continued...)

graph I.2. Land-tax and usufruct rights



In terms of annual rates, the trend of agricultural fiscal receipts for 1856-1874 were as in table I.4. The currant growing provinces of Ilia and Aigialeia display tendencies that separate them clearly from Pilia and the three non-currant growing provinces. Land taxes in Ilia and Aigialeia yielded falling returns in 1856-1874, though in Pilia,

[53](...continued)
distribution procedure started in 1871, the usufruct right was normally paid until at least 1874; according to the law of 1871, the tenants should normally have continued to pay their rent to the State until they received the "cession" documents, or if there was a delay in their issue (which in effect started in 1878), until two years after the declaration (Art.8 and 17 of the law No 431 of 25/3/1871). The law changed at the end of 1875 and non-payment of usufruct tax became directly possible from 1876.

graph I.3. Per capita land-tax and usufruct rights



Mantineia, Megalopolis and Lakedaimon they continued to increase, at least until 1874. Per capita receipts were decreasing in all the provinces of our sample except in Pilia; but the negative trend is definitely stronger in the currant-producing Ilia and Aigialeia. It should be noted that, in terms of fertility and physical terrain, the plains of Ilia and Aigialeia had further resemblances to Pilia than to the highlands of Mantineia or Megalopolis. Had Ilia and Aigialeia not specialized in currant growing, they could have developed their cereal production as quickly as Pilia; and this reinforces the conclusion that currant growing was to a large extent supplanting cereal cultivation.

Table I.4. Trend of agricultural fiscal receipts, 1856-1874

currant growing provinces	total receipts	per capita
Ilia	-0.41%	-1.61%
Aigialeia	-0.25%	-1.43%
non-currant growing provinces		
Lakedaimon	0.66%	-0.60%
Megalopolis	1.36%	-0.60%
Mantineia	1.41%	-0.80%
Pilia	3.45%	2.06%

There is little need to add that the figures on which table I.4 and graphs I.2 and I.3 are based cannot lead to any reliable estimate of the real volume of agricultural output of the six provinces. A multitude of factors could influence fiscal receipts and alter their relation to the value of gross production: changing prices, transformations of the structure of cultures (other than the principal one consisting of increasing specialisation in currant growing), minor changes in the system of taxation. But the overall tendency indicated by these figures is beyond doubt: non-currant agricultural production of the currant growing provinces - and especially cereals, which yielded the bulk of the land and usufruct tax receipts - developed at a perceptibly lower rate than that of the other regions of the

Peloponnese and clearly lower than the rate of population increase.

d. Cereal cultivation and currant viticulture: incompatibility and complementarity.

The data discussed above leave no doubt about the declining trend of per capita cereal production which accompanied 19th century currant expansion. This conclusion is further confirmation that the peasantry became increasingly engaged in and devoted most of their efforts to the production of currants. Peasant families probably tried to farm as much area of currant vineyard as possible; the only limit to this effort was the capacity of the male adult members of the family to meet the labour demands of the main tasks of cultivation during the most busy periods, concentrated in the months from January to the end of August, with a relative pause in June and July. Hence, less time was left to cater for the growing of other crops, whose volume of production naturally tended to show a relative decrease.

The predominance of currant-growing over cerealiculture is particularly explicit with reference to maize. Maize grew well in the currant-growing western coastal plains of the

Peloponnese;[54] however, it could not be easily combined with currant cultivation, because ploughing and sowing of maize were performed in late January or February. This coincided with hoeing, which was, in relative terms, the most demanding task of currant cultivation in male adult labour.[55]

As a result, maize production in the currant producing regions diminished in the period 1860-1911 from 21.4 million okes to 20.5 million okes, although at the same time in the rest of the kingdom it increased from 33.5 to 52.6 million okes.[56] The decrease of per capita maize production in the currant producing provinces is even more remarkable, if one bears in mind their rapid demographic growth. In the case of the province of Patras, which pioneered currant expansion since a very early date, the French consul reported that as early as 1844 maize production had recorded a spectacular decline.[57]

The priority accorded to the currant did not, however, lead the rural population to abandon altogether cereal production, which was so precious to its daily consumption.

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[54]See Asdrachas [1984].

[55]For maize cultivation, see Psihogios D.K. [1987] p.39, Dinos Psihogios [1979] n.34, pp.1027-1031, Hariton [1889] p.39. For details on the task of currant cultivation which consists of "hoeing the ground into sods", see chapter V, below.

[56]Psihogios [1987] p.40. An oke was equal to 1.28 kgr.

[57]See Bakounakis [1988] p.138.

Peasants did not disregard occupations which could be successfully combined with currant growing. During the months left free by currant cultivation, that is from September to January and in high summer, prior to the preparations for the harvest in mid-July, currant growers employed themselves in the production of winter cereals, wheat, barley, oats, olives and wine grapes.

There are clear signs in the calendar of currant growing that, whenever it was possible, certain labours in the vineyards which coincided with the cultivation of winter cereals were put off to another period of the year, even at the cost of further encumbering the most busy periods of currant cultivation.[58] Moreover, currant farms often included arable fields, so as to allow growers to combine easily tasks of winter cereal cultivation with work in the vineyards. Arable land adjacent to the vineyard constituted, in addition, a useful reserve, readily available for planting currant vines as soon as the landowner found the means required for enlarging his farm.[59]

Thus, grain production did not decline in absolute terms, but only relative to population and to the general

[58]See chapter V, p.232 below.

[59]This observation arises from several contracts of vineyard farm transactions found in the Transactions Register of the Mortgage Hall in the small currant-growing town of Amalias.

development of agriculture. As late as 1893, when currant specialisation was at its apex, the British consul at Patras reported that "*the currant growers and peasantry in general ..., with few exceptions, possess plots of land in the plains and near their villages in the mountain districts, where they grow maize and wheat for their own wants*". It may be concluded that the peasantry always kept a door open to fall back on cereal production for home consumption; an attitude which proved very useful indeed, especially in cases of currant crisis.[60]

On the other hand, it must always be remembered that any agricultural activity continued and developed only within the margins left by the predominance of currant monoculture. Tasks of currant growing were the dominant feature of the agricultural calendar, and maximization of currant production became the main objective of the peasantry.[61] It is emblematic in this respect that in many regions, during the all-

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[60]Eg. BRCREP Pirgos 1884 reported that, due to the severe crisis which hit local currant production in 1883 and 1884, "*latterly more attention than was usual is being given to the cultivation of breadstuffs, the production of which is estimated to cover this year the requirements of nine months' consumption*". See also n.38, above.

[61]It is not possible to accept the objection that "*currant cultivation did never become a monoculture*", on the grounds that "*even at the moment of major development, currant-vines never did cover more than 25% of cultivated surface in any of the currant-growing provinces*" (D.K. Psihogios [1987] p.40). Not only because at the level of the municipality, a less extended unit than that of the province, respective percentages were much higher than 25% (for the concrete example of the municipality of Patras see p.23 above), but mainly because there is little sense in assessing in terms of surface the relative importance of a cultivation which makes such an intensive use of the land, especially when compared with crops that are extensively cultivated, such as cereals - see also p.28 above.

encompassing trend of the 1880s towards currant monoculture, which pushed specialisation of Peloponnesian agriculture to its utmost limits, when no more land suitable for currant cultivation was available, centuries-old olive trees were eradicated in order to cede their place to additional vineyards. The British consul at Patras Thomas Wood, in the annual account for the year 1892, related that "*the olive oil crop in the Morea is likely to show an annual decrease, as many fine olive groves are being ruthlessly cut down to make way for currant and grape vineyards, which the peasants find more remunerative*".[62] Three years later, in 1895, when the overproduction crisis had already started, Thomas' successor F.B.Wood, commented: "*It is strange that the Greek peasantry, usually so intelligent, should have been so short-sighted as to deprive themselves of an article which is of absolute necessity, and which, once done away with, cannot be replaced for many years.*"[63]

[62]See BRCREP 1892.

[63]See BRCREP 1895. On this point, see also Dertilis [1984].

e. Agricultural colonization, currant trade and cereal production.

The secondary position assigned to grain cultivation in comparison to the absolute priority granted to currant viticulture is also illustrated by the geography of migratory movements. As noted above, rates of population growth in the currant-growing regions, when compared with those in the rest of the Peloponnese, do not leave any doubt about the strong influence exercised by this profitable monoculture on migratory movements (rapid population growth being understood here as an index for in-migration).[64]

It may be added that, as shown by the figures presented in table I.5 and illustrated in graph I.4 and I.5, the development of cerealiculture, in contrast with currant cultivation, seems to have had little influence on the choices of the migrants.

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[64] See above p.33.

Table I.5. Per capita currant and cereal production in 1860 and population growth in 1861-1896.[a]

Province	per capita currant output (venetian litres)	per capita cereal output (okes)	population growth 1861-1896
Aigialeia	855	120	1.67
Patras	398	124	1.84
Ilis	286	157	1.97
Trifilia	286	180	1.91
Korinthos	212	220	1.57
Kalamata/Messinia	150	147	1.62
Olimpia	98	184	1.23
Pilia	82	215	1.82
Nauplia	76	126	0.53
Lakedaimon	8	198	0.97
Kalavrita	5	217	0.43
Ermionis/Spetses	5	36	0.75
Troizin/Idra	5	96	0.03
Gortis	3	175	0.81
Mantinia	0	282	1.29
Kinouria	0	84	1.10
Megalopolis	0	419	1.35
Epidauros Lim.	0	273	1.45
Argolis	0	223	0.83

Sources: Psihogios [1986], table 2, pp.192-193.

a.Per capita currant production and population growth presented in this table refer to the administrative boundaries of provinces and not to those municipalities in each province located in the plains, as is the case with those presented in table I.2; differences existing between the two sets of data are due to this, as well as to the fact that figures of currant production used in this table are those of Spiliotakis [1864], though in all other parts of the thesis we follow the figures presented by the British consular correspondence and by Pizanias [1988].

graph I.4. Population growth and per capita currant production (Peloponnese).



Provinces producing much grain (Mantinia, Megalopolis, Epidauros Limira, Argolis) were not among those presenting the highest rates of population growth, though leading currant growing provinces were.

Moreover, as illustrated in graph I.6, the level of development of grain cultivation does not seem to have influenced the distribution of migrants, not even within the eight currant growing regions of table I.5.

graph I.5. Population growth and per capita cereal production (Peloponnese).



Korinthia, Pilia, Trifilia and Olimpia, which present the four highest figures for per capita cereal production among the eight currant-growing provinces of the Peloponnese (Aigialeia, Patras, Korinthos, Ilia,Trifilia, Olimpia, Kalamata-Messinia, Pilia), are respectively the seventh, fourth, second and eighth province in order of rate of population growth. Presumably, production of foodstuffs did not influence the migrants in their choice of a new home, not

graph I.6. Population growth and per capita cereal production (currant growing provinces).



even as a secondary criterion.[65]

[65]Psihogios [1986] argues that grain exerted a stronger influence on the decisions of migrants than did currants. In order to prove his assumption, he claims that the correlation coefficient of rates of population growth of all the Greek provinces with the per capita cereal production in each of them ($r = 0.52$, $p < 0.001$) is stronger than that with the per capita currant production ($r = 0.40$, $p < 0.01$). But this conclusion is unfounded, since currant viticulture was restricted to a few provinces, and therefore per capita currant production was in no means normally distributed over the entire set of provinces of the Greek kingdom. With a strongly skewed distribution the significance that can be attached to such correlation coefficients is far from evident. The same conclusion is repeated in Psihogios [1987] p.122, n.8.

f. An interpretation of the differentiation of agricultural colonization within the currant-growing Peloponnese.

Currant expansion, agricultural colonization and the specialisation of the Peloponnesian peasantry in currant viticulture were different aspects of the same historical process. Indeed, it was neither possible for the population of the Peloponnesian mountains and of the Ionian Islands to colonize the fertile coastal plains of the peninsula without the enhanced revenues generated from currant exports, nor could such a labour-intensive type of agriculture have ever expanded so quickly without involving the increasing specialisation in it of an increasing number of people.

However, the evolution of in-migration and of specialisation in currant viticulture was not uniform throughout the currant growing Peloponnese. And as noted above, differences in the rate of population growth between currant-growing provinces cannot be explained by differences in per capita cereal production.

The fact that currant growing provinces were only very few renders impossible any regression analysis of the factors which influenced the choices of the migrants. In the following paragraphs a tentative interpretation of these factors is advanced, based on the data presented in table I.6 and on the scattergrams presented in graphs I.7 to I.12.

ble I.6. Growth of population, per capita currant production and evolution of specialisation.

	population in 1861[b]	production in 1860[c] (10^6 of litres)	per capita output 1860/61	population growth 1861-79[d]	growth of production 1860-78	growth of per capita output 1860-78
Patras	30,985	14.96	482.8	2.15%	2.52	0.36%
Aigialeia	12,054	11.62	964.0	2.00%	2.14	0.14%
Ilia-Olimpia[a]	58,074	23.33	401.7	1.93%	5.35	3.56%
Messinia-Kalamata	50,718	3.83	75.5	1.66%	9.55	8.44%
Pilia	20,946	1.60	76.4	1.74%	8.92	7.74%
Trifilia	25,984	8.07	310.6	1.74%	7.53	5.79%
Korinthos	20,341	10.47	514.7	1.66%	-	-

	production 1878 (10^6 of litres)	per capita output 1878/79	population growth 1879-89	growth of production 1878-88	growth of per capita output 1878-88	population 1879
Patras	23.41	515.1	2.64%	2.51%	-	45,450
Aigialeia	17.02	989.1	2.23%	3.50%	1.24%	17,208
Ilia-Olimpia	59.58	753.5	2.25%	6.89%	4.53%	79,073
Messinia-Kalamata	19.79	324.7	1.61%	7.29%	5.59%	60,957
Pilia	7.45	292.1	1.87%	18.30%	16.13%	25,505
Trifilia	29.79	840.5	2.25%	2.99%	0.73%	35,445
Korinthos	8.94	326.6	2.40%	6.14%	-	27,370

	population 1889	currant production 1888	per capita output 1888/89
Patras	58,989	30	508.6
Aigialeia	21,449	24	1118.9
Ilia-Olimpia	98,809	116	1174.0
Messinia-Kalamata	71,517	40	559.3
Pilia	30,707	40	1302.6
Trifilia	44,261	40	903.7
Korinthos	34,694	19	547.6

a. Ilia and Olimpia are here considered together because no data on the evolution of currant production in each of them separately is available.
b. Unlike data used to produce table I.5, figures of population do not include non-currant growing municipalities within currant-growing provinces: see n.b of table I.2, p.34 above.
c. See appendix IV.
d. Calculated approximately on the assumption that natural population growth was 1.5% yearly (see n.27, p.32, above).

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graph I.7. Population growth in 1861-1879 and per capita currant production in 1860/61.



graph I.8. Population growth in 1879-1889 and per capita currant production in 1878/79.



graph I.9. Population growth in 1861-1879 and growth of currant production in 1860-1878.



graph I.10. Population growth in 1879-1889 and growth of currant production in 1878-1888.



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graph I.11. Per capita currant production in 1860/61 and growth of per capita production in 1860/61-1878/79.



graph I.12. Per capita currant production in 1878/79 and growth of per capita production in 1878/79-1888/89.



It is striking that the decisions of migrants do not seem to have been influenced by the speed of regional currant expansion: as shown in graphs I.9 and I.10, population growth was rather negatively associated with the rate of growth of production. On the other hand, population growth was positively connected with the per capita currant production in each region: graphs I.7 and I.8 show that the rate of population growth in each province and in a given period of time was positively associated with the per capita currant production at the beginning of the period of observation.

The inverse association between rate of population growth and rate of increase of currant output leads to a negative statement: if rapid growth of production is accepted as an index for the existence of plenty of land available for the expansion of currant vineyards, the fact that rapid growth of currant production in a given region was not positively associated with population growth shows that the availability of fertile land, adapted to the expansion of currant viticulture, was not the most important reason in attracting migrants, whose arrival was the main factor which determined the differentiation of rates of population growth in different provinces.

Closely connected with this inverse association is the fact that the level of per capita production of currants and

its rate of increase were also negatively associated with each other (see graphs I.11 and I.12). This may well have been because, as early as in 1860, specialisation in currant viticulture was already very advanced in some provinces, and further specialisation probably hit against technological and social limits.

However, viticulture continued to expand rapidly, even in provinces which had already achieved a high degree of specialisation. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the impossibility for the native population of rapidly increasing the already high level of its per capita production created acute labour shortages, which offered migrants many opportunities to find an occupation and creditors wishing to advance them loans. If this is the case, the main factor determining the distribution of migrants between the currant growing provinces of the Peloponnese will have been the difficulties encountered by local societies in their effort to exceed certain limits of specialisation in currant viticulture.

On the other hand, the above mentioned negative association between population growth and rate of increase of currant production was probably an indirect effect of the positive association between population growth and level of specialisation; a high level of specialisation probably also

indicated relative greater scarcity of land for new vineyards and greater difficulty in finding labour to plant and cultivate additional vineyards. As a result, in provinces where currant specialisation was very advanced - and in which rates of population growth reached the highest levels - production could develop only at a relatively slower pace.

g. The case of three selected provinces, Aigialeia, Ilia and Pilia.

Further confirmation of the above conclusions is supplied by the comparison between level of specialisation in currant viticulture and contribution of population growth to the evolution of regional production between 1878 and 1888 in three of the currant growing regions of the Peloponnese, Aigialeia, Ilia-Olimpia, and Pilia, typical of the northern, western and southern pattern of currant growth respectively.[66] Specialisation is here assessed in a more accurate way than in table I.6, with the aid of model estimates of maximum achievable per capita production in each province, according to local productivity of the vineyards.

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[66] On the different path and timing of currant expansion in the major regions of currant production in the Peloponnese, see above, p.23.

TABLE I.7. Relative contribution of specialisation and of population growth.[a]

	Province	Aigialeia	Ilia-Olimpia	Pilia
		(venetian litres)		
(1)	per capita product in 1878	989	753	292
(2)	per capita product in 1888	1,119	1,174	1,303
(3)	maximum model per capita product	1,929	2,571	3,000
(4)	% of population required to produce the crop of 1878 (1)/(3)%	51.28%	29.3%	9.7%
(5)	% of population required to produce the crop of 1888 (2)/(3)%	58.00%	45.7%	43.4%
		(annual growth rates)		
(6)	growth of production	3.49%	6.90%	18.3%
(7)	increase of per capita output	1.24%	4.54%	16.13%
(8)	population growth	2.22%	2.25%	1.87%
		(approximative shares)		
(9)	specialization effect (7)/[(7)+(8)]	0.36	0.67	0.90
(10)	population growth effect (8)/[(7)+(8)]	0.64	0.33	0.10

a.On regional distribution of production, see table I.1. As noted above, crops of 1878 and 1888 were abundant, and therefore representative of regional productive capacity; the closest censuses of population are those of 1879 and 1889. Per capita product reported here is the division of the 1878 and 1888 fruit by the 1879 and 1889 population: since all calculations are reported on the basis of annual rates, assumed to be uniformly distributed in the short run, taking into account the one-year difference between the censuses and the respective regional distributions of production would be an unnecessary complication, not yielding any significant improvement in the accuracy of the operation.
On population figures, see n.b above.
For the method of calculation of model maxima per capita product, see table I.2 above; average productivity of vineyards was recognized as 4,500 litres per ha in Aigialeia, 6,000 in Ilia-Olimpia and 7,000 in Pilia.
For the rate of natural population growth, see n.27 above.
For the sake of the comparison of the relative contribution of population growth and of the increase of pro-capita production (specialisation intensification) to currant growth, the **rate of increase of production (r_q)** may be expressed as following: $r_q = r_p * r_s$ where r_p is the rate of population growth and r_s is the rate of specialization intensification, given that: (a) $r_q = (q_{n2} / q_{n1})^{1/(n2-n1)}$ where q_{n1} and q_{n2} is the production of the initial and of the final year of observation; (b) $r_p = (p_{n2} / p_{n1})^{1/(n2-n1)} = r_n + r_i$ where p_{n1} and p_{n2} is the population of the initial and the final year of observation; (c) $r_s = [(q_{n2} / p_{n2}) / (q_{n1} / p_{n1})]^{1/(n2-n1)}$.

In Aigialeia, already in 1878, the degree of specialization of the population had assumed very high levels, since more than half of the inhabitants were needed to produce the currant crop (see table I.7, line 4). Further increase of per capita production could proceed only at a very slow pace (1.24% yearly - see table I.7, line 7) and most of the increase of total production was due to the increase of population. According to the estimates presented in table I.7, 64% of the increase of currant output of Aigialeia between 1878 and 1888 was due to population growth (table I.7, line 10), obviously through massive in-migration.

The provinces of Ilia and Olimpia constitute an intermediate case. The percentage of the population required to produce the currant crop was already high in 1878 (29.3% - see table I.7, line 4), much higher than in Pilia (9.7%) - but not as high as in Aigialeia (51.28%). No doubt, considerable margins for further specialisation of the native population were still there to be exploited, since per capita production continued to increase by 4.54% yearly, and in 1888, the population employed in currant cultivation reached 45.7% of the total. This increase of per capita production was responsible for 67% of the achieved rate of growth of production (in Aigialeia, the respective figure was only 36%); but in-migration played an increasing role in Ilia-

Olimpia and accounted for no less than 33% of the growth of production (against 64% in Aigialeia and only 10% in Pilia).

Pilia presents a totally reverse example. In 1878, per capita currant output was still at a very low level in comparison to the two other provinces. It is not therefore astonishing that further specialisation of the inhabitants of Pilia could by itself lead to very substantial increases of production. Nine tenths of the spectacular increase of currant production between 1878 and 1888 (18.3% yearly) was caused by the increase of per capita output (table I.7, line 9). The effect of population growth during the same period was comparatively trifling (10%, line 10).

The differences between the trajectories followed by the three provinces in 1878-1888 might therefore be ascribed to the different stage of specialisation in which they were found in 1878. It should moreover be noted that there was a strong tendency towards uniformity; in 1878-1888, Ilia-Olimpia approached the degree of specialisation of Aigialeia in 1878, and the late-comer Pilia almost filled the gap separating it from Ilia-Olimpia. Most probably, had currant trade continued for another two decades to be as profitable as it was in the 1880s, all three provinces would have reached equally advanced levels.

h. Currant trade, capital and migrants: some suggestions.

Currant growing for export was a clear case of voluntary specialisation, very different from the forced commercialisation through the levy of taxes, typical of grain cultivation for home consumption. The fact that peasant families, not subject to any sort of extra-economic coercion, continued for more than a century to settle massively in the fertile but marshy plains of the Peloponnese in order to cultivate currants, is a strong indication that currant viticulture offered them better living conditions than their traditional occupations, namely grain cultivation and flock-herding.

As noted above, peasant families tended to move to provinces where specialisation of the population in currant production was already much advanced and where further expansion of vineyards required extra labour, rather than to provinces characterized by greater availability of land suitable to currant viticulture. This is not surprising; peasants could not plant and cultivate currant vines on their own, because these activities required the possession of much capital. What particularly attracted them in currant viticulture was rather the opportunity to borrow capital, useful for the full deployment of their and their families'

labour resources and for increasing their productivity.

In fact, besides immigrants, currant trade was also a pole of attraction for capital from the foreign markets, the exporting cities and the national banking system.[67] The formation of peasant family farms working on borrowed capital was much favoured by the relative availability of credit in the currant sector, constituting the major exception in an economy suffering deeply from lack of resources. For instance, peasants could farm vineyards under share-cropping agreements; they could also obtain cultivation loans by selling their crop in advance, or acquire property by undertaking the creation of the elite's farms, in exchange for half of the vineyard they planted.

It is true that the greater part of the enhanced productivity of the family farm operating in the currant sector was absorbed by the high rates of interest on loans, as well as by the manipulation of fruit markets by the currant merchants. As will be shown in the following chapter, currant and money markets were controlled by hierarchically organized merchant networks, which did not fail to draw considerable benefits from their commercial and financial transactions with the growers. Nevertheless, it seems that, in an environment of acute underpopulation and labour

[67] See chapter III, below.

shortage, peasants managed to keep a not insignificant part of the increased output of their labour, at least sufficient to permit them to improve their previous living conditions.[68]

[68]That relative scarcity of labour in the Peloponnese resulted in high wages is also proved by the fact that in the over-populated Ionian Islands - place of origin of great part of the migrants who settled in the western coastal plains of the Peloponnese - labour cost to currant farm less owners than it did to their Peloponnesian counterpart (see BRCREP Cephalonia 1865). It seems, however, that increasing out-migration from the Islands exerted a positive influence on the level of Ionian wages, which gradually tended to reach those of the Peloponnese (BRCREP Cephalonia 1865 and 1866).



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Chapter II. Distribution of the "National Estates", concentration of landed property and farm consolidation.

Currant expansion induced deep transformations in the agricultural landscape, as well as in both socio-economic and legal relations of land property. In particular, it favoured the establishment of private ownership rights and it encouraged land concentration and farm consolidation. As will be suggested in the course of this chapter, these changes were undertaken principally by the wealthy and powerful local families who possessed their own capital and easy access to credit from the currant exporting houses and the national banking system.

A. The question of landed property and the affair of the National Estates.

Before the introduction of currant viticulture, the coastal plains of the Peloponnese were almost deserted and to a large extent covered with marshes. The prevailing cultivation techniques were primitive and the use of the land extremely extensive. Private landownership rights were almost unknown, except in the case of intensively cultivated fields and orchards situated close to the villages. The rest of the land belonged in theory to the state - before 1830 to the

Sublime Porte and after that date to Greece; in practice, nobody was very much interested in the exact legal status of areas of little economic use, except to shepherds and peasants who practised primitive cultivation.[1]

In contrast, currant vineyards were associated with a very intensive use of the land and with permanent land improvements. The currant fields were enclosed with trenches, drained, cleaned of stones, ploughed in depth; the construction of wells, cisterns, huts and ware-houses was

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[1]At the beginning of the 19th century, Greece was one of the less populated countries of Europe and Asia, and the cultivable area exceeded by far cultivated land. Average population density was 19.26 inhabitants per km² in 1843, 23.08 in 1861, 37.37 in 1896 (calculations include only the Peloponnese, Central Greece and the Cyclades Islands). Spiliotakis [1864] presents an international comparison which shows that the share of uncultivated land could only be compared to Russia with its enormous steppes (cfr. also Mansolas [1867] p.50).
Most parts of the fertile plains of the kingdom were totally deserted and were covered by extensive marshes, whereas the majority of the population lived in the arid but healthier mountainous regions. "*Greece is surrounded by lakes and swamps from all sides*", stated an anonymous article of *Efimeris tis Ellinikis Georgias* of November 1855 (n.2, p.51): "*Lakes and marshes cover an area of almost 230,000 hectares, which favour the propagation of fevers and other diseases which torment the already scarce population of Greece. The lowlands suffer more. The swamp fevers are more injurious to those coming from the healthier climate of the mountains to the plains to pass the winter. That is the reason why entire populations live in a state of continuous migration, similar to herds of sheep, and cannot settle in the empty plains. Hunger and snow chase them away from the mountains during the whole winter; fevers drive them out of the plains back to the mountains for six months, as if they were in a state of siege. Those obliged to pass the summer in the plains, when they fall ill, instead of searching for another remedy, turn back to the highlands; those who insist on staying, run the risk of catching chronic diseases due to swamp fevers ...*". According to McGrew [1979], p.467, "*almost all the well-watered valleys contained marshes harbouring swamp fever which the mountain people had learned to dread. Many of the post-independence settlers of marshy regions fell victims of the endemic malaria which menaced the valleys until well into the 20th century.*"
Pasturage and nomadic methods of cultivation predominated in the empty lowlands. Part of the forests was often burnt, either in order to be cultivated to exhaustion and then to be abandoned for several years or in order to provide fresh grazing for the shepherds' flocks; in the following year, the destruction provoked by fire was completed by the teeth of sheep and goats. Fields flooded during winter by torrential rivers maintained their natural fertility and could be sowed in early spring; then, if early autumn rains did not destroy the crop, the harvest could be abundant (see Mcgrew [1971] p.254; Dertilis [1988] p.44; *Efimeris tis ellinikis georgias*, "On Greek Agriculture" [1855] p.52,73; Whitebled [1886] p.220. The British consul at Patras reports that "*peasants apply wilfully fires to the forests*": see BRCREP 1881).

indispensable to cultivation. Moreover, the vines needed five full years of special and attentive treatment before yielding any fruit at all. Hence, the possession of secure and unconditional property rights over the soil supporting the future vineyard was an important prerequisite for the undertaking of such an expensive investment.

The intensive use of the land in currant viticulture, so different from the primitive and extensive agriculture prevailing in most other Greek regions, is the main explanation for the success of 19th century projects of general sale of state lands in currant growing provinces, as opposed to the poor results obtained by the same projects in the rest of the Kingdom.[2]

a. Estate property under Ottoman rule.

In early 19th-century Greece, the acquisition of full ownership over a piece of land was not a mere question of paying for it. Under Ottoman rule, legal and political factors seriously restricted the availability of privately owned land and therefore the development of a proper market

[2]The plain of Levadeia, dominated by cotton cultivation, constituted an exception which rather confirms the rule: private property deeds were requested only in the case of intensive commercialized cultures, though in the rest of the Kingdom, local societies remained for long reluctant to introduce full property rights on the land they cultivated. As late as in the 1930s, in Central Greece, there were still villages cultivating cereals with the system of "open fields" (see Anagnostopoulos & Anagnostopoulos [1939]).

where land could be freely exchanged.

According to Koranic law, the supreme source of any official legislation until the establishment of the independent Greek state in 1830, all land belonged to the Sultan and could only be ceded to individuals during their life, on condition that they would look after it faithfully.

In the course of the centuries, this theoretically inalienable quality of the land became in part a dead letter. Muslim religious institutions, local Turkish dignitaries, the Greek church and Greek notables gradually brought considerable portions of the Sultan's estates into their virtually unconditional possession.[3] But the legal status of these quasi-privately owned lands had never been fully defined or clearly established.[4] As a result, persons wishing to acquire property rights were obliged to follow complex procedures in order to obtain them.[5]

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[3]For a detailed discussion of the land regime in the Ottoman Empire during the 17th and 18th centuries, see McGowan [1981].

[4]As late as 1819, the Ottoman judicial authorities of Patras tried to apply a "firman" (decree of the Sublime Porte) prescribing that estate property of dying Christians was a property of the Ottoman government. Rich christian notables of Patras found themselves obliged to bribe the local magistrate magnanimously in order to secure the suspension of the decree (see Triantafillou [1959] p.189).

[5]A rich collection of pre-1830 property certificates of currant vineyards is contained in the *J. Papadiamantopoulos archive*, file 7873. Their study reveals the complexity of the procedure which had to be followed in order to ensure the legitimacy of the act: the contract was drawn up in front of the authorities of the Greek community and with the approval of the Greek church. Then the seller would report the transaction to the Turkish judicial authorities, which issued the property title called *tapi*. In some cases, an additional document was issued by the Turkish fiscal authorities (*hontzeti*).

b. The question of the "National Estates" and the "Law for the endowment of Greek families" of 1835.

On the departure of the Turks and according to the international treaties that regulated the establishment of the Greek state, the latter succeeded to the Ottomans as the exclusive legitimate inheritor of all their possessions. All land previously belonging to the Sultan or to local Turkish dignitaries and religious institutions was transferred to the Greek government and was given the particular legal status of "National Estates".

The "National Estates" originally appeared as a formidable occasion for introducing a general land reform which might have changed the fortunes of the Greek economy and society. In fact, the distribution of the "National Estates", combined with the creation of a national banking system, constituted the fundamental project of the first governor of Greece, Capodistria, who aimed at the reconstruction of agriculture and the establishment of the new state.[6] But following his assassination in 1830, these plans were definitively

[6]For a concise and clear interpretation of the efforts of the first governor of Greece, Capodistria, to found his agricultural policy on the distribution of the national lands, see Dertilis [1988], pp.42-46.

abandoned.[7]

A serious complication was that the "National Estates" served as a guarantee to the international loans contracted in 1824 and 1825 by the leaders of the nationalist insurrection. In order to provide funds for the amortization of the "revolutionary" loans and of the 60,000,000 francs loan "of Independence", advanced by the protecting powers as a means for the consolidation of the first loans and for the reconstruction of the country after the devastating war of 1821-1830,[8] the vice-royalty which governed Greece in the name of King Otto enacted the law of 1835 "for the endowment of Greek families with land".[9] According to this law, all family heads were entitled to buy land in public auction by using a promissory note of 2.000 drachma nominal value granted to them by the government, payable in 36 annuities, each equal to 6%. The lands purchased in this way were exonerated from the tithe, in place of which a 3% acreage tax was introduced.[10] The revenues were intended to cover the

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[7]According to approximate estimates, the "National Estates" represented no less than the third of the cultivated land of the kingdom and half the cultivable land. In the fertile plains of the Peloponnese, national land covered a much higher share of the total cultivable surface.

[8]See Dertilis [1988], pp.33-81.

[9]Royal Decree of 26/3/1833.

[10]The projected change in the structure of agricultural taxation represented an important step towards the modernization of agricultural policy. The tithe tax, equal to 10% of the gross agricultural product, was a typically Ottoman inheritance and had always constituted a major target of criticism by (continued...)

servicing and the reimbursement of the international debt.

In most respects, the law of 1836 proved a complete failure. The response of the public was not at all enthusiastic; the amount of land effectively put to auction was very limited, and government revenues from it proved totally disappointing, not even reaching 40,000 drachmas (less than 36,000 francs) in any single year of the period 1835-1840. Until 1871, no more than 14,500 hectares were sold under the endowment law throughout the kingdom, and no more than 9,133 acts of cession were issued.[11]

c. The reasons for the failure of the "endowment" project.

The Bavarian bureaucrats of the vice-royalty, principal authors of the "endowment" project, committed a fundamental mistake in their otherwise enlightened calculations: they simply did not take into account the demographic and socio-economic relations dominating the early 19th century Greek countryside, which were totally unfavourable to the kind of

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[10](...continued)
westernizing modernizers. Its indiscriminate incidence acted as a disincentive to land improvements, punishing investment in long-term increases in productivity. Even the ministers of finance themselves, when introducing it to parliament during the discussions of the annual budget, always had a word to say against its anachronistic nature, while postponing its abolition till the future, when better financial circumstances would exist. The tithe tax was finally abolished in 1880.

[11]See Stefanidis [1948] p.81-86 (referred by Psihogios [1987] p.68, n.10).

changes essential for the success of the law of 1835.

The greatest part of the "National Estates" were situated in the fertile, but still deserted and unhealthy plains. Prices sanctioned in the "endowment" law auctions would have been relatively cheap for holdings subjected to intense cultivation and whose fertility was conserved through manuring or crop rotation. But under the prevailing primitive technological conditions, unreclaimed land had scarcely any market value at all. The purchase of "national" land and the cost of the yearly instalments could be worthwhile only if accompanied by considerable land improvements; whereas any price paid for open fields cultivated once every three or four years would prove excessive.[12] The same was true for the acreage tax, which could be really beneficial to a systematically cultivated and productive holding, yet constituted a disproportionate burden on estates exploited in an extremely extensive fashion.

The kind of "enclosures" proposed by the endowment law presupposed a radical transformation of the prevailing methods of land exploitation,[13] requiring the employment of

[12]Whitebled [1886] p.212 reported that in 1885 still, that is more than half a century after the introduction of the "endowment" law, arable land was usually sowed once every two years. And the anonymous translator of the *Efimeris tis Ellinikis Georgias* corrected him by saying that in most cases, arable land was cultivated once every three years (p.212, n.2).

[13]Cfr. the article of McCloskey on the "economics of enclosure" in England, in Parker & Jones (eds.) [1975].

considerable capital and labour inputs. However, the latter were hardly available at the time, because of both the ravages of the long war of Independence and the chronic depopulation of the country, dating back many centuries.[14] The law of 1835 provided for the supply of the only factor of production that already existed in relative abundance, namely land, and therefore had no chance by itself of provoking the desired transformations.

d. Currant growing provinces: the exception.

As suggested above, the currant growing provinces and particularly that of Patras, constituted a major and significant exception to the widespread failure of the endowment project: more than half the total sales of national land under the law of 1835 was concentrated in the currant-growing districts. In 1836 alone, the value of the land sold in the currant-growing district of Patras amounted to 713,210 drachmas, out of 1,459,254 for the entire kingdom. The total value of the national land sold in Patras province up to 1838 amounted to 1,173,592 drachmas, which was by far the highest figure for any single province of the kingdom and

[14]See Panagiotopoulos [1985].

corresponded to more than 2,000 ha.[15] Later on, state land purchases under the "endowment" scheme became important also in the currant growing provinces of the western Peloponnese, Ilia and Trifilia.[16]

In practice, currant viticulture was at the time the only agricultural sector which could easily attract the capital resources required for the success of the endowment scheme. Moreover, it was the only sector in urgent need of privately owned land, since permanent and expensive improvements connected to currant planting could not be developed under conditions of insecurity of property rights.[17]

The remarkable success of the endowment project in the currant-growing provinces, diametrically opposed to its clamorous failure in the rest of the kingdom, underlines the revolutionary change that the expansion of currant cultivation represented for the traditional ways of land

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[15]Cfr. McGrew [1979] p.356, n.42. McGrew draws his information from the government budget report for 1845. See also Bakounakis [1988] p.126. On the importance of the endowment law for the expansion of currant viticulture, see Mansolas *Politeiografikai ...*, p.72: "*After the publication of the endowment law, facilitating the transfer of a considerable share of national land to the citizens' property, currant cultivation entered a new era ....*".

[16]See the series of "Accounts of the Greek state", "Revenues from the sale of state land under the endowment law".

[17]Abusive planting on state-owned land was practised only by petty growers; bigger investors usually avoided undertaking such a risk, with the exception of a few potentates who enjoyed immunity because of their close connections with the government in Athens (see S. Petmezas [1990], p.23, n.24). In 1860, out of 15,306 ha of currant vineyards, those planted on state land were 4,695, or 30.67%, when in most currant growing provinces, cultivated National Estates represented almost two thirds of total cultivated land.

exploitation. On the other hand, the responsiveness of the currant-growing provinces to the massive sale of land permitted by the law of 1835 shows clearly how important the latter was for the further expansion of currant viticulture: in the period 1845-1847, when the first vineyards which had been planted on "endowment" lands came into full maturity, the currant production of the Peloponnese recorded its highest 19th century growth rates, increasing by 66% in two years (1845 to 1847).[18]

e. The law of 1871 for the distribution of the National Estates.

The success of the endowment project in the few provinces producing currants already in the 1830s could not of course counteract its failure in the rest of Greece. This failure, by destroying any hopes of collecting the necessary funds, definitely contributed to the decision of the government to suspend the regular servicing of the foreign debt from 1837, As a result, the question of the "National Estates" came to a halt and any solution had to be postponed until the final settlement of the debt, which remained suspended until a

[18]See appendix II, p.315. For the visible effect of the "endowment" scheme on the evolution of total currant production of the Peloponnese, see graph I.1, p.21.

compromise was reached between Greece and its foreign creditors in 1878.[19]

However, irrespective of the legal complications of the question, anyone could sow a smaller or larger parcel of national land by just paying a rent to the public treasury.[20] As pointed out by McGrew, the government was "*largely powerless to dispose of the bulk of the holdings for its own needs or in ways which ran counter to the interests of those who exercised practical control over them, namely their traditional occupants, usurpers, squatters and local power brokers.*"[21] Moreover, a law of 1845 expressly guaranteed the inviolability of peasant holdings, recognizing what was already an everyday practice.[22]

A major change to this state of affairs occurred with the application of the law of 1871 "for the distribution of the national lands". This law decreed that all occupants of national lands should declare the exact area, location and

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[19]See Dertilis, *op.cit.*, pp.70-79. Very probably, the coincidence of the debt consolidation of 1878 with the first issue of "cessions" of national holdings to private individuals, notwithstanding that the respective law had been passed already in 1871 (see the first volumes of the chronologically ordered *Lists of cessions of the National Estates* enabled by the law No 431 of 1871), is not accidental. Further research relative to this chronological coincidence might reveal unknown and interesting aspects of the question.

[20]This rent, called "right of usufruct", amounted to 15% of the gross output.

[21]Mcgrew [1971] p.447.

[22]*ibidem* p.372.

boundaries of the occupied holdings, for any amount of land up to 80 stremmata.[23] Subsequently, the occupants were to redeem the occupied holdings at their estimated market price, payable in 26 yearly instalments at 3% amortization and 2% interest rate. The price was officially determined by a special committee set up by the local municipal, financial and administrative authorities. After payment of the first instalment, the declared holding was considered private and consequently absolved from the obligation of paying the "usufruct" tax. The owner received an official "cession" document, which was equivalent to a full ownership title. Any occupant omitting the declaration or the disbursement of the instalments would lose his rights to the occupied holding, which in that case could be sold without any restriction and by the same procedure to any aspiring purchaser. Greek citizens not occupying national lands had the right to claim unoccupied holdings and could buy them according to the same procedures.

The law of 1871 "for the distribution of the national lands" was considerably more effective than had been its predecessor endowment law of 1835. Between 1878 and 1911, 357,217 cessions were issued, distributing about 265,000 ha of national land; their estimated value amounted to

[23]One stremma is equal to 1,000 sq.m. or 1/10 of a hectare.

90,000,000 drachmas.[24] These 265,000 hectares represented 38,5% of all cultivated land in 1860 and 31,7% of all cultivated land in 1911.[25] Most of the holdings were "declared" (the first step to legal possession) in the period 1871-1885. The issue of the first cession certificates dragged on until 1878, probably due to the uncertainty concerning Greece's obligations towards its foreign creditors, definitively removed with the compromise achieved in that same year.[26]

Undoubtedly an important factor which contributed to the relative success of the 1871 law, as suggested by McGrew, was "*the element of coercion it introduced by abolishing the 1843 law which tolerated squatters on the one hand and, on the other, by making farms held without legal title vulnerable to the purchase rights of other parties*".[27] Possession rights over national holdings had always been transferable and

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[24]Referred by Anastasiadis [1911] pp.36-38. I checked and reconfirmed the calculations of Anastasiadis, which were probably based on the "general register of cessions of national land", found in the general accountancy service of the state and microfilmed for the HANBG under the supervision of Eve Karousou.

[25]Total cultivated land (including fallow land) of the Peloponnese and of Continental Greece - the two major departments of the kingdom which contained all national land - was 688,300 ha in 1860 and 835,600 in 1911. For sources, see n.19, chapter I.

[26]See n.19 above.

[27]Mcgrew [1979] p.433.

inheritable.[28] But their conditional nature and the complication of their legal status protected to a considerable degree the direct cultivators from overt seizure. In this respect, the built-in "element of coercion" of the law of 1871 constituted a deep break with the Ottoman tradition of inalienability of peasant holdings.

However, the relative success of the 1871 law was principally due to the increase in population density and to the advance of commercialisation which had taken place since the introduction of the endowment law of 1835. The limits of McGrew's argument are illustrated by the repetitive modifications of the 1871 law, which continued to invite holders of national land to declare it until as late as 1890. Only part of the state-owned lands were finally sold, and most of them were found in provinces presenting an advanced degree of commercialisation (see graph II.1). If the principal reason for the success of the land distribution had been that peasants were afraid of being evicted from the land they traditionally cultivated, national land purchases would have been much more evenly distributed.

On the other hand, as stated in the previous chapter, migrant peasants settled precisely in those regions where sales of national land were most massive - namely the currant

[28] See Karousou [1989], Psihogios [1987] p.64.

graph II.1. Instalments for the redemption of national lands, 1879-1881: the share of the currant-growing Peloponnese.



growing plains. If the law of 1871 had really restricted the access to land, peasant families would have preferred to settle elsewhere. Moreover, it is certain that plenty of non-declared lands continued to be available until long after the application of the 1871 law.

f. The law of 1871 and the development of currant culture.

Sales of state land under the "Law for the endowment of the Greek families" of 1835 constituted the main source of property titles during the first period of continuous spread of currant viticulture in 1835-1851. But the conversion of

graph II.2. Average per capita expenditure for national land instalments (1879-1881).



state land into currant vineyards in 1871-1892 under the "Law for the distribution of the National Estates" was a phenomenon of unprecedented magnitude. The voting of the law in 1871 coincided chronologically with the start of the major period of vigorous, continuous and widespread currant expansion. Moreover, the provinces where most vineyards were planted in 1870-1892 happened to be precisely those plains of western and southern Peloponnese where there existed the greatest concentrations of "National Estates".[29]

All contemporary observers are agreed on that the 1871 law

[29]For an approximative indication of the distribution of national lands in the various Peloponnesian provinces, see the map presented in Psihogios (1987) p.67, produced according to the figures offered by the agricultural census of 1860 for the percentage of national to total sowed land.

greatly contributed to the expansion of currant viticulture.[30] In fact, in the three first years of its application (1872-1874), currant vineyards increased by 9.3% yearly, which was the highest rate of growth of currant vineyard acreage in the second half of the 19th century. Between 1871 and 1893, more than 30,000 ha of currant vineyards were planted;[31] according to all indications, most vineyards in the post-1871 Peloponnese were planted on national lands, and most holdings were purchased for the purpose of planting currant vineyards.

B. Distribution of National Estates, concentration of landownership, and farm consolidation: the case of Amalias.

Currant growing represented a very intensive use of the land; it required close supervision, both of the vines and of those who cultivated them. It also required infrastructure of a kind which offered considerable economies of scale: threshing-floors, buildings, fences, irrigation and draining facilities. Extensive and consolidated farms - at least, say,

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[30]Cfr. eg. Hairetis [1883] p.387 and p.431; Lamprinidis [1905] p.14; Sideris [1934] p.78. As stated by the British consul in Patras, "*in consequence of a law passed in the year 1871, granting favourable conditions to the purchasers of national land, no less than 100,000 acres of land have been bought since that date by Greek citizens, part being covered with bushes which have been burnt and cleared, and the remainder of pasture land, well adapted for planting currant vineyards ... Of the above mentioned land, a large portion is being planted with currants, so that we may look for a great increase in their production when the vines come into full bearing.*" (BRCREP 1876).

[31]See chapter I, p.27.

10 ha large - could meet these requirements in a much more effective way than could farms made up of tiny plots scattered around the village.

The law of 1871 "for the distribution of the National Estates", which coincided with the start of the major period of continuous currant expansion (1871-1893), was an excellent opportunity for creating large and consolidated estates. The distribution of the national lands favoured concentration of landownership and farm consolidation, since previously uncertain possession rights over land were fixed for the first time in a definitive way and since it represented a generalized and simultaneous offer of sale of both cultivated and unreclaimed fields.[32]

In order to examine the procedure of distribution of state lands and of their conversion into currant vineyard farms, I chose the case of the small town of Amalias, once a flourishing provincial centre of currant production and trade. Suggestions and observations presented here are in large part the outcome of detailed nominative research in the archives of this town.

[32]A clear sign of a rapidly expanding agriculture and of changing ways of land exploitation, many parcels of national land are described in the list of cessions as "bordering on the forest", "bordering on the swamp" or "bordering on unreclaimed national lands".

a. Problems in the use of the sources and attempted solutions.

The two principal sources consulted are the official list which records all the cessions of national land which was distributed according to the procedures of the 1871 law, and the estate property transactions register, which contains copies of all contracts which record acts relating to estate property.

The list of cessions presents the advantage of lending itself to quantitative analysis and is exhaustively used here in order to test the hypothesis of land concentration and plot consolidation connected with the distribution of the National Estates. However, as proved by an inquiry into the estate property transactions register, distributed plots were quite often transferred to other persons immediately after declaration, long before the completion of the cession. In such cases, the real purchaser of the plot was not the person who initially declared it, but rather the one to whom the rights on the plot were transferred. In cases where the transfer was communicated early enough to the ministry of the Interior, the cession document was issued in the name of the real purchaser. But more often than not, the cession was issued in the name of the initial declarer, and its transfer

to the new owner only took place afterwards.[33] As a result, the plot was recorded in the list of cessions as belonging to the initial declarer and not to the real purchaser.[34]

In theory, it would be possible to discover the precise allocation of all plots of national land distributed in Amalias, because all consecutive transfers of distributed plots were minutely recorded in the estate property transactions register. But this would have required consultation of all the contracts of all persons appearing on the cession lists, an operation forbiddingly demanding in terms of time and resources.[35]

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[33]See e.g. TR 19/83-5/12/1877: "*Ioannis Markopoulos, peasant from Roviata, sells to Anagnostis At. Dalianis, mayor of Ilis, 20 stremmata in Agios Atanasios, which he declared in the 31st of August of this year in the declarations register of the village of Roviata... He promises that* if the cession is to be issued in his name, he will transfer it *to A.A.Dalianis* (emphasis added).

[34]The list of cessions of Amalias records only 22 cases of transfer of rights. But inquiry into the estate property transaction contracts of just 4 notables revealed another 22 transfers, none of them recorded in the list of cessions. Consequently, we may safely assume that more often than not, the transfer of rights over national land was not registered in the list of cessions and that constituted a much more common practice than would appear from exclusive consideration of the number of transfers registered in that list.

[35]Similar problems were encountered by scholars of the sale of the "Biens Nationaux" confiscated during the French Revolution. For a presentation of the questions relevant to the French case, we may quote here Lefebre [1963], pp.308-309: "Qui donc, en définitive, a surtout profité de la vente? Ceux qui travaillaient la terre ou les autres? Les paysans qui étaient déjà propriétaires ou ceux qui le voulaient devenir? *Faut-il, d'ailleurs, sur ce point en croire les actes de vente? Nombre d'acqueureurs n'ont-ils pas acheté pour des commandes non dénommés?* Les émigrés n'ont-ils pas récupéré une part notable de leurs biens? Au profit de qui se sont faites les cessions des spéculateurs, si nombreux sous le Directoire? Les réponses peuvent varier avec la période considérée, c'est-à-dire avec le mode de vente, la situation monétaire, l'état général du pays, tant politique qu'économique; avec les régions aussi, les biens nationaux étaient inégalement répartis, inégalement morcelés et la population paysanne étant plus ou moins dense, plus ou moins aisée, comportant ici une majorité de propriétaires, là de métayers et de journaliers. De cette complexité, qu'on n'avait jamais mise en si bonne lumière, résultait la nécessité d'études locales, poussées aussi loin que les documents le permettraient, à l'aide de la connaissance particulière des lieux, des personnes, des circonstances et aussi des sources auxiliaires" (emphasis added). Yet, however similar the questions may

(continued...)

A sample was formed instead, containing a limited number of persons, and the full corpus of their contracts recorded on the register was studied in detail. It is comforting that the results of this latter inquiry do not contradict, but rather confirm the conclusions of the quantitative analysis based on the list of cessions.

b. Plot fragmentation and farm consolidation in Amalias.

(1) Consolidation by kin.

According to the list of cessions of the 1871 law, 937 cession certificates were issued for state land distributed in the Amalias district.[36] As a result of these certificates,

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[35](...continued)
be between the French and Greek cases, a major difference exists as regards the availability and organisation of the archives in the two countries: it is very difficult, not to say impossible for the historian of the Greek case to arrive at figures of a precision comparable to those of his French colleague. A major difficulty in the case of Greece is the absence of an organized "cadastre", which would easily permit one to follow the changes of property of the National Estates after their first sale recorded in the list of cessions - often deceptive in France and Greece alike. Another serious problem is the deplorable condition of the indexes of the Transactions Register (*Vivlio Metagrafon*): the study of any single contract requires recourse to its full text, to be found in several volumes, often partly in a state of decomposition, without any possibility of getting any previous information about its contents, because contracts are indexed only by first name and surname of the contractors. These difficulties seriously limit the number of cases which can be studied in a given period of time, making practically impossible the full counting of all cases and imposing the use of indirect techniques of calculation.

[36]Distribution of state land planted prior to the enactment of the 1871 distribution project was dealt with according to a special law (law 386 of 1871) and cession certificates concerning "National Plantations" were recorded in a separate list. Out of 937 cession certificates issued for the district of Amalias, 91 fell under this latter category. However, in the present study no distinction is made between uncultivated and planted state land and both kinds of cession certificates are considered together.

1,304 plots of land were assigned, covering a total area of 16,518 stremmata (1,651.8 ha) .[37] The average number of plots per cession certificate was 1.39 and a single certificate might refer to up to 5 separate plots of land. Plots ranged between one and 80 stremmata, their average size being 12.61 stremmata. The division of the total area of national land distributed in Amalias is shown, by size of plot, in graph II.3.

The first impression is one of extreme land fragmentation; 58% of distributed state land consisted of plots of less than 20 stremmata and plots of less than 40 stremmata covered 81% of total area. Inquiry into the location and boundaries of plots described in the cession certificates however proved that plots assigned to persons belonging to the same patrilineal kin (identified through common surname) were usually neighbouring with each other and tended to form larger contiguous blocks.

A test was then carried out in order to search for patrilineal kin groups collectively possessing clusters of plots of at least 20 stremmata: 162 out of 310 groups of

[37]Amalias was formed by the unification of two formerly separate villages, *Dervitselepi* and *Kalitsa*. Their territory, although bordering, is separately referred to in the list of cessions. The administrative boundaries of the two villages are however considered here as one, since by the middle of the 19th century the process of their unification was fully completed. Nevertheless, official statistics and other sources continue to refer to them separately till as late as 1879 (eg. see Houliarakis [1974]).

graph II.3. Division of total area distributed in Amalias by size of assigned plots.



land purchasers bearing the same surname were discovered to fulfil this condition.[38] All members of 142 out of these 162 groups possessed neighbouring plots, and only in the remaining 20 did any member only possess plots which were separate from those of the other members of the group.

These 162 groups of national land purchasers possessed 257 clusters of plots of 20 or more stremmata. On average, each group corresponded to 1.59 clusters, whose average size equalled 51 stremmata. At least 80% of national land distributed in Amalias consisted of such clusters of

[38]Purchased national lands were predominantly destined for the constitution of currant vineyards; 20 stremmata (2 ha) may be considered the minimum area required for the creation of a vineyard which could fully occupy a nuclear family. See below, Chapter VI.

neighbouring plots covering more than 20 stremmata, and 59% consisted of clusters covering more than 40 stremmata. The division of distributed national land according to size of clusters formed by plots assigned to persons of the same patrilineal kin is presented in graph II.4.

graph II.4. Division of distributed national land in Amalias by size of clusters of plots assigned to members of the same patrilineal kin.



How is one to explain this radical difference from the previous image of an extremely fragmented landscape? Dowry and hereditary customs, providing daughters with land, did not favour farm consolidation at the level of patrilineal kin.[39] Far from being the passive result of inertia

[39]See chapter VI.

automatically produced by the succession of generations, the clustering of plots belonging to members of the same patrilineal kin was the result of conscious collective choice. Such contiguous areas made up of several plots of national land probably formed either a single farm or several farms which were complementary from the point of view of productive organization. Consolidation of plots belonging to a group of close relatives probably also signified cooperation of these latter in the tasks of cultivation and collective access to infrastructural works such as wells, storing houses, pathways, etc.[40]

(2) Consolidation and risk.

Another observation arising from this investigation of property boundaries is that in most cases where a kin group held land in several localities, almost all members of the group used to hold land in each of them. Most probably, by so doing they combined advantages of economies of scale offered by farm consolidation with advantages of spread of risk brought about by possession of farms located on different qualities of soil, asymmetrically affected by weather and

[40]E. Psihogiou, in her essay on the architecture of the village of Lehena, bordering on Amalias, reports that in the majority of cases, closely situated currant farms belonged to related families which collaborated intensely in tasks of cultivation. See E. Psihogiou [1987], p.228.

climate variations. Currant vines planted on hilly grounds were favoured in years of abundant rain, when those planted on the heavy and fertile soils of the low plain were suffering from extreme humidity; the latter yielded better quality fruit in times of drought.[41]

(3) Land fragmentation before the distribution of the National Estates.

The question remains however why national lands in Amalias, although forming larger consolidated farms, were referred to in the cession certificates in the form of so many and so tiny plots. Where a contiguous area was attributed to the same person with several cession certificates, as consisting of various plots, one might assume that the purchaser claimed these plots at different dates simply because he preferred to spread over time the payments of deposit and instalments. Yet this does not provide an explanation for parts of the same holding claimed by a single person, with a single declaration, which corresponded to a single cession certificate. And more often than not, assigned plots registered in one and the same

[41]On scattering of plots as behaviour toward risk see D. N. McCloskey, "The Persistence of English Common Fields" in W. N. Parker & E. L. Jones (eds) [1975], pp.113-119.

cession certificate bordered on each other.[42]

The only likely answer is that neighbouring pieces of land appearing as separate in the cession certificates had in the past been occupied by different persons and that at the time of the distribution of the National Estates aspiring purchasers managed, through exchange or purchase, to consolidate them into fewer plots. Acceptance of this suggestion might also explain why the procedure of declarations lasted several years: indeed, the conclusion of so many exchanges of plots must have been a rather time-consuming operation. Although there can be no direct evidence of such a generalized procedure of exchanges aiming at farm consolidation - since occupants scarcely ever produced written contracts concerning the possession, sale or exchange of ill-defined legal rights over national land - one can rightly conclude that separate registration of neighbouring pieces of land belonging to a single owner provides a trace of the fragmentation of property prevailing in Amalias prior to the distribution of the National Estates.[43]

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[42]Another explanation could have been that the distinction between parts of a contiguous plot was an effort to define in a more accurate way its boundaries and location. But this explanation is irrelevant, because the description of the plots claimed used to be very approximative. Boundaries were referred to by just stating the name or the family of the owner of some neighbouring plot, or in reference to physical obstacles (a river, a hill, the sea etc.).

[43]Farm fragmentation is considered typical of subsistence and technologically backward agriculture, as was the Peloponnesian prior to the spread of currant monoculture. See McCloskey, *ibidem*.

c. Strategies of estate property concentration: who benefited from the distribution of the National Estates?

(1) The choice of patrilineal kin as a level for analysis.

The primary unit of social and economic life in traditional societies - such as in 19th century Peloponnese - was the family, not the individual; consolidation of plots belonging to members of the same patrilineal kin, discovered during the investigation of property boundaries, is a consequence of this fact. In assessing the level of concentration of the National Estates, there would be little sense in considering the plots assigned to a son separately from those assigned to his father, brother or wife, when there are clear indications that all of them collaborated closely in the cultivation and management of property.

The ideal measure of the degree of land concentration would be to compare the area assigned to each family to the size of this latter at the moment of distribution. But such a calculation is not possible, because material for reconstructing family composition is simply not available.

Two alternative ways exist for estimating the degree of concentration which characterized the distribution of the

National Estates. One is to calculate how much land was assigned to each person appearing in the list of cessions, assuming that individual purchasers were also heads of families; the second is to calculate how much land was assigned to each patrilineal kin group, that is to each group of persons bearing the same family name.

The study of national land concentration by individual purchasers, referring to single families, might give us a more precise image. Yet this solution presents serious drawbacks. Purchases of National Land were spread over several years. No doubt, most of them took place in the 1870s; but at least some occurred in the 1880s and (probably very few) in the 1890s. Even if we accept that national land was usually claimed by the head of the family, one and the same family might have acquired land in the name of more than one successive family leader. Moreover, a family wishing to acquire more than 80 stremmata might declare land in the name of several of its members, in order to circumvent the upper limit established by the 1871 law.[44]

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[44]The 595 purchasers of national land in Amalias (individualized through common first name, family name and - wherever recorded - father's name) can thus by no means be identified with the heads of the 600 families which, according to the 1879 census of population, lived in Amalias at that date (population in 1879 amounted to 2,833 and the average family size in the *demos* of Ilis was 4.75 persons per family). The region moreover experienced quick population growth due to in-migration. Ten years later, in 1889, there were 50% more inhabitants, that is no less than 300 more families. Although it is true that new settlers, not possessing the status of ancient occupant, did not fully participate in the distribution of the National Estates, we cannot exclude that some of them (probably a few) did purchase national lands. A further complication is that rich merchants and notables of neighbouring towns also bought some National Lands in that district, in order to invest in currant vineyards. Their number must have

(continued...)

Besides this, information offered by the list of cessions is not sufficient to provide an accurate identification of individual purchasers. In Greece it is a tradition to name the eldest male children after the name of the paternal grandfather; two brothers' eldest sons often bear the same first name and the only way to avoid confusion would be to know the name of the father. But most cession certificates do not record this latter information. As a result, risk of homonymy is high.

As against these limitations, analysis on the basis of surnames presents advantages which strongly recommend it. The consolidatic of plots belonging to members of the same patrilineal kin discovered during the investigation of property boundaries has demonstrated that patrilineal kin constituted an organic entity of ownership of property in land and consequential organization of production. Moreover, there were extremely few probabilities for people possessing neighbouring plots of land and bearing the same surname to belong to unrelated kin groups. As a result, individualization of patrilineal kin leaves little ambiguity.

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[44](...continued)
been rather limited, because they lacked the qualification of ancient occupants and because they had to face competition from the local ascending elites of Amalias. Examples of such cases were those of the lawyer Papailiou from Pirgos, who bought 240 str., and of the Augerinos family of deputies, mayors etc. from Divri (40 str.). Most investors from other cities probably used the method of second time purchase, or bought national land in less inhabited nearby districts.

(2) Land concentration by patrilineal kin.

A test for land concentration at patrilineal kin level proves that the distribution of the National Estates in Amalias was markedly unequal. 70.32% of kin groups received less than the average amount of land ceded per kin group (53 stremmata). As shown in table II.1, almost half (48.1%) of the 310 groups got less than 20 stremmata each; this corresponded to only a tenth of the total distributed area. On the other hand, the "richest" 16.8% of kin groups received 58.4% of land.

It would be possible to advance an interpretation of the above figures based on a model similar to that of Chayanov,[45] by assuming that the amount of land assigned to patrilineal kin groups was proportionate to the number, size and developmental cycle of families which belonged to it. In such a case, the unequal distribution of national lands to kin groups would be concealing a more equal per capita distribution. The data do not, however, support this hypothesis. There is no reason to support that the size of patrilineal kin groups was not normally distributed, or that kin groups of average size were more numerous than kin groups of minimum and maximum size. If the assigned area was highly

[45]See Chayanov [1966].

Table II.1. Concentration of the National Estates in Amalias

(1) area per kin group (stremmata)		(2) kin groups		(3) percentage of cases		(4) share of total assigned area (stremmata)		(5) share of total assigned area (percentage)	
			SMALL						
1 - 19		149		48.1%		1,750.7		10.6%	
20 - 39		45		14.5%		1,161.7		7.0%	
SUBTOTAL	1 - 39		194		62.6%		2,912.4		17.6%
			MEDIUM						
40 - 59		28		9.0%		1,314.5		8.0%	
60 - 99		36		11.6%		2,641.2		16.0%	
SUBTOTAL	40 - 99		64		20.6%		3,955.7		24%
			LARGE						
100 - 199		36		11.6%		5,019.5		30.4%	
200 - 500		16		5.2%		4,630.5		28.0%	
SUBTOTAL	100 - 500		52		16.8%		9,650		58.4%
TOTAL		310		100%		16,518		100	

correlated with kin group size, kin groups receiving average amounts of national land should be more numerous than those receiving minimum or maximum amounts. Yet the distribution of kin groups according to the purchased area, illustrated in graph II.5, appears to indicate a pyramidal social stratification.

(3) The share of the "upper class" kin group.

Research on a sample of "upper class" kin groups shows that ranking of kin groups in the social hierarchy of the small town provides a quite satisfactory explanation for the **graph II.5.**



unequal character of the distribution of National Estates. This "upper class" sample was defined with the aid of the following sources:

a) The lists of clients of the Pirgos branch of the National Bank of Greece, responsible at that time for the territory of

Amalias and the surrounding villages. These lists, available for the period 1870-1878, included 32 family names also appearing in the National Estates' cessions list of Amalias.[46] Access to credit from the only official banking institution existing at that time was restricted to big farmers, notables and merchants; as a result, participation in the clientele of the Bank is a sure indication of the non-peasant identity of a family.[47]

b) A collection of 189 contracts from notarial archives of Amalias, covering the currant seasons 1877-1882. These 189 contracts were selected out of about 700 consulted, on the grounds of their relevance to currant production and trade.[48] People who appear in them as creditors of the peasantry, employers and rich landowners, were considered to belong to the "upper class". Many of them also figured in the lists of the National Bank. This source enriched our sample with another 19 family names (not appearing in the group of National Bank's customers, although some of their close relatives - bearing a different family name - did).

These 51 "upper class" kin groups received 6,852

[46]HANBG, branch offices' correspondence, "pistotikoi katalogoi emporon kai ktimation, Ipokatastima Pirgou".

[47]See G. Dertilis, "Réseaux de credit et stratégies du capital" in G. Dertilis (ed) [1988], pp.32-81.

[48]The contracts studied belonged to the Nikolopoulos archive and were produced in the periods 7.8.1877-22.1.1878, 25.5.1879-19.9.1879, 5.11.1880-27.1.1881, 3.8.1882-4.9.1882.

stremmata, or an average of 134.36 stremmata. This figure is 2.5 times greater than the average area assigned to the entire set of the 310 kin groups and 3.6 times greater than the average area assigned to the 259 kin groups not included in the "upper class" sample.

The kin groups included into our "upper class" sample, although forming only 16.5% of kin groups which received land, purchased no less than 41.5% of the total area of National Estates assigned in Amalias. And we must bear in mind that the sample is by no means an exhaustive list of the rich and powerful families in the small town.[49] There is no reason to assume that well-off families not included in it behaved in a different way. Very probably, most national land purchased in greater than average lots was acquired by the upper strata of the small town.

[49]Our data barely cover the period 1870-1882, though currant expansion continued to elevate families to the higher ranks of social and economic hierarchy until as late as 1893. To form a more complete list we would also need the credit lists of the National Bank for the period 1879-1893, as well as a more substantial number of contracts.

(4) Transfer of peasants' rights on national land in favour of members of the elite.

There are moreover strong indications that the list of cessions significantly underestimates the upper class's share of National Estates. As noted above, distributed plots were often transferred right after declaration, long before the completion of the cession. In particular, such transfers usually occurred in favour of members of the elite. Inquiry into the estate property transaction register of Amalias proves that notables were widely engaged in the purchase of peasants' rights on national land: they convinced peasants (or other citizens not interested or not possessing the means to utilize their rights to 80 stremmata of national land) to sign a contract selling them the area which these latter had just "declared" according to the procedures established by the law of 1871. At the same time the new owner assumed the responsibility for paying the remaining instalments to the government.

More often than not, the list of cessions records the original declarer and not the person to whom the rights on the plot were transferred, and who should be considered as the real purchaser. Hence, many plots in reality purchased by members of the elite, were recorded in the list of cessions

as if purchased by others and are not included in the above presented estimates of the elite's share.

On the other hand, and not surprisingly, no transaction was found in the register of national land going in the opposite direction; that is, no peasant family appears to have bought national land declared by a notable, with the very rare exception of some minute plots, never greater than 5 stremmata. In fact, peasants had no interest in buying national land "declared" by other people, since if they wished they could declare it themselves, profiting from the convenient rates of payment by instalments of the 1871 Law.

Although it is not feasible to trace the precise allocation of all plots of national land distributed in Amalias,[50] the above inquiries provide sufficient support for a general conclusion: rural rich and notable families managed to get possession of a large part of the distributed National Estates. This conclusion runs contrary to the assumption commonly accepted up to now in Greek historiography.[51]

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[50]See above, p.96.

[51]See p.2 of the introduction. However, D. K. Psihogios [1987] p.72, who used the archives of the Mortgage Hall of Lehena in order to provide figures for the composition and evolution of dowries (see chapter VI, below) reports that only wealthy farm owners and merchants appear to have "declared" more than 1 to 2 hectares of national land and notes the existence of contracts transferring rights on national land to wealthy people who wished to invest in currant vineyards.

d. The example of some individual notables.

The study of land concentration by kin, performed with the aid of the list of cessions, offered the advantage of covering the entire area distributed in Amalias. But land concentration strategies emerge still more explicitly from the study of the land purchase policies of individual notables. For this purpose, a limited number of cases of wealthy farmers was studied in detail and the full corpus of contracts appearing under their name in the estate property transactions register of Amalias were consulted.

Out of these individual cases studied in detail, two were mayors of the *demos* of Ilis; the others were a doctor, a lawyer from Pirgos, a currant merchant, three farm-owners (*ktimaties*). They all, at least occasionally, practised money-lending and were customers of the National Bank. Many of their close relatives did likewise: they were also merchants, notaries, doctors, magistrates and farm-owners.

Concentration of extensive areas of national lands was common to all cases studied. Anagnostis Dalianis, deputy to the National Parliament, purchased as many as 797 stremmata; his nephew Leonidas Galanopoulos, doctor, 837 stremmata. Together they obtained a concentrated area equal to almost 10% of all national lands distributed in Amalias. Aristeidis

Harvalos, currant merchant, purchased 450 stremmata and Theodoros Papailiou, lawyer from Pirgos, 240 stremmata. The examples could be multiplied at will, since there seems to have been scarcely any head of a notable family not tempted by the opportunity of national land consolidation.

Most of this land was concentrated by buying up the rights of other beneficiaries of the 1871 Law. 85% of the land purchased by Anagnostis Dalianis came from such indirect purchases. The relative percentage for L. Galanopoulos was 88%, for A. Harvalos 100%, for Th. Papailiou 67%.

Although it is impossible to calculate with precision how much of this land was planted with currant vines, we may conclude that most of it was. The contracts show that A. Dalianis converted at least 320 stremmata into vineyards; A. Harvalos planted the entire area he purchased (450 stremmata); Th. Papailiou planted at least 160 out of the 240 stremmata he purchased.

They all kept purchased national lands as for long as possible and none tried to speculate by selling them immediately after purchase. Unless the land was seized by creditors in times of hardship, it was inherited by successors or given to daughters as dowry. The only cases of sales encountered in research were connected to exchanges for other pieces of land or vineyards, which aimed at farm

consolidation.

Another conclusion is that most acquisitions of the notables whose land purchase contracts were studied did not take place inside the territory of Amalias, but in that of the villages surrounding it.[52] For A. Dalianis the relative percentage was 92%, for L. Galanopoulos 78%, for A. Harvalos 100%. This preference for national land situated in the territory of neighbouring villages was probably connected to the fact that these latter were less densely populated than Amalias. The fields close to the city had been cultivated for a very long time, were more fragmented, contained orchards and peasant dwellings. Unreclaimed land was found in the neighbourhood of small and newly formed villages rather than in the outskirts of the small town. This land was well suited to the purposes of the aspiring currant farmers, who could thus proceed to the establishment of extensive vineyards by reclaiming previously uncultivated or fallow land without meeting any kind of peasant resistance or traditionally established boundaries.

[52] Kardamas, Savvalia, Messologaki, Roviata, Sampanaga, situated at a distance of less than ten kilometres from Amalias.

value of the land, incomparably lower than market rates. Instalments were also modest: a person who declared his preference for a certain piece of property would pay 1.5 drachmas per stremma deposit at the moment of declaration and 3% for amortization over the next 26 years.

However, purchase of national land was not a very attractive investment (unless if it was used for a particular purpose, such as the establishment of a vineyard); since undeclared national land was abundant, the rate of increase in the value of the declared plots over time was far from being comparable to interest rates on capital. Somebody who needed to purchase land, would prefer undeclared state land to already purchased plots (unless of course he was interested in a particular plot, e.g. in order to consolidate his estate). If he bought an undeclared plot, he would benefit from the convenient rates; though if he bought a plot already purchased by somebody else a few years before, he should pay him for the instalments already disbursed. But it was better to owe instalments to the state at 2% interest, than to pay to the owner of a plot a capital sum for former instalments, at a time when interest rates on loans often exceeded 20%.[54] What actually happened was that those who, for any reason, sold national land already declared, were obliged

[54]See chapter III, below.

to accept prices much lower than the expenses they had advanced for deposit and instalments up to that moment.

To make an example, let us assume that in the sales of partly redeemed plots presented in table II.2 the two average prices calculated for the two groups, 10.4 and 23.25 drachmas, corresponded to the mean lapse of time from declaration recorded for each of the two groups; that is, to the second and eleventh year respectively. If somebody bought a plot for which two yearly instalments were already paid and sold it again nine years later, he would receive 12.85 drachmas more than he had paid; but during the nine years from purchase to sale, he would have paid no less than 18 drachmas for instalments.[55]

On the grounds of the above considerations, we may conclude that the prospect of fully redeeming the land 26 years later does not seem to have been a significant contribution to the increase of the family property. Consequently, if an occupant of national land did not intend to plant a vineyard - or to make some other permanent improvement in the plot - he would compare yearly costs of declaration only with the benefit from the exemption from the usufruct tax.

[55]Since he should pay 5% yearly on the value of the land (3% for amortization and 2% for interests), which was 40 drachmas.

Table II.2. Prices of national land only partly redeemed.[a]

lapse of time from declaration (years)	cases	average price (drachmas)	lower price (drachmas)	maximum price (drachmas)
0-4	5	10.4	6	20
5-17	4	23.25	10	33.33

Source: contracts from the estate property transactions register.

a.In all cases, the official estimate of the full value of the land was 40 drachmas per stremma.

In Amalias, prices of national land ranged between 25 and 50 drachmas per stremma (0.1 of an hectare): for the sake of our calculations, let us admit an average of 38 drachmas per stremma.[56] That is, instalments were on average 1.90 drachmas per stremma. If we accept that the deposit was paid with money borrowed at 20% a year the yearly cost of purchasing a stremma of national land rose to 2.20 drachmas.

The usufruct tax, from which declared plots were exempted, amounted to 15% of gross product. For a stremma of purchased national land which cost 2.20 drachmas a year, one would have paid as much in terms of usufruct tax if its gross output was valued at 14.66 drachmas. But one should also take into consideration that land cultivated with cereals was usually left fallow one year in two (and sometimes even longer),[57] in which case the yearly instalment would equally be paid; 2.20

[56]See HANBG, "Lists of Cessions" of the law No 431 of 1871.

[57]See e.g. Spiliotakis [1864], p.xxxi, Psihogios D.K. [1987] p.91.

drachmas a year for instalments were thus equivalent to paying "usufruct tax" for gross product amounting at 29.32 drachmas per cultivated stremma.

Cereal cultivation in the district of Amalias was usually based on a triennial rotation of maize, wheat and oats;[58] according to the 1864 agricultural census, the average gross output of these three crops was calculated at 18.82 drachmas per stremma,[59] definitely less than what was required to render "declaration" of national land directly advantageous. Moreover, the 1864 census calculation, based on market prices, rather overestimated the real monetary yield of the land, since hardly ever did the peasants get from the sale of their product the full price the market was ready to pay. As against this, "usufruct tax" was payable in kind, not obliging peasants to provide for the commercialization of their crop.

Being proportional to real yields, this tax in kind also presented considerable advantages of flexibility. In regions where currant growing had assumed dimensions of monoculture, cereals were attributed a secondary importance. During peak periods of cultivation, works in the vineyards were

[58]See e.g. cn.2662-25/11/1877, cn.2.806-14/1/1878, cn.6302-5/11/1880, cn.6329-13/11/1880, cn.6490-21/12/1880, cn.6507-29/12/1880, cn.6532-8/1/1881, cn.6571-18/1/1881, cn.8895-29/8/1882.

[59]See Spiliotakis [1864] pp.34-47.

considered more urgent than those for other crops and especially maize, the cultivation of which coincided with that of currants. As a result, cereal yields, besides variations depending on the weather, were also conditioned by time availabilities of cultivators, only allocating to these crops the time left over from currant growing.[60] Obligations ensuing from the purchase of national lands were instead fixed in time and totally independent of the degree to which the field was cultivated, to the harvest it yielded, to whether or not the peasant possessed the implements indispensable for cultivation.[61]

In conclusion, it seems that the cost of deposit and instalments to the Public Treasury was not worth paying for lands intermittently and extensively cultivated. The purchase of national lands appears to have been rewarding only to those who also possessed adequate means to intensively exploit them, in particular to convert them into currant vineyards.

But currant cultivation was a very expensive occupation, especially in terms of fixed capital. The establishment of

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[60]In several share-cropping agreements for arable fields, tenants were left the choice "to sow with maize as many stremmata as they could afford" (e.g. cn.6302-5/11/1880,cn.6329-13/11/1880) since it was probably difficult to convince them to commit an inflexible part of their activity to what was considered a secondary task. In other share-cropping agreements, probably for the same reasons, a high penalty was stipulated for share-croppers who neglected cultivation of part of the field.

[61]See D.K. Psihogios [1987] p.90-91.

vineyards was a long-term investment, since it involved the commitment of considerable amounts of land, labour and capital inputs, which would only produce a return at a distance of several years. The currant vine only started to bear any fruit five years after it was planted, was becoming profitable in its seventh year and did not fully reach maturity before its tenth or twelfth year of age.

The cost of any profitable use of purchased national lands was thus inaccessible to peasant families, which therefore limited their purchases in the tiny plots they were able to intensively cultivate by planting a few trees, some vines or by creating small orchards. Conversely, the live interest of "upper class" families in concentrating large areas of national lands was connected to the fact that they were able and interested in financing the creation of extensive currant vineyards.

Chapter III. The predominance of merchant capital over the currant sector.

The influx of credit from foreign markets, from the exporting cities and the national banking system was the principal motive force for the important changes connected with the development of the currant trade. As was argued in chapter I, immigration to the coastal plains of the Peloponnese appears to have been determined mainly by the relative availability of capital resources; and as was shown in chapter II, the concentration of landownership and consolidation of farms effected by the local elites in currant growing provinces were to a large extent financed with borrowed funds.

The economic instability that characterized the centuries preceding the establishment of the Greek state, followed by the complete devastation of the country during the long War of Independence and the civil strife that ensued, left few fortunes intact and few resources available for investment. Locally accumulated wealth was by no means sufficient to finance the spectacular growth of the currant trade. The main form of credit available to currant viticulture was that supplied by the merchant networks which controlled the commercialization of the crop. As a result, the organization of currant commerce and the strategies of the exporters were

the chief factors which shaped the pattern of development of currant viticulture: in contrast to the situation characteristic of a developed capitalist economy, in a pre-capitalist social formation dominated by merchant capitalism it is relations of exchange that fashion relations of production rather than the opposite.[1]

a. The organization of currant trade.

The currant trade was hierarchically organized in several levels, distinguished by place of action, kind and order of operation. The highest level within the frontiers of the kingdom was constituted by the Greek and foreign exporting houses, with offices in Patras, Aigion and Pirgos. Exporters collaborated with correspondents abroad or maintained branches in London and other centres of consumption.[2] They possessed access to credit both from the national banking system and from their European partners.[3] According to contemporary estimates, before the crisis of 1893 the yearly

[1]See the conclusion, p.297 below.

[2]Among the exporting houses possessing branches in England were those of Burff, Messinezis, Vourloumis, Georgakopoulos and Panagopoulos, Kollas, Kolliros, Koursis, Papagiannis, Spiropoulos and Fragkopoulos. See Kalafatis [1987] pp.218-231.

[3]Thus, after several failures which took place in 1864, the British Consul at Patras reported that "*as usual, the English merchants and bankers in England have been the chief sufferers*" (see BRCREP 1864).

borrowing from foreign houses of currant merchants amounted to 20 - 25 million drachmas;[4] during the same period, the amount advanced by the National Bank of Greece to currant merchants and big vineyard owners amounted to a further 15 - 20 million drachmas. Yearly fruit exports in 1885-1891 were valued at 50 to 60 million drachmas.[5]

The supply of fruit to the exporting houses was assured for the most part by smaller merchants established in the currant producing villages, to whom they anticipated cheap loans against promises of delivery of determined quantities of currants immediately after the harvest, at a price to be fixed according to the quotations of the market at the time of the fruit's sale.[6] Village merchants in their turn committed these funds in anticipated purchases from direct cultivators, at significantly higher interest rates and also at indeterminate prices. The final settlement of accounts usually followed the establishment or "cutting" of prices which traditionally took place in February, after the end of currant sales in England.[7]

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[4]See K.I. Zografos [1899] p.11 (referred to by Pizanias [1988] p.50 n. 10).

[5]See appendix V, p.319.

[6]The usage of open prices in the transactions between local merchants and currant exporters is also confirmed by Kalafatis [1987] p.210.

[7]See Agriantoni [1986] p.69 n.53, referring to Stavropoulos [1966] pp.631-636.

(1) The universality of the "open prices" system.

Throughout the 19th century "open prices" appear to have been applied universally throughout the currant sector. Several contracts found in the archive of J. Papadiamantopoulos - one of the most important currant merchants in the last years of Ottoman rule - indicate that this system had prevailed since at least the early nineteenth century.[8] The account offered by Hairetis in the late 1870s shows that two thirds of a century later, the currant business was carried out in much the same way. The deposit of currants in the numerous storing-houses established in Patras started in the very first days of August. Peasants were bound to deliver their produce to store-keepers who had advanced them cultivation loans during winter and spring. In this way from very early in the sales season store-keepers would accumulate large quantities of fruit, which they marketed on the owners' account. Either because they were in their turn indebted to exporters, or in order to secure the sale of some fruit at the increased prices paid for the first cargoes of currants arriving in London or Bristol, they delivered to the

[8]John Papadiamantopoulos, a national hero of the War of Greek Independence who died during the siege of Messolonghi, used to grant loans to big currant vineyard owners, usually Turkish dignitaries, at 20% to 24% interest, against promises of delivery of currants in August. See Papadiamantopoulos Archive Ms.7872/41-Patras 5/7/1817, Ms.7872/42-Patras 23/12/1818, Ms.7872/51-Patras 3/12/1820, Ms.7872/52-Patras 11/5/1820, Ms.7872/58-Patras 29/7/1819, Ms.7873/128-Patras 1/1/1821, Ms.7873/133-Patras 20/1/1821.

latter the produce of their debtors without having previously fixed its price, which was left open to be determined according to its reception in the foreign markets. Entire cargoes of currants often left Patras without the owners of the fruit knowing the price at which the store-keeper had sold them.[9]

The information given by Hairetis is also confirmed by the correspondence of the branch offices of the National Bank of Greece established in various currant growing provinces. In 1893, in a letter to the headquarters in Athens, the director of the Aigion branch of the National Bank of Greece stated that:

> "*Currant fruit keeps on being delivered to the merchants' storing-houses without any price being fixed; it is mainly the produce of those who were committed to merchants, as well as that of the merchants' farms and of their relatives. For any indication on prices we will have to wait until at least next Monday, when first shipments will take place.*"[10]

And a month later he confirmed:

> "*the part of the crop already loaded was delivered to exporters at unspecified prices, by their debtors, friends*

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[9]Chairetis (1883) pp.460-463.

[10]HANBG, "currant", file 2, Aigion to Athens, 13/8/1893.

and relatives".[11]

Such transactions seriously endangered the interests of the peasantry and of the lesser landowners who, being in debt, had no say in the fixing of the price by the store-keepers and exporters. And currant prices were strongly influenced by the speculative intentions of the merchants and by "*the avidity of the gang of store-keepers*", as Hairetis called them, who cared only about their own interests and ignored that of their indebted clients.

(2) The form of contracts stipulating anticipated purchases of currant fruit.

A concrete instance of the mechanisms governing the supply of credit against promises of currant deliveries at indeterminate prices is provided by two contracts found in the notarial archives of Amalias. The first, dating from 1878, recorded that Th. D. Lagkouras, merchant in Patras, advanced to P. Hr. Koutroulis, merchant in Amalias, the sum of 5,836.79 drachmas, against the delivery of 100,000 Venetian litres of currant fruit from the crop of August 1879. The liquidation of the loan would be calculated on the basis of the market prices at the time of the fruit's sale in

[11]HANBG, "currant", file 2, Aigion to Athens, 7/9/1893.

Patras and Lagkouras would take 2% commission. If the delivered currants fell short of the agreed quantity, Koutroulis would pay compensation at the rate of 4 drachmas per 1,000 non-delivered Venetian litres. The loan was granted "without interest" until August 1879 and 12% interest was to be paid on any further delay of repayment. According to what was often stated in similar 19th-century contracts, it may be assumed that, in practice, interest was included in the capital sum and that the interest rate was either equal to or lower than 12%.[12]

The second contract, dating from December 1877, recorded a loan of the same Amalias merchant P. Hr. Koutroulis to the currant grower D. Katzigianis. The latter, "*being in need of money for the cultivation of his farm and for other necessities of his household*", acknowledged that Koutroulis lent him the sum of 500 drachmas until August 1878, against the promise of the debtor to deliver 5,000 litres of currant fruit to the ware-houses of the merchant before 15/8/1878. The liquidation of the accounts would be based on prices running on the market at the moment of the delivery. In case of delayed repayment of the loan, the interest to be paid amounted to 24%. On the other hand, Koutroulis declared "to consider settled" all previous debts and obligations of

[12]See cn.4460-25/5/1879.

Katzigianis.[13]

The second contract is a typical example taken from a sample of 101 anticipated purchases of currant fruit consulted in the notarial archives of Amalias. These documents, dating from the period 1877-1882, concerned anticipated purchases of currant fruit in exchange for a loan, usually granted by currant merchants or wealthy farm-owners in November or December, i.e. at the time cultivation in the vineyards was starting. The price of the fruit was always left open to be determined at the moment of sale, according to the prices running on the market. The compensation to the creditor in case of non-fulfilment of the promised delivery ranged in the contracts studied between 4 and 50 drachmas per 1,000 non-delivered Venetian litres. If the loan was not fully reimbursed in August, the interest to be paid usually amounted to 20% or 24%. The interest of the loan for its normal duration was usually included in the capital sum, and therefore its rate was not recorded in the contract. But in 13 of the contracts studied, where the rate of interest from the first day of the loan was explicitly recorded, it was never lower than 20%. It should moreover be noted that most loans were tacitly renewed for several years, as indicated by the dates of the contracts concerning their

[13]See cn.2743-17/12/1877.

final settlement, usually recorded on the reverse side of the initial contract. In 35 such cases, the average duration of loans was 2.7 years (or rather 2.7 currant seasons), ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 7 years. In other cases, the loan was renewed through the signature of a new contract.[14] The rate of interest established for the eventuality of "delayed" payment therefore functioned in practice as the normal rate of interest at which the debt was running.

b. Hierarchical differentiation between sectors of merchant capital.

As is registered by the documents presented above, the mechanism of exchange of promised deliveries of fruit at "open prices" against allocation of credit, reinforced by the clause of compensation due in case of incomplete delivery, prevailed at all levels of the currant trade, from agreements between exporters and intermediaries down to deliveries promised by direct producers. In practice this meant that the entire commercial risk fell down to growers, since after having spent money and effort, they were obliged to place

[14]The contract between the merchant Koutroulis and the currant grower Katzigianis renewed older obligations of the debtor. See also cn.6376-23/11/1880, renewing a loan contracted in cn.2586-13/11/1877 and finally settled only in cn.7278-9/9/1881.

their produce in the hands of currant merchants, authorizing them to settle its price unilaterally.

On the other hand, it looks as if speculation on the product and its prices was reserved to the higher level of the currant trade, represented by the commercial houses established in the exporting cities and ports. As against this, village merchants, who were also obliged to deliver fruit to the exporters at indeterminate prices, had few possibilities of profiting directly from the commerce of currants itself. In recompense, they realized considerable gains on the difference between interest rates running on the loans granted to them by the exporters and those prevailing on advances to growers: the merchant of Patras charged the merchant of Amalias 12%, while the latter charged the growers 20%-24%.[15]

Village merchants were thus practising a form of usury. They collected the currant crop from the growers not in order to profit on its commercialization, but rather in order to exchange it for handsome and relatively cheap advances from the exporters. And they insisted in being refunded with

[15]It should be noted that rate of interest on loans against promised deliveries of fruit was somewhat lower than that charged on any other kind of loan to peasants. The latter sometimes rose as high as 30% or 40%, even when mortgage on petty farms was presented as collateral. From this one may recognize the discrepancy between currant viticulture and the rest of agriculture. See: cn.2249-9/9/1877, cn.2563 (28%), cn.4557-22/7/1879 (30%), cn.4574-4/8/1879 (30%), cn.4598-12/8/1879 (40%), cn.4638-27/8/1879 (40%), cn.4648-30/8/1879, cn.6311-8/11/1880, cn.6316-9/11/1880 (40%), cn.6489-21/12/1880 (30%), cn.6503-28/12/1880 (30%), cn.6566-18/1/1881, cn.6599-27/1/1881 (30%), cn.4462-27/5/1879 (30%).

currants - not in cash or with other crops, because only currants offered them the possibility to borrow cheaply from exporters in order to lend dearly to peasant growers.[16]

The coalition between exporters and village merchants, consisting of the reciprocal recognition of the operative field of each one, was beneficial to both parties. Village merchants renounced the profits that would have accrued to them from commerce in exchange for relatively cheap credit and an undisturbed monopoly over the supply of the village capital market; moreover, their profits were guaranteed against sudden decline of prices, as were those of exporters, since they too also purchased fruit at indeterminate prices.

In turn, exporters had various reasons for ceding to village merchants the benefit they might have kept for themselves had they lent directly to the growers at interest rates as high as 20% to 24%. First of all, the maintenance of agencies capable of administering loans and collecting the crop in a multitude of dispersed villages would have required a large investment and would probably have proved unrewarding.

Still more important, in addition to the funds advanced

[16]The insistence of village merchants on being reimbursed only with currants, expressed by the recompense clause stipulated in the contracts recording the anticipated purchases of the crop, is also witnessed by a wide range of sources (see eg. Kalafatis [1982] p.7). As I personally had the opportunity to observe in March 1987 during a research visit to Stafidokampos, a former currant producing village in the plain of Ilia, creditors' insistence on being reimbursed with currants and not in cash is still alive in the memories of older peasants.

by exporters, village merchants undertaking the collection of fruit committed considerable funds of their own in the operation. Exporters could thus maximize the stock of currants they assembled on their account. In order to collect the quantity of currants promised to the Patras merchant, the merchant of Amalias was obliged to commit in loans to growers much more than he received in advance from the former. The Patras merchant forwarded 5,400 drachmas in cash, against a promise of delivery of 100,000 Venetian litres of currants;[17] however, no less than 85 to 100 drachmas was usually forwarded to growers for every 1,000 litres promised.[18] Koutroulis himself advanced to the grower Katzigianis 500 drachmas (nominal) against the promised delivery of 5,000 Venetian litres.[19] One may reasonably infer that Koutroulis committed at least another 3,100 drachmas in order to fulfil his obligations towards his creditor. That is, in order to collect directly 100,000 litres from growers, the merchant from Patras would have had to advance a sum almost 60% greater than the one he actually advanced to the village

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[17]This figure is based on the assumption that the yearly interest rate charged by Lagkouras to Koutroulis amounted to 10% (see above p.131).

[18]This figure is an estimate resulting from the analysis of 44 contracts of anticipated currant fruit in Amalias, dating from the same period (1877-1882), on the assumption that the average duration of loans to growers was 9 months and that the interest rate was 20%. The average (nominal) sum advanced for each 1,000 Venetian litres promised was 116 drachmas and only in 9 contracts did it fall below 100 drachmas, the minimum being 58.75.

[19]See above p.132.

merchant. His additional profits from interest would have been much greater, since he would have received 20%-24% instead of 10%-12%, but so probably would have been his expenses as well. If his main objective is assumed to have been the collection of the greatest possible quantity of currants, which would facilitate his effort to influence the market and to speculate on prices, his decision to entrust the collection of fruit to the Amalias merchant appears to have been fairly rational.

The mobilization of the village merchant's resources in the collection of the currant crop on account of the exporters was also very valuable to the latter because village merchants possessed access to institutionalized credit from the National Bank of Greece. Out of 24 merchants appearing as currant purchasers in the contracts consulted in the notarial archives of Amalias, at least 12 were included in the credit lists of the Pirgos branch office of the National Bank of Greece. None out of the 71 grower-sellers were included in the lists.[20] According to the credit list of 1878, the merchant Koutroulis could borrow from the Bank up to 3,000 drachmas, an amount equal to what he had to commit in order to supply Lagkouras with the 100,000 litres he had

[20]It should be noted that surviving credit lists of the National Bank of Greece are not complete and that therefore probably at least some of the remaining 12 currant purchasers also were customers of the Bank.

promised in that same year. On the other hand, interest rates charged by the National Bank of Greece on mortgage and other types of loans to village merchants, varying between 8% and 12%,[21] seem to have determined also the level of rates charged by exporters. Most probably, the latter could not ignore the existence of a potentially antagonistic source of credit.[22]

Consultation of the archives of the National Bank of Greece fully confirms that village merchants were committing to anticipated purchases of fruit from growers not only the sums forwarded to them for this purpose by exporters, but also the loans issued by the Bank. A letter dating from 1885 directly denounced the National Bank of Greece for enriching the local merchants by granting them loans they then re-lent to currant growers at much higher interest rates. The

[21]On interest rates of mortgage and other loans issued by the National Bank of Greece, see Dertilis, "Réseaux de crédit et stratégies du capital" in Dertilis (ed.) [1988] p.72; Thomadakis [1981] p.301 (extract from the regulations of the Bank); Valaoritis [1902] p.21. In some cases of loans mentioned in the Bank's correspondence, I calculated that the interest rate was running at between 8% and 12% (this latter only in cases of overdue loans).

[22]In the early 19th century, prior to the establishment of the Greek state and of the National Bank, J. Papadiamantopoulos used to lend to outstanding Patras merchants at 20 to 24%. After the establishment of the National Bank, such rates were only charged to peasants without access to institutionalized credit: see Papadiamantopoulos Archive Ms.7872/34-15/11/1820, Ms.7872/44-8/10/1819, Ms.7872/46-7/3/1819, Ms.7872/50-17/1/1820, Ms.7872/51-3/12/1820, Ms.7872/52-11/5/1820, Ms.7872/58-29/7/1819. In times of difficulties, and at the risk of endangering his reputation, a merchant could borrow at interest rates as high as 36% (see Ms.7872/37-9/9/1818). At the same time, the upper clergy of the Orthodox church received 12% interest on cash they deposited with Papadiamantopoulos, who acted as their private banker: see Papadiamantopoulos Archive, Ms. 7872/76-1/12/1818 and Ms.7872/59-8/3/1820. In the first document Papadiamantopoulos appears as a guarantor of a loan granted to his brother-in-law Andreas Kalamogdartis by the bishop of Greek Independence Palaion Patron Germanos. On the relationship between Papadiamantopoulos and Kalamogdartis, see Bakounakis [1988] p.89. It is not accidental that the Church later on became one of the main stockholders of the National Bank.

Director of the Pirgos branch himself reported in September 1884 that "*the merchants, after having borrowed* [from the Bank], *became moneylenders, advancing capital to the peasantry in exchange for various benefits*".[23]

Unlike exporters, the National Bank did not put any effective limitation on the use of loans issued to village merchants; these latter could thus freely decide on how to invest them. The fact that village merchants committed the funds borrowed from the Bank in anticipated purchases of currants - as they did with funds advanced by exporters - indicates that this operation was a very attractive one. Loans to peasant growers against promises of delivery of currants were in fact not only a remunerative, but also a relatively safe investment. According to model estimates, the difference between the interest rates charged for loans by currant exporters to village merchants and those charged by village merchants to growers could only be considered as a compensation for risk if the risk of default on loans to peasant growers were more than four times higher than the risk of default on loans granted to village merchants.[24]

Information on 19th century borrowing conditions in Amalias does not, however, support such an enormous

[23]See eg. HANBG 23/9/1884 (25), HANBG 25/2/1885, HANBG 28/7/1892 (21a).

[24]See appendix I, p.309.

divergence in risk rates. The merchants' borrowing capacity was much higher than that of peasant families, since they could use much more sophisticated means of credit than peasants - for instance, the correspondence of the National Bank abounds with allusions to bills drawn on it which did not correspond to any real transaction of goods.[25] As a result, the debt of a merchant might often exceed the value of his property.[26] Moreover, in case of bankruptcy, merchants possessed various ways to avoid judicial seizures and full reimbursement of their debt, for instance by transferring property to other members of their family.[27]

As against this, peasant families, who enjoyed very restricted access to credit, could scarcely ever create debts larger than their wealth and productive capacity. As noted above,[28] in 1877-1880 the sum advanced against the promise of delivery of 1,000 Venetian litres of fruit was 85 to 100 drachmas, though during the same period currants of the local description were valued in the local market at 140-220

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[25]See eg. HANBG 7/4/1885 (12), 28/7/1892 (21a).

[26]Various instances of this are mentioned in the correspondence of the National Bank; see e.g. HANBG 10/10/1884.

[27]Such practices are documented by several fictitious estate property transactions found in the Transactions Register of the Hall of Mortgage Records of Amalias; see eg. the series of transactions of the families Harvalos, Galanopoulos, Dalianis. An original alternative is illustrated by the example of Giannakopouuloi Bros., grocers, who were caught during the night by the agents of the Bank while they transported merchandise out of their shop in order to avoid seizure: see HANBG 24/7/1884 (13).

[28]See above p.137.

drachmas.[29] Loans to growers were thus fully secured against any decline in the value, the quantity or the quality of the fruit to be delivered, for a proportion of up to 40% to 60%.

Moreover, peasant loans were guaranteed by additional collateral securities, usually mortgages on small currant vineyards or cottages, of a market value always considerably higher than the debt. The courts fully recognized the terms stipulated by the contracts, interest rates included, and did not hesitate to authorize seizures of property of indebted peasants.[30] Consequently, it was rather the borrower who was

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[29]See cn.2163-28/8/1877 (220 drachmas/1,000 Ven.litres), cn.2164-28/8/1877 (165 drachmas/1,000 Ven.litres), cn.2153-26/8/1877 (220 drachmas/1,000 Ven.litres), cn.4586-9/8/1879 (140 drachmas/1,000 Ven.litres), cn.8769-5/8/1882 (200 drachmas/1,000 Ven.litres).

[30]See e.g. cn.6340-16/11/1880, recording the official minutes of the auction of a 3.2 stremmata (0.32 ha) currant vineyard belonging to the debtor Anastasios Ximeropoulos:

"On Sunday, 10:00 p.m. of the 16th November 1880, in front of the coffee-shop of the heirs of Hristos Perdikis, located in the market of Dervitzelepi, at the request of the prosecuting creditor Anastasios Io. Stamatopoulos, notary of Gastouni, myself the undersigned Theodoros Nikolopoulos, notary of Ilis, put up to auction the farm of the debtor Anastasios Ximeropoulos, resident of Kalivia Palaioupoleos, seized according to the report of the process server Konstantinos G.Mperetas, after taking notice of the relative legal papers transmitted to me, consisting of: a) the loaning contract No 4248 of the notary of Lehena Andreas Vranitis, dated 16th October 1874, according to which the debtor Anastasios Ximeropoulos is obliged to pay to the prosecuting creditor Anastasios Io. Stamatopoulos the following sums: 306 drachmas for capital due, plus 80 drachmas for interest at 24% for the period from 1st October 1875 to 20th December 1876, when the creditor officially summoned the debtor to reimburse his debt, plus 12 drachmas for summon expenses, in total 398 drachmas, plus interest at 24% for the period from 20th December 1876 to 23rd August this year, when the debtor was summoned for a second time to pay, in total 759.16 drachmas; after deduction of 20 drachmas which the prosecuting creditor A.I.Stamatopoulos received from the auction of the horse of the said debtor Anastasios Ximeropoulos, there remain 731.16 drachmas, plus 10 drachmas for the expenses of the second notification, in total 741.16 drachmas, plus interest at 24% from 23rd August of this year and until full reimbursement ...

See also cn.2164-28/8/1877, cn.2163-28/8/1877.

faced with risk in case of default rather than the lender.[31]

Although not very frequent, seizure of collateral securities, especially of vineyards and fields bordering on the creditor's farm, was not totally uncommon. This incidentally provides an additional explanation for the monopoly of local merchants over the supply of the village

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[31]As aptly put by A. Bhaduri, referring to the context of Indian peasant agriculture:

> "*In such fragmented credit markets where the lender has considerable monopoly power in undervaluing the price of collateral securities, the concept of a lender's risk premium becomes not only irrelevant but positively misleading. By undervaluing the collateral securities sufficiently, the lender can not only cover his capital loss of defaulted loan, but also make a "capital gain" through transfer of the collateral in case of default.* Such a situation is characterized not by lender's risk but by borrower's risk *in case of default.*" Bhaduri [1983] p.77.

However, I would not subscribe to Bhaduri's position that under these conditions money-lenders systematically aimed at seizures in order to realize a "capital gain", at least in the case of 19th-century Peloponnese. Bhaduri uses the concept of borrower's risk in the framework of a model quite different from the one presented here. His view is that moneylenders positively try to provoke default in order to profit from the capital gain arising from seizure of the undervalued collateral. The debtor in turn is supposed to consider credit from unorganized credit markets as an "inferior good" and is expected to borrow less when his revenue increases. Consequently "*a landlord's income from usury may decrease as a result of increased level of income for his tenant*" (*ibidem*, p.83). His line of reasoning leads to the well-known and justly criticized thesis - see Ghose and Saith [1976], Griffin [1974], Newbery [1975], Srinivasan [1979], Bardhan [1984] and others - of "*maintenance of forced commerce through technological backwardness*", by which landlords and moneylenders positively hinder economic growth in order to prevent the peasants' revenue from increasing, an effect which would supposedly decrease their profits from forced commerce. The problem is that if moneylenders possess the monopoly power to undervalue collateral securities and to impose high interest rates, then it is difficult to understand why they should not also have the power to extract sufficient part or even the whole of the increase of the debtor's revenue in case of technological improvement. If on the other hand the creditor, drawing his profits principally from moneylending, does not aim at radically changing the system of cultivation, why should he systematically proceed to seizures, thus endangering the profitable personalized relationship he maintains with his debtors? In the case of 19th century Peloponnese, my impression is that village merchants lent to peasants principally in order to profit from high interest rates and not in order to seize securities; they did not of course disdain seizing mortgaged fields bordering on their farms or if some change in the conditions of the debtor's family rendered the relationship less profitable or more risky. As Eve Karousou observed during her current research on an impressive set of 19th century loan contracts from the district of Argos, creditors often proceeded to seizures when the head of the indebted family died and when no guarantees existed that heirs (eg. a widow with young children) were able to respect the family's obligations.

credit market: undervalued collateral securities offered by peasant growers, other than promises of delivery of currant fruit, could not be of any particular use to exporters and bigger merchants established far away from the mortgaged securities. A petty vineyard or a small house could not serve much to a big exporting company, though it could be very valuable to the owner of the neighbouring big farm who wished to enlarge his estate.[32]

c. The speculative practices of currant exporters and their impact on the terms of trade.

By applying "open prices", exporters and village merchants avoided having to discount risks from commercialization, which fell entirely on the growers; they thus increased the amount of currants they could market with a given amount of

[32]The observations of A. Bhaduri *op.cit.*, p. 76, although they refer to a different context, characterized by a much less advanced degree of commercialization than the currant growing Peloponnese, are particularly relevant to this point: "*The functioning of unorganized rural money markets is inextricably interwoven with economic power relations between the debtor and the creditor, which serve a dual purpose in determining the acceptability of collateral securities and valuing them for advancing loans. Because the lender frequently enjoys considerable personal power over the borrower, he can enforce the terms and conditions of the loan arrangement far more effectively than an institutional lender from the organized money market. A landlord lending to his tenants, or a local money-lending trader through whom the borrowing peasant markets his harvest, is usually in a much stronger position than a lender in an organized market to recover defaulted loans, using such means as attachment of future labour services, direct or indirect transfer of land through revision of tenurial arrangements etc. This personal power over the borrower allows a private moneylender to accept otherwise unacceptable securities for advancing loans, and the general unmarketability of these collaterals by the peasant in the organized credit market for assets also gives a private moneylender the exceptional economic power to place an arbitrary valuation on the collaterals offered by poor peasants.* "

capital, because they were not obliged to hold reserves for the eventuality of a season of bad prices.

On the other hand, by avoiding the discount of risks from commerce, exporters renounced the lawful recompense which would have accrued to them had they guaranteed to the growers a fixed price for their produce. As a result, their profits came to depend mainly on speculative manipulations or straightforward fraud. If exporters and village merchants had not tried to influence prices according to their own interest and had cleared their accounts with the growers according to the prices really paid by the foreign markets, the difference between producer's and export prices, constituting the merchants' profit, would not have exceeded by much taxes and cost of transport. In fact, given that risk was assumed by the grower, in a perfect market, recompense for it should be calculated together with the cost of production, and producer's prices should not normally differ much from export prices.

Savage speculation was thus an integrate part of the merchants' practices, the necessary complement of the system of "open prices". Protected as they were by it, exporters, in the pursuit of market control and profit maximization, could freely play around with the value of currants, the quality and timing of deliveries.

For instance, they often used to accept orders for large deliveries of fruit from the future crop.[33] Having concluded agreements with a firm abroad, they often speculated on the devaluation of the crop, trying to profit from the difference between the price fixed with foreign importers and the price paid to local intermediaries, determined only at the moment of delivery of fruit according to the quotations of the market. A frequently adopted practice aiming at a fall in prices was to spread rumours that the harvest exceeded the needs of international demand.[34]

Another practice which also destabilized trade and stimulated the decline in price was competition between merchants to export as quickly as possible the maximum

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[33]See e.g. BRCREP 1881: "*Large contracts for delivery of currants in November, December, January, and February were made by Greeks and other foreigners with French buyers in the early part of the season, and this having become generally known, speculators were forced, in order to fulfil their engagements, to pay higher prices than would otherwise have been necessary.*" That occasion of course represented the exception rather than the rule, since it occurred under the sudden and heavy pressure of the entrance of France into the currant market. For information on a much earlier period, see the interesting correspondence on orders by Davison Newman & Co. of London to merchants in Leghorn for the purchase of currant fruit from the Morea and the Ionian Islands during the period 1778 - 1817 (Ms.8612/1 of the manuscript.section of Guildhall Library, London).

[34]On this point see also Kalafatis [1987] p.210. By contrast, merchants of the foreign markets, having concluded agreements at fixed prices, did their best to provoke increases. Spreading false rumours seems to have been a very common practice, as also indicated by the following short ironic comment of *The Fruit Trade Journal* of London, No 11, July 31, 1890, p.345, :

"Up went the price of - currants!" Mr. Golds, "the Currant King", is back again. Now listen to the result: the market which had been declining during his absence steadied immediately."

Mr. E.A.Golds was a member of the permanent committee of the wholesale dealers in dried fruits (*ibidem*, April 1, 1890, No 4, p.110).

available quantities of fruit.[35] In that way foreign markets were glutted and transactions could proceed only by lowering prices.[36] Most probably, the exporters' haste, at least in part, was deliberately aimed at devaluation. It also pointed to the high prices traditionally attributed to first arrivals of fruit. Exporters tried to place on the market first the product of their own vineyards and that of their close associates. Moreover, early realization permitted merchants who operated with limited and often with borrowed funds to clear their accounts as quickly as possible, thus saving interests and speeding up the turnover of their running capital.[37]

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[35]See HAIRETIS [1883] pp.461-463 and 467-473; also BRCREP 1895: "*At the opening of the currant season, 28/8 by law, 3 steamers from London and 2 from Liverpool, guaranteed by their owners to do the passage home with early fruit within ten days, obtained full cargoes at the handsome freights of 1 10s per ton. Shipowners having steamers of capacity of not over 1000 tons, capable of doing the run from Patras to London and Liverpool within ten days, who may wish to compete for this early business, should put themselves into communication with some of the ship agents in this place during the month of May or June.*"; BRCREP 1896: "*At the opening of the currant season in August, when* a large fleet of steamers usually collects to carry home early cargoes of fruit at enhanced rates of freight, *there was considerable disappointment for shipowners, as the crop was unusually late, much smaller supplies than usual were sent forward from the provinces for sale, and many steamers, having been lying for a long time on the berth waiting for cargo, had to leave almost empty, in order to fulfil their engagements elsewhere.*"

[36]According to Hairetis [1883] p.467-471, the effects of competition between merchants to export as quickly as possible worsened with the substitution of steamers for sailing vessels in the 1860s. Because of their limited capacity and their dependence on the weather, sailing vessels carried the crop in smaller quantities and used to reach London at rather unpredictable dates, thus helping the prices to stay high for longer periods. As against this, big steamers transported most of the crop in a very short time, increased supply and established equilibrium between supply and demand at a lower price.

[37]See Hairetis [1883] pp.471-472. Also Kalafatis [1987] p.210, on early sales by local merchants-intermediaries.

(1) Short-term movement of prices in Patras.

The short-term movement of prices in the main export centre, that of Patras, represented on graph III.1, reflects quite clearly the cumulative impact of the merchants' speculative practices. Except for 1879 and 1880, years marked by the sudden and massive opening of the French market to Greek currants,[38] prices always showed a considerable decline between the start of the transactions on a year's crop in August-September and the end of the year.[39] This four-month period included the great bulk of shipments of a year's crop. The decline of prices varied much between different qualities; the graph presents the evolution of the average as well as the maximum rate of decline registered for any single quality (usually referring to the lowest quality which also represented most of the crop).

As suggested above, declining prices directly favoured the merchants' interests. Since growers could not easily check the exact date their produce was exported, merchants could tell them that it was exported after the prices had dropped. In that way, that part of the crop merchants managed to export at the beginning of the sales' season at high prices,

[38]See BRCREP 1879 and 1880.

[39]Cfr. also Kalafatis [1987] p.181-184.

graph III.1. Change of currant prices at Patras from September to December, 1877 - 1896.



0% = annual prices at opening of sales.

Sources: BRCREP 1877-1896.

they could reimburse to growers at the low prices of the end of the year.

An episode illustrating such a manoeuvre is reported in 1888 by the director of the branch office of the National Bank at Pirgos. In that year, producers deposited their fruit in the merchants' ware-houses right after the harvest, earlier and in a more massive way than usual. Having the option to "declare" the sale of their product at any moment

they wished, i.e. to ask to be paid for it at the prices running at that particular moment on the market, several producers chose September, some others November or December, and a few left the date open for further confirmation, in order to choose the date they would consider most convenient. The merchants, as soon as they got possession of several millions of Venetian litres of currants by committing insignificant amounts of capital, hastily exported important quantities at rewarding prices, with which they satisfied the requirements of foreign consumption. After completion of that operation they deliberately devalued the crop by starting to send to the foreign markets currants damaged by rain or mixed with dirt, selling them at very low prices. This change occurred at the very moment producers were due to be paid. Those who had already chosen a fixed date or were not able to wait any more because of urgent needs, were paid at only 135-140 drachmas per Venetian litre, i.e. at 30% less than the opening price of the respective quality of fruit in 1888.[40] And those who could wait longer just postponed their "declaration", hoping for better days to come.[41]

The chronic tendency of currant prices at Patras to drop

[40]See BRCREP 1888.

[41]See HANBG 31/10/1888 (46). Similar events are denounced in an anonymous letter to the Headquarters of the National Bank, dating from 25/2/1885, also in HANBG.

considerably over one and the same season shows the degree to which Greek merchants avoided committing funds in storing the crop and in waiting for satisfactory prices of realization. It is not possible to check whether any single group of merchants wished to follow any alternative policy; but there is no doubt that since the interests of all merchants were protected against devaluation of the crop by the application of "open prices", none of them was urged to change things.[42]

(2) A comparison between Patras and London prices.

In order to assess the far-reaching negative consequences of the system of "open prices", let us examine what would have been the probable implications of an economically sounder behaviour. If currant exporters had been willing to assume and discount the risks arising from currant trade, they would have effected their anticipated purchases from producers at determined prices. These prices would have been lower than those actually paid by the merchants, since risk would have been discounted. Exporters would have committed

[42]Hairetis [1883] p.472 suggests that even though some merchants possessing their own capital might have wished to follow a more reasonable policy, they were obliged to follow the example of hurried sellers who formed the majority. But one may doubt the true intentions of the bigger merchants: these latter controlled a considerable part of currant exports and might seriously influence the dominant practices of the market. For example, Kalafatis [1987] p.187-188, table 52 reports that in 1879 the two biggest exporting houses, the German Fells & Co. and that of Geroussis (a close relative of Hairetis) exported 50% of the entire quantity of currants sent to France in that particular year.

more capital in order to discount risks, but they would have been recompensed for it by the increased difference between producer's and export prices. Meanwhile, instead of trying to devalue the crop, merchants would have tried to sell it at the best possible prices, since they would have direct interests in it.

The comparison between the movement of prices at Patras and at London, presented on graph III.2, indicates that, in fact, the crop might have been sold at better prices. In both places, prices usually moved in the same direction, reflecting the changing relation between volume of the crop and quantity needed by international consumption. However, wholesale London prices tended to amplify price increases at Patras and to show a certain inertia in their adjustment to price drops in the places of production. Only in two out of ten years of observation for first quality fruit (in 1876 and 1877) and in four out of ten for lower quality fruit (1868, 1875, 1877 and 1878) did London prices rise less than Patras prices; in the remaining eight and six years respectively, either they rose more sharply or they showed a smoother decline.

graph III.2. Movement of prices at the markets of Patras and London, 1861-1878.



Sources: Hairetis [1883] p.402; BRCREP 1865-1878.[43]

Another comparison between currant prices at Patras and London for the period 1875-1896, although much less accurate because referring to a series of London prices which did not differentiate between different qualities, shows that in only seven out of twenty years of observation did the difference

[43]Prices at Patras presented in graph III.2 are the average prices of two subsequent crops, in order to be comparable to prices at London; these latter referred to the average price of a given quality over a whole year, in other words they referred to the prices of two subsequent crops, that of the current and that of the preceding year - since until the arrival of the new fruit in September markets of consumption were supplied with currants from the preceding season. Prices at London do not include import duty.

between Patras and London prices display any tendency to decrease.[44]

A test carried out for the period 1882-1896 demonstrated that fluctuation of freights did not provide even a partial explanation for the observed divergence between prices in London and at Patras (apart from the fact that freightage represented less than 5-6% of the value of currants).[45] The above comparison therefore indicates that sellers at London tended to be more firm and obtained relatively better prices than did holders of fruit in Patras.[46]

That London merchants often managed to increase the difference between Patras and London currant prices confirms that currant prices at Patras were by no means the highest that international consumption would have accepted. Had Greek exporters been willing to improve their marketing practices by committing larger amounts of capital for longer periods,

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[44]This comparison was made utilising the average prices at Patras reported by the British Consul and the average prices at London reported by Pizanias [1988], table VI of the appendix, pp. 141-142. The latter series is the mean of a random compilation of different prices of different qualities (cfr. *ibidem* pp.86-87) and is therefore not to be used without reservation.

[45]Freights for the shipment of currants from Patras to London are regularly reported by the British consul at Patras in his annual account.

[46]A concrete example is offered by a report on the London currant market in *The Fruit Trade Journal*, n.16, 4/9/1890:

> "*About 1600 tons were placed on the market by the arrival of the first two vessels. A fair business has been done in all growths, though sales have been rather slow* owing to the merchants forgetting the reduction that has taken place in the duty" (emphasis added).

In 1890, the British import duty on currants was reduced from 7 to 2 shillings per cwt.; presumably, importers tried to profit on the reduction by selling at the same prices as before.

the value of the currant crop would have greatly improved, to the benefit of the sector and of the Greek economy at large.

d. The attitude of growers.

Currant growers did not always suffer without protest the effects of the merchants' speculative practices. The British consul at Cephalonia reported in 1866 that:

> "*Sales opened at 32 dollars per mil in the Lixuri market, on which side the finest currants are produced, not without undue pressure, however, for the peasantry who farm the vineyards, and have an immediate interest in half the produce, assembled* en masse, *assumed a menacing attitude, and intimated a determination to prevent purchases at a lower price being embarked ...*"[47]

But the peasantry had few chances of improving the marketing conditions of their produce, since merchants possessed much stronger means for overcoming any resistance. The same consul reported in the next year's account that:

> "*as regards the merchants, the first effect of their recent experience will naturally be to induce greater caution, and an abstinence from all speculation, not attended by prospects of a certain gain, as also a total*

[47]BRCREP Cephalonia 1867-68.

change in the methods adopted for ensuring a ready supply of stock for the opening market, a change which could not fail to produce increased distress among the growers, accustomed hitherto to rely on large advances in cash on the strength of the coming crop."[48]

The change alluded to by the consul was that Cephalonian merchants, in order to become independent of the local supply, started buying up increasing quantities of Morea fruit for delivery in Cephalonia, where it was deposited, on arrival, in the Transit Stores, and thence reshipped for England "*at the convenience of the purchasers*".[49]

Another popular outburst against the practices of the merchants occurred in the early 1860s, when manifestations in Aigion and other currant growing centres convinced the government to pass a law making obligatory the fixing of prices prior to any delivery of fruit. But the law was soon revoked, without leaving any trace upon the established practices of the currant trade.[50]

The indeterminacy of price until after the delivery of fruit reflected the unconditional ascendancy of merchant capital over currant production, which could by no means be

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[48]BRCREP Cephalonia 1868-1869.

[49]See BRCREP Cephalonia 1867, 1870.

[50]See Agriantoni [1986] p.69 n.53, referring to Stavropoulos [1966] pp.631-636; also Kalafatis [1982] p.8.

altered by the simple promulgation of a law. The practice of "open prices" constituted the organizing principle of currant commerce, similar to the "*contratto alla voce*" which prevailed in Southern Italy for olive oil and wheat.[51] As noted above, its main effect was that the entire trading risk weighed on the grower, without his being in a position to influence the fate of his crop. Because he was obliged to deliver the crop to his creditors without even knowing

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[51]On the chronologically earlier Southern Italian counterpart to the Peloponnesian anticipated purchases of currant fruit, see Aymard [1978] p.1147: "*... Vi è infine il livello dei rapporti sociali di produzione, dove la funzione del denaro è lungi dal limitarsi a quella di un semplice strumento per il pagamento dei salari e dei canoni. Più diffusa e più insidiosa, la sua presenza vi assume forme più complesse e più vincolanti. Le vendite anticipate, "alla meta" o "alla voce", sottendono il funzionamento dell'agricoltura meridionale: sono la contropartita degli anticipi in denaro, in grano per la semina o l'alimentazione, in bestiame, talvolta in arature del maggese compiute con le bestie da tiro del gabelloto, e il prezzo da rimborsare è un prezzo "politico", fissato all'indomani del raccolto dalle amministrazioni locali, che deve remunerare l'interesse "legitimo" dei capitali anticipati dai mercanti; in caso di non regolamento del credito accordato, in denaro o in natura, questo può venire regolato nella stagione successiva; ma i tomoli di grano e le libbre di seta non consegnati saranno allora fatturati al prezzo del mercato, sensibilmente superiore. Le "mete" dell'olio (gennaio) e del grano (luglio) regolano così in Sicilia, verso il 1600, tutta l'organizzazione del credito a medio termine, anche in città. Ma anche allora continuano a integrare i produttori contadini entro un sistema vincolante, che li esclude di fatto dall'accesso diretto al mercato, e quindi dai possibili guadagni della commercializzazione.*"

But even in more recent times and even in relatively "modern" sectors such as that of citrus fruit, credit continued to play an important role as a means of control over Southern-Italian agricultural production and commercialization of agricultural produce. See Aymard [1987] p.20: "*Salvatore Lupo, nel ripercorrere un secolo di storia della coltura degli agrumi in Sicilia, ha in effetti sottolineato con chiarezza tutte le ambiguità di questa "agricoltura ricca", conquistatrice sicura di sé, che segna progressi rapidissimi a partire dagli anni '50 e '60 dell'Ottocento. Anche se infinitamente meno rigida di quanto non fosse stata in passato quella del grano, e di quanto non fosse in quello momento quella dello zolfo, anche se più aperta all'intervento attivo, nel funzionamento dei mercati e nella formazione dei prezzi, degli operatori locali che riuscivano a imporre la propria mediazione, la sua organizzazione commerciale è rimasta speculativa nel suo stesso principio, come mostrano la pratica degli acquisti del raccolto anticipati sulla pianta e delle esportazioni a rischio del mittente, le forti oscillazioni incontrollabili e mal controllate dei prezzi, il peso sociale degli intermediari (fontanieri, guardiani, sensali, speculanti, magazzinieri, ecc.). Siano essi di origine siciliana o straniera, i grandi esportatori insediati a Palermo, Messina e Catania faticheranno a stabilire, e più ancora a mantenere, una posizione dominante in un settore le cui stesse strutture produttive sfuggono loro e su cui essi intervengono soprattutto dall'esterno, attraverso la via indiretta del credito.*"

whether the costs of production would be reimbursed, the grower was deprived of any bargaining power and was left at the mercy of exporters, store-keepers and village merchants.

The timing of these popular outbursts is, however, quite significant. The 1860s were the only decade of successive years of low currant prices throughout the long golden era of the currant trade, covering most of the 19th century. Between 1867 and the end of the century, when overproduction led once again to continuous and serious decline of currant prices, no peasant unrest is recorded whatsoever and long social peace seems to have ruled.

Thus, merchants' speculations seem to have encountered peasant resistance only in bad times. But under favourable circumstances, when profits from currant trade were so great that, even though merchants kept most of them, the part left to the grower was substantial, the peasantry accepted the rules of the game set by the merchants.

It may in fact be argued that, by using savage speculative practices such as those described above, exporters could not always sweep from growers the entire benefit from the commercialization of the crop. The following example, referred to by Ch. Agriantoni,[52] indicates that although merchants enjoyed considerable liberty in settling currant

[52]Agriantoni [1986] p.70, reported by the French consul in Patras.

prices according to their interests, they were nevertheless not completely uncontrolled. In 1859, after the bankruptcy of one of the two biggest foreign currant exporting houses (Igget & Co.), the remaining one (Burff & Co.) considered that there were no more competitors and offered abusively low prices to the farmers - 125 to 160 francs for a thousand litres of good quality fruit. But Greek merchants immediately intervened and started to buy at prices ranging between 265 and 325 francs; Burff & Co. was finally constrained to surrender.

Moreover, when, thanks to strong international demand and despite the speculations of the Greek merchants, prices tended to increase vigorously, growers could make good profits. For instance, as reported by the British consul at Patras for the year 1872:

> "*Although growers and shippers anticipated low prices, basing their calculations on the prices of previous years, when the crops were very much less in quantity than now, they have been agreeably disappointed, and have obtained higher rates than they did when the crops were small ... It is evident that so large a crop ... at the average high price of 21 per ton, has thrown a large amount of money into the hands of the agricultural and labouring classes;*

and there has, consequently, been a large increase in the amount of goods imported."[53]

Similarly, in 1880, when the opening of the French market caused a rise in currant prices between the start of shipments in September and the end of the year,[54] the British consul reported:

"The shipments to France have relieved the English market of a large surplus quantity, so that prices have been well maintained in all places of consumption to the great benefit of the Greek grower."[55]

e. A risk-neutral peasantry?

Although the sector was dominated by the speculative practices of merchants illustrated in the previous paragraphs, peasant families continued for more than a century to massively settle in the coastal plains of the Peloponnese in order to cultivate currants. This indicates that, despite what is usually considered to be the typical

[53]See BRCREP 1872.

[54]See above p.147.

[55]See BRCREP 1880.

attitude of the peasantry towards risk,[56] peasant growers seem in the case of currant viticulture to have borne the risks from trade almost without complaint.

It may be argued that in all probability, due to labour scarcity, elevated productivity and high remuneration of work in the vineyards, currant growers were not dangerously close to subsistence levels of consumption and that they could afford a bad currant season without risking to starve. Moreover, it is probable that creditors did not go very far in seizing the mortgaged properties of indebted peasants, and that in cases of bad trade conjunctures, they would rather renew the loans of their debtors, waiting for better times.

f. The interaction between the organization of trade and the organization of production.

As suggested above, the fact that currant merchants avoided assuming and discounting trading risks led them to speculative marketing practices which worsened the terms of trade. They thus contributed to the creation of an unstable economic environment, characterized by violent shifts from prosperity to disaster and from high to low prices and vice-

[56]Students of peasant economics widely accept that peasants, living close to minimum levels of subsistence, tend to be much more risk-averse than rich landowners or merchants (see e.g. Adams and Rask [1968], R. Pearce [1983] p.58).

versa.

Trade instability, in turn, influenced significantly the organization of currant production. Although as suggested in the previous chapter, wealthy and powerful local families managed to establish large and consolidated vineyards, the uncertainty of the currant market rendered very difficult the direct exploitation of these farms. A wealthy farm owner willing to run his estate with the aid of hired labour would need - in addition to the ordinary circulating capital for advancing wages and other expenses of the yearly cultivation - a considerable reserve of funds in order to survive bad selling years and to be able to expect for the good ones. But a possessor of capital would prefer committing it to trade or money-lending, activities which yielded elevated and relatively safe returns, rather than immobilizing it in farming.

On the contrary, the peasant family unit of production possessed labour of its own, abundant and reliable; peasant family heads were not obliged to advance wages and - if necessary - they could convince the members of their family to reduce their consumption. This offered them a flexibility which was invaluable in bad conjunctures.

As a result, the production unit which prevailed in the currant sector was the peasant family farm; and the only

viable solution for the large farms of non-peasant owners was to rent them to peasant share-croppers. On the other hand, the predominance of small units of production accentuated the under-capitalization of agriculture - itself a preliminary condition for the domination of merchant capital.[57] As will be argued in greater detail in the following chapters, merchant domination and peasant organization of production reinforced each other, blocked the possibility of a radical qualitative shift of the economy and were perpetuated and reproduced throughout the secular expansion of the currant sector.

[57]For a general theoretical discussion of the incompatibility of merchant capital ascendancy with a high degree of economic development, see K.Marx, *Capital*, vol.3, pp.323-338.

Chapter IV. Notables, peasants and currant vineyards.

The negative influence of the predominance of merchants on the currant sector was not restricted to the instability provoked by their way of carrying out trade; the very fact that currant exporters were, together with the National Bank of Greece, the exclusive suppliers of credit to agriculture, posed quite complicated problems for the organization of production.

Capital requirements for the creation of vineyards had a primarily long-term character, since several years would elapse until amortization of the expenses of planting and infrastructure. But merchants aimed at a rapid turnover of their assets; the National Bank had been set up to serve commerce and the public treasury, not agriculture or industry. As a result, long-term loans were simply not available on the money market.[1]

The solution offered by Peloponnesian society to the contradiction between long-term exigencies and the exclusively short-term character of credit supply consisted of an arrangement between notable purchasers of National Estates and peasant families which stipulated the active participation of both sides in costs, risks and benefits

[1]On the centrality of the question of credit in the case of 19th-century Greece, see the contributions of G.B. Dertilis, N. Bakounakis, L. Fontaine, E. Bournova, T. Kalogri and K. Kostis in G.B. Dertilis (ed) [1988].

arising from the creation of currant vineyards. In particular, this arrangement offered peasant families the possibility of acquiring currant vineyard property in exchange for planting the elite's farms.

a. The typical currant vineyard farm.

M. Hairetis and the folklorist D. Psihogios provide detailed accounts of the permanent land improvements required to create currant farms, and these are amply confirmed by archival sources.[2] As reported, the land was first carefully drained and cleaned of stones and bushes. The fields situated on the hill-sides were divided in several parts by stone terraces, perpendicular to the slope of the soil, which prevented the earth from being washed away by rain and continuous digging. After the walls had been built, the ground was levelled by hoe and holes were dug to receive the new vines. An ample corridor of about two meters was left between every other row of currant vines, wide enough for a cart. Finally, a trench was dug around the field to drain off the water coming from the rows of the vines and discharge it in the nearest ditch or gorge. After the trenches had been dug, the field was fenced with reeds, except for the sides

[2]Hairetis [1883] pp.251-267; Dinos Psihogios, "Ta ktimata", *Iliaka* n.11, August-September 1979, pp.985-986.

bordering on other currant farms, which were left unfenced.

Somewhere on the estate, often on its higher and better ventilated part, a house called *metohi* was constructed for the sojourn of the owner's family during the summer months. The *metohi* was equipped with facilities depending on the owner's affluence: it might vary from a simple hut to a luxurious neoclassical villa, similar to those possessed by wealthy farm owners and merchants in town.[3] In big estates, not very far from the luxurious "*metohi*" where landowners spent a part of the summer, there were also simpler houses to which the share-croppers (*semproi*) and their families moved during the critical months of currant cultivation, namely June, July and August.[4]

The *metohi* was usually surrounded by orchards with citrus and other fruit trees, vegetables and flowers. Indispensable elements of the estate were also threshing floors for the drying of currants, one or more wells, cisterns, store houses, paths linking the farm and the house to the main road, useful for the transportation of fruit by cart, as well as for the passage of the landowner's coach. The main

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[3]According to E. Psihogiou [1987], p.228, in the plain of Ilia, "*there often existed luxurious dwellings in the big estates of currant merchants and other rich families, similar to the magnificent neoclassical houses these people owned in town*".

[4]Share-cropping agreements sometimes expressly specified the obligation of share-croppers to stay with their family in the *metohi*: see cn.2725-12/12/1877, cn.4528-3/7/79.

entrance was usually closed with an iron or wooden door and stone-built columns. In addition to currant vines, covering the major part of the estate, there were also olive trees, wine vines, and arable land reserved for sowing winter cereals.[5]

b. Short term inelasticity of currant production to price.

Apart from the considerable expenses required for the long term improvements described above, currant viticulture was also in great need of long-term credit because of the frequent cyclical crises of the sector, which could not be met by a reduction in the costs of cultivation.

The decision to plant was binding, because it implied - besides costs of initial investment - the permanent

[5]An impressive description of a currant farm is found in HANBG Pirgos, 30/4/1882, n.7a, provided by the judicial announcement of auction of the property of P.I. Halikiopoulos, the most important National Bank debtor at Pirgos, politician and editor of the "Journal of Greek Agriculture". This farm was probably one of the biggest and best equipped of its time, covering 501.803 stremmata (50.18 ha) of land in the vicinity of Pirgos, cut into three parts by two roads passing through the fields. The first of the three parts was 93.7 stremmata large, situated on the slope of a hill; on its top, 3 stremmata formed a plateau, where a two-floor stone-built house was constructed, 730 square meters large. It had 11 rooms, 45 doors and windows, and was "*nicely embellished*" with a staircase of marble. It also possessed 4 storehouses, 1,650 square meters large, and a well. The fields around the house were planted with 80 stremmata of currant vines, 890 olive-trees, 300 pear-trees, 100 fig-trees, 80 almond-trees and 40 mulberry-trees. The second part, 192 stremmata large, was flat, planted with 160 stremmata of currant vines, tidily cultivated, an orchard of 15 stremmata with citrus and other fruit trees, 2 stremmata of wine vine-trees, 3 stremmata sultana vine, a cistern, solidly constructed, a warehouse 245 square meters large, built with limestone and surrounded by a peristyle, and two wells equipped with *British* pumps. In the third part, 215.4 stremmata large, there were 63 stremmata with sultana and mulberry nurseries and a stone-built cistern. The rest was arable land. The estate bordered onto currant vineyards of other owners and national lands.

obligation to provide for the maintenance of the vines. Once planted, the currant vine needed continuous care and expenditure, otherwise it would turn wild and part of the initial investment would be completely lost. Repairing the damage caused by a single season's careless cultivation might require several years of special treatment.[6] Even when prices barely covered costs, growers carried on farming by any possible means and sacrifice in order to preserve the productive capacity and value of their vineyards.[7] This goal could not of course always be attained and lack of resources often led to defective cultivation;[8] but this kind of compulsory adaptation to short term expectations was not an efficient solution, since it provoked great damage to the vines.

The impossibility for farm owners to adjust the intensity

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[6]See below chapter V.

[7]The concern of producers to find the means for sustaining cultivation in years of disastrously low prices is indeed very frequently expressed in the sources. Such examples were often referred in the accounts of the director of the Pirgos Department of the National Bank of Greece, who reported that landowners were in such cases obliged to contract usurious loans (e.g. HANBG Pirgos, 25/4/1869, 1/12/1870, 16/11/1879). Moreover, the Bank was often worried by the damage that careless cultivation might cause to vineyards mortgaged to the establishment; sometimes, the director judged it preferable to renew a loan to an insolvent producer, in order to encourage him to cultivate the vineyard which constituted the security of the loan (e.g. *ibidem*, 31/1/1870, 16/3/1884). In effect, such problems could not be totally avoided, and in some rare cases individual vineyards lost their value because of defective cultivation (e.g. *ibidem*,16/9/1875). An account of the efforts of landowners to continue cultivation in the adverse conditions of the terrible overproduction crisis of the 1890s, is offered in HANBG currant, file 2, Pirgos 12/3/1894.

[8]See *Apantisis tou en Patrais* ..., p.4-6. Conversely, when high prices were foreseen, cultivation was performed with increased care. See eg. HANBG 31/1/1870 (3).

of cultivation to conjunctural conditions conferred on the currant sector a marked inflexibility, with serious effects on its development. Greece held the international monopoly of currant production; consequently, the market was directly influenced by the volume of the Greek crop, and prices depended on its relation to international demand. Excessive supply induced disproportionate falls in prices, and the total value of abundant crops was often lower than that of smaller ones. But since currant growers could not adjust output to expectations, the fall in prices did not have any immediate impact on supply. In fact, during the entire period 1830-1893, the volume of the crop only fell when it was affected by unfavourable weather or disease. There was never any deliberate decrease of production and cultivation increased continuously, except when financial conditions were so adverse that farmers could not find even the means indispensable for preventing deterioration of their vineyards.

As a result, the main factor determining the evolution of the volume of the crop was the past rate of creation of vineyards. But this rate was not related to current prices. Thus, at times of depression, the crop usually continued to increase, due to formerly planted vineyards gradually continuing to reach maturity. In such cases, the increase of

production accentuated the problem of excessive supply, and at the same time led to an increase in overall production costs.

c. The impact of price fluctuations on the expansion of vineyards.

As against lack of short term output elasticity, fruit prices had a decisive long term impact on production through the variation of the rate of expansion of vineyards. According to contemporary observers, most vineyards were planted in years of favourable prices, and conversely, low prices slowed down any planting activity. Massive planting in 1834-1841, 1845-1847 and 1856-1857 was attributed to the high prices ruling during those years.[9]

Detailed analysis of the correlation of the rate of expansion of vineyard acreage to price variations and to other factors influencing investment in the currant sector would require the accurate assessment of the evolution of the planted area. But the only index available for indirectly estimating vineyard acreage is the rate of growth of production, and this index presents several defects.[10] The

[9]See Mansolas [1868] p.72 and p.74 and *Efimeris Ellinikis Georgias*, January 1856, p.205.

[10]See above chapter I, n.17, p.27.

volume of a year's crop was related to vineyards aged at least seven years, since vines only yielded fruit seven years after being planted. But a year's crop was also influenced by climatic conditions, as well as by the meticulousness of cultivation in that and in the directly preceding years, and this in its turn depended on the availability of resources. As a result, only crops of years characterized by favourable weather, by absence of disease and by careful cultivation can indicate with satisfying precision the evolution of vineyard acreage.

In the second half of the 19th century, crops meeting these requirements were only those of the years 1871, 1876, 1878, 1881, and partly those of 1888 and 1893.[11] On the basis of the volume of production in the respective years, and by allowing seven years as a period necessary for the development of the vines, it may be inferred that the average yearly growth of vineyard acreage was 2.4% from 1865 to 1869, 7.8% in 1870 and 1871, 9.3% from 1872 to 1874, 3.6% from 1875 to 1881 and 3.2% from 1882 to 1886.

These figures seem generally to confirm the suggested association between prices and rate of creation of new vineyards. The relatively slow rate in 1865-1869 was due to the low prices which ruled from 1864 to 1868 and increase of

[11]Cfr. the entire series of BRCREP from 1854 to 1900.

prices from 1869 led to the unprecedented rates of creation of vineyards in 1870-1874. Most probably, the distribution of National Estates in 1871 played a major role in accelerating the growth of vineyard acreage since 1872. High rates were probably the rule also in 1875-1886, following the high prices prevalent during the latter period;[12] but the diminishing productivity of the vineyards which started to grow old in the late 1880s partly counteracted their impact on the size of the crop.[13]

The observed correlation between high currant prices and increased rate of investment in currant vineyards was by no means a matter of expectations: when deciding to plant a vineyard, the farmer could not foresee the prices its produce would obtain seven years later. It was very probable that vines planted in years of high prices would give fruit in years of low prices, since the value of the crop often dropped considerably from one year to the next. Hence, it

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[12]See also BRCREP 1879: "*... many young plantations are coming into full bearing and new ones are being made every year*"; BRCREP 1880: "*The numerous plantations which are yearly coming into fuller bearing ...*"; BRCREP 1881: "*Large plantations of currants continue to be made ...*"; BRCREP 1882: "*New plantations are constantly being made, as a large quantity of suitable land is yearly being brought under cultivation.*";
BRCREP 1887: "*... many young plantations are being made in all the currant-producing districts*"; BRCREP 1890: "*... many new plantations of currants are made yearly*".

[13]See eg. BRCREP 1887: "*Many agriculturalists are of the opinion that the very old plants are getting exhausted, partly also on account of the ring-cutting now universally carried out on the stock of the vine.*" Also, BRCREP 1890: "*Apparently many old currant vineyards are not so productive as formerly, and require to be renewed.*"

would be ingenuous to assume that people deciding to commit resources to the creation of vineyards in years of favourable market conditions did so because they hoped that such conditions would last forever.

A much more plausible explanation is that high prices stimulated planting by generating additional income available for investment in currant vineyards. In years of favourable market conditions, farm owners committed to the expansion of their farms a great part of the increased profits from the sale of their produce, without pretending to foresee in how many years their expenses would be reimbursed.

As natural, the unpredictability of the period of amortization of the initial investment further aggravated the long-term character of the credit requirements for the creation of vineyards. Moreover, in case of trade depression, additional capital was needed in order to face costs (interests, instalments of National Estates etc.) until the recovery of fruit and vineyard prices.

d. Commitment of short-term credit to long term obligations.

Profits from the sale of currants were of course not sufficient to finance the rapid expansion of vineyards. And as argued above, cultivation loans granted by the National Bank or loans advanced by the exporters against the delivery of fruit from the future crop were not adapted to the financial needs of vineyard creation.

Such loans usually lasted nine months, from November to August, and were meant to serve exclusively as rotating capital for the financing of the year's cultivation. Exporters, as well as the Bank, insisted on full reimbursement immediately after the harvest, if possible in early August. When the raisins were dried and ready for export, merchants were urged to ship as quickly and as great a quantity as possible. At the same time, the Bank needed cash in order to buy exchange bills drawn on foreign houses by currant exporters, which were essential for the service of its international commitments and the finance of import trade.[14]

But farmers could not easily refund their creditors in August, if they employed the funds borrowed in winter to plant new vines that would become profitable only seven years later. Those wishing to invest in the creation of currant

[14]See Th. Kalafatis [1987] p.213.

farms were thus obliged to convert part of the short-term credit received from the Bank and the exporting houses into long-term credit corresponding to the real needs of the currant economy.

This conversion could take place in various ways. Cultivation loans could cater for the needs of the vineyards as circulating capital, in so far as the rich farmers' capital could be safely deployed towards long-term commitments. Farm owners could also spent their expected profits in advance, hoping that the crop would be abundant and that prices were going to stay high. As the councillors of the Pirgos branch office of the National Bank of Greece stated, when asking in 1874 for an increase of the sum reserved for cultivation loans, the farmers possessed adequate funds of their own to cater for the running needs of their vineyards, but they had committed most of their wealth in the construction of comfortable houses for their own families and in the expansion and improvement of their farms.[15]

The principal way of unofficially converting short-term into long-term credit was to convince the Bank and the Patras merchants to renew cultivation loans for several years. Wealthy farm owners tried to do so by paying only the yearly

[15]HANBG Pirgos, 21/2/1874 (5b).

interest and by increasing the securities guaranteeing their debts. The correspondence of the department of the National Bank of Greece at Pirgos abounds with complaints of the director about the commitment by customers of the Bank's funds to planting and the difficulties of exacting repayment of the capital sum and interest at the expiry date of the loan.[16] The Bank's customers often declared themselves unable to meet their obligations, begging for suspension of reimbursement of the borrowed capital to a later date and in return for repayment of only the annual interest on the debt.[17]

The problem assumed dramatic dimensions in years of unfavourable marketing conditions, when the farmers claimed that the revenue from the sale of their produce could not even cover cultivation expenses. In such cases the Bank faced

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[16]An extreme case was that of a priest who "*borrowed 6.200 drachmas for cultivation purposes, but spent them in buying land and in planting it, so now that the loan has expired he is in the impossibility of paying back even part of the capital, not having any other source of revenue*" (HANBG Pirgos 23/9/1884, n.25).

[17]For instance, in 1870, the Pirgos branch managed to collect only 60% of loans advanced during the previous season and was obliged to renew for another year the remaining 40%; the Director attributed delay of repayment to the conjunctural depression dominating the local trade (HANBG 28/11/1870, n.23). But again in 1875, although several successive good seasons had passed, the yearly loans reimbursed within the fixed term did not exceed 60.6% of the entire sum advanced, the Bank being constrained to renew the remaining 39.4% (HANBG 12/11/1875, n.16). Similar complaints were expressed by the Director Megapanos 20 years later, in 1895, stating that although during the preceding 15 years wealthy farmers and merchants realized good profits, they did not agree to regulate their position with the Bank (see HANBG June 1895). See also HANBG 1/12/1870, n.24; 20/10/1873, n.11; 6/10/1873, n.10; 19/11/1873, n.14; 4/8/1884, n.18; 23/9/1884, n.25; 12/10/1884, n.30; 24/8/85, n.31a; 28/7/1892, n.21a.

the dilemma of either putting the mortgaged farms up to auction, or of renewing the loan for another year. Usually this latter solution was regarded as preferable: in addition to the political cost of judicial seizures, the auctions had little success, because such unfavourable circumstances also caused an abrupt decline in the value of the mortgaged farms; the Bank therefore risked losing its securities without getting back the borrowed capital.[18] On the other hand, and especially when the debtors were people of influence, as often happened, nobody wished or dared to present himself at the auction.[19]

Of course, there was no question of the Bank assuming direct responsibility for the running of the estates. In cases where this measure was adopted as a last resort, the results varied between poor and disastrous, because of the idiosyncratic character of currant cultivation and the lack of the required structures on the part of the Bank.[20] Hence the Bank often found itself obliged to renew the loans to

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[18]See HANBG 13/1/1867, n.2; 17/10/1870, n.17.

[19]See HANBG 1/12/1870, n.24. It furthermore transpires from the correspondence of the Bank that serious leverage was exerted by local politicians on the Headquarters of the Bank in Athens. There is for instance a letter dated June 1867 by the Director of the National Bank, Pirgos, stating that a bailiff who delivered notice of lawsuits of the Bank against two indebted deputies was dismissed from service after lobbying by these latter in Athens (see 2/12/1866, n.6).

[20]The Director of the Pirgos branch in 1887 invited the Headquarters in Athens to sell farms belonging to the Bank, because although he tried to supervise cultivation as much as farmers did, he could not obtain satisfactory results (see HANBG 29/4/1887, n.15). See also HANBG 2/12/1866, n.6; 3/9/1884, n.25b; 6/4/1896, n.20.

insolvent debtors in order to permit them to carry on cultivation; because if left uncultivated, the mortgaged farms risked losing an important part of their value.[21]

e. The entrepreneurial role of local elites.

The tension characterizing the relations of the Bank with the wealthy farmers who formed its selected clientele highlights in reality the important function assumed by members of the local elite in the process of currant expansion. By offering their property as a security, they acted as intermediaries between banking (and merchant) capital and the direct producers, filling the gap between the short term credit offered by the former and the long term exigencies of vineyard creation.[22] In the absence of such intervention, currant expansion would have probably been inconceivable, due to the limited development of the credit market in 19th century Greece.

This role of intermediary offered the wealthy farmers

[21]See HANBG 31/1/1870, n.3; 16/9/1875; 16/11/1879, n.13; 16/3/1884, n.4.

[22]The correspondence of the National Bank abounds in examples of currant vineyard farms mortgaged to the Bank; see eg. HANBG 2/12/1866 (6), 13/1/1867 (2), 17/10/1870 (17), 11/1/871 (1), 1/12/1870 (24), 20/10/1873 (11), 10/9/1875 (11), 30/4/1882 (7), 5/9/1884 (23), 23/9/1884 (25), 7/4/1885 (12), 5/2/1886 (7), 5/11/1891 (19 a,b), 6/4/1896 (20). Several of these farms were also mortgaged to big exporting houses of Patras: 6/11/1873 (13b), 19/11/1873 (14), 10/7/1874 (12), 22/11/1874 (21), 10/10/1884 (29).

quite a strong position within the community. As they were the only persons with resources available for long-term commitments, they held a virtual monopoly over the creation of vineyards. And indeed, as demonstrated in chapter II, those who purchased national land in Amalias in order to convert it into currant farms were mostly merchants, notables, professionals, notaries, lawyers, doctors, priests and civil servants.

It may therefore be argued that the entrepreneurs of currant expansion, those who assembled the necessary inputs and decided on the creation of currant farms, were mainly the members of the political and economic elite of the currant growing districts.

As against this, unable to find the required long-term credit, peasant families could not take on themselves the creation of new vineyards, except for a stremma or two of vines planted in their garden; however, as will be shown below, they had the option to become owners of vineyards in exchange for undertaking to plant the elite's farms.[23]

[23]Cfr. also Bakounakis "La vigne et la ville: qui finance la culture?" in Dertilis (ed) [1988], p.84: "*Le rythme rapide de l'expansion de la viticulture dans le Péloponnèse entraîne une demande accrue de capitaux, que ne possédaient pas, bien entendu, les cultivateurs.*"

f. Planting agreements: the principal mechanism of vineyard formation.

Research into the notarial archives and the Mortgage Hall of Amalias shows that the most widespread way of converting purchased national land into vineyards was by a special type of agreements between owners of the land and peasant families.

Such agreements entailed the concession of land and some advances (in cash or kind) on the part of the landowner. The peasant was obliged to perform all the tasks relating to the establishment of the vineyard; at the end of the first five years of particular care required by the young vines, the then established vineyard was divided into two equal parts, one for the planter and one for the original owner of the soil. Until division, the landowner took on himself the payment of the yearly instalments for the redemption of the land.

A characteristic case of a strategy aiming at the creation of a large currant vineyard was that followed by Th. Papailiou, a lawyer from Pirgos. Th. Papailiou "declared" 80 stremmata of national land and purchased the rights of two other beneficiaries of the 1871 law over 160 neighbouring

stremmata.[24] He thus became the owner of 240 adjacent stremmata of land, 116 of which he ceded to two peasants from the mountainous province of Mantineia and another 65 to a peasant from the province of Kalavrita and his three sons. They were obliged to plant the land with currant vines and to construct the threshing-floors necessary for the drying of currants. Papailiou advanced the planters interest-free loans of 2,135 drachmas and 1,257 drachmas respectively. Five years later, when the planting process would be completed, the lawyer was to receive back half of the vineyard and the threshing-floors, while the other half was to pass to the full ownership of the planters, on condition they paid back the advance loan.

The peasants from Mantineia planted the entire area they received; they did not, however, reimburse the debt and promised to repay it at 12% interest in the course of the successive 5 years, without having the right to sell or mortgage their part of the vineyard. If not, Papailiou would become full owner of the entire vineyard. The planters also assumed responsibility to pay the instalments for the redemption of their part of the estate and promised to provide for the maintenance and cleaning of the path and the

[24] See TR 27/23-27/11/1883.

main entrance, which remained the property of Papailiou.[25]

The peasants from Kalavrita planted only 37 stremmata and Papailiou sued them for not having respected the terms of the contract. Later on a compromise was reached: Papailiou took 18.5 stremmata of vineyard and 4 stremmata of threshing floors; the planters promised to repay their debt in the successive 5 years at 12% interest. If not, they would lose any right to the vineyard. They were also obliged to construct the path which connected the farm to the main road and to repair and clean Papailiou's threshing-floors.[26]

Terms of most planting agreements consulted in the archives of Amalias were very similar to the above, except that in other contracts monetary advances were often accompanied by contributions in kind. The mayor A. Dalianis ceded for planting 130 stremmata of national land he had purchased to three peasants from the village of Dara, also in the province of Mantineia; besides a loan of 500 drachmas (at 12% interest until completion of the planting process and division of the vineyard, and at 20% beyond that date), he promised to contribute to the expenses with 5 casks of wine and 10,000 canes (useful for propping up the young vines).[27]

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[25]See TR 61/61-30/12/1894.

[26]See TR 61/62-30/12/1894.

[27]See TR 48/62-20/9/1890. Division in fact occurred five years later (see TR 63/53-19/11/1895).

In other agreements the landowner offered maize,[28] part of the timber resulting from the removal of trees found in the fields destined for planting,[29] or promised to take over the cost of preparation of the field and permitted the planters to sow it with maize.[30]

g. Planting agreements: cost and benefit for rural entrepreneurs.

The mechanism of planting agreements presented strong similarities to that of anticipated purchases of fruit.[31] In both cases, the original source of invested funds was the urban merchant and banking capital; and also in both cases, the channelling of these funds to the local economy was monopolized by members of the local elite, allowing them to realize considerable profits.

However, in the creation of currant vineyards, the local notables played a much more active part than in currant commerce. In the case of anticipated purchases of fruit, village merchants acted as mere brokers of credit and bore

[28]See cn.2820-18/1/1878.

[29]See eg. cn.2552-6/11/1877.

[30]See cn.2588-13/11/1877, cn.2837-20/1/1878.

[31]See chapter III above.

little risk, since fruit prices were left "open" until export and since peasant lenders offered undervalued collateral securities. But landowners who initiated planting agreements were assuming at their own risk both the diversion of short term credit into long term commitments and the advance of funds to peasant planters without obtaining any immediately marketable collateral in exchange - such as was fruit in the case of funds committed to currant commerce.

The cost of a vineyard for the initiator of a planting agreement may be approximately assessed by analyzing the terms of the contracts presented above. Although disbursement was often distributed over several stages, let us accept for the sake of simplicity that all outlays were advanced in the beginning of the planting process. National land ceded to planters cost about 10 drachmas per stremma, plus another 1.90 drachmas yearly for redemption instalments.[32] The five instalments payable until the division of the plot between original landowner and planter, discounted at 20% yearly, represented at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement

[32]On the assumption that the initiator of a planting agreement purchased somebody else's rights on the land. If he declared the land himself, i.e. if he was ancient occupant or chose unreclaimed and non-occupied land and up to the limit of 80 stremmata imposed by the Law of 1871, he would pay only the deposit and the yearly instalments. On the calculation of costs of purchase of national land, see chapter II, p.119.

an expense of 6.8 drachmas per stremma.[33] The loan granted to planters amounted to about 20 drachmas per stremma.[34] Therefore, at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement, the expenses of the owner of the land corresponded to a capitalized value equal to 36.8 drachmas per stremma, or 73.6 drachmas for each stremma he would receive at the end - since half the mature vineyard would pass to the planter.[35]

Prices of mature vineyards in Amalias recorded in a small sample of contracts dating from the same period (1877-1887) ranged between 250 and 533 drachmas and were on average 341.2 drachmas per stremma.[36] Therefore, in the beginning of the first year of the planting process, the landowner who financed a planting agreement would have advanced 73.6 drachmas for each stremma he would receive at the end; five

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[33]On the assumption that the opportunity cost of capital was equal to 20% yearly, this latter being the ordinary rate of interest running on loans to peasant growers against anticipated sales of fruit.

[34]In the agreements presented above, Papailiou advanced 18.4 and 19.3 drachmas per stremma respectively to the planters. In another agreement, D. Papagiannopoulos promised to advance 100 drachmas yearly for five years to Hr. Antiohos, who undertook to plant currant vines in 20 stremmata of land and to cultivate the fruit trees already existing on the farm: see TR 29/149-15/3/1880. G.Hr. Xidias forwarded 900 drachmas to two planters of 46 stremmata: see TR 57/149-7/12/1897. Unfortunately, the diversity and the nature of contributions in kind stipulated by other contracts do not permit their evaluation in drachmas. However, in those cases monetary advances did not exceed 10 drachmas per stremma: see e.g. cn.2837-20/1/1878.

[35]Of course, when part of the outlay was disbursed later than the first year of the planting process, the capitalized expense would diminish.

[36]See the following sales of mature currant vineyards: cn.2294-18/9/1877 (533 drchs./stremma), cn.2453-21/10/1877 (300 drchs./stremma), cn.2477-23/10/1877 (380 drchs./stremma), cn.6313-8/11/1880 (400 drchs./stremma), TR 26/21-11/1/1883 (300 drchs./stremma), TR 30/129-1/10/1885 (266.7 drchs./stremma), TR 35/52-13/9/1886 (300 drchs./stremma), TR 33/167-30/4/1887 (250 drchs./stremma).

years later, he would receive back 40 drachmas which he had advanced to the planters as an interest-free loan and a stremma of vineyard of a market value equal to 341.2 drachmas. His original capital would be increased by 518% in five years, which corresponds to an annual rate of capital gain of 38.95%. This rate was almost double the profit realized by the commitment of capital to anticipated purchases of fruit.

Yet the above calculations - which are of course highly tentative and have an exclusively indicative value - are based on vineyard prices which refer to years of normal trade. If the vineyard was coming into maturity during a cyclical crisis, the owner would be obliged to wait for a longer period until seeing his property reach its full value on the market. Amortization of capital committed to the creation of the vineyard would in that case extend over a longer period and the yearly increase of the owner's capital would proportionately diminish.

However, even if currant trade depression constrained the owner to wait for four or five additional years, his capital gain would not drop below an annual average of 20%. The difference between the rate of interest charged on loans against future deliveries of fruit, which raised to 20%, and the rate of profit from planting agreements, reckoned here to

be almost twice as much under favourable circumstances, may be considered as a compensation for the risks arising both from the commitment of short-term credit to long-term obligations and from the probability of trade depression, which would cause a delay in amortization of the expenses.

h. The attitude of the peasantry towards property.

An essential condition for the high capital gains obtained by the initiators of planting agreements was of course that the peasant planters should tolerate the terms imposed by the wealthy landowners. In other words, the fact that this type of planting agreement was widespread in the 19th century Peloponnese indicates that the peasantry judged them acceptable, and in exchange for a piece of vineyard property peasants consented to cede to landowners a very high proportion of the value they added to the land through their labour.

Still more than in the case of anticipated sales of the crop on indeterminate price, where peasant growers assumed the risks from trade, it is clear that peasants entering planting agreements did not aim at merely guaranteeing subsistence, but at the acquisition of property. It can by no means be maintained that planters accepted the terms of

landowners by immediate necessity. Peasants assuming the planting of a vineyard would have to wait several years before getting any tangible recompense for their efforts. A planting agreement represented an investment not only for the original landowner, but also for the planter.

The appetite of the Peloponnesian peasantry for property seems to have been one of the major elements stimulating the rapid and relatively continuous expansion of vineyards. The willingness of peasant planters to accept the terms of landowners allowed the latter to cover the risks arising from the instability of the currant sector; such instability, combined with the defective structure of the credit market, might have otherwise rendered impossible the quantitative expansion of currant viticulture. Had the expected benefit from investment in planting been lower than the average opportunity cost of capital, vineyard acreage and production could hardly have increased as rapidly as they did.

On the other hand, property of currant vineyards acquired by peasants in exchange for planting and taking care of the landowner's farm may be considered as a very considerable reward. As suggested above, it was not possible for peasant families to plant on their own a currant vineyard of substantial dimensions. By acquiring half of the vineyard they planted, they managed to increase considerably the

productivity of their labour; if they had rented the same farm under a share-cropping agreement, they would have been obliged to yield half of its produce to the landowner.

Moreover, if planters managed to pay back the original landowner without incurring other debts, they would come into possession of a considerable piece of property. If the two peasants from Mantineia managed to repay their debt to Papailiou, they would become full owners of a currant vineyard 58 stremmata large, of a value exceeding 15,000 drachmas. This was a very significant sum, not only for a peasant family, but even for a notable or merchant.[37]

In other words, by undertaking planting agreements, peasant families were gaining indirect access to fixed capital, which might be an important step towards upward social mobility. The importance of this tendency should not, however, be exaggerated, because it was quite difficult to repay debts to the original landowner without contracting other loans and without selling out property. Moreover, landowners did not allow planters to mortgage or sell out pieces of the vineyard until they repaid their debt, which rendered repayment still more difficult. Sometimes, planters who had received half of the vineyard, subsequently found

[37]Examples of planters who managed to reimburse their debt and to finally become owners of half the vineyard they planted are given by TR 48/62-20/9/1890 and TR 68/149-7/12/1897.

themselves obliged to sell part or the whole of it back to the original landowner.[38]

i. Planting agreements and the development of market relations.

Planting agreements prevalent in the 19th century western Peloponnese constituted a drastic move towards the development of full property rights on the land and of market relations of landed property. By dividing the newly established vineyard, both landowner and planter acquired absolute ownership on their part of the farm, permitting them to exploit their vineyards without being hindered by traditional constraints. They might rent, sell, exchange or mortgage them as often as they wished and under the conditions they regarded as most profitable.

An illustrative counter-example is offered by the emphyteutical agreements dominant in the Ionian Islands and parts of the Northern Peloponnese, similar to the centuries-old contract of *enfiteusi* widespread in South Italy.[39] These agreements made no distinction between planting and

[38]Eg. according to TR 70/53-14/7/1898 a planter sold part of the half of the vineyard he had received according to TR 63/53-19/11/1895. The planting agreement was TR 48/62-20/9/1890.

[39]See G. Giorgetti [1974], pp.95-103.

subsequent cultivation of the vineyard. Costs of both planting and cultivation were shared between landowners and planters; the latter assumed, for themselves and their heirs, the obligation (and the right) to cultivate the vineyard for life, in exchange for half the produce.[40] Eviction of the planter and share-cropper could only occur in the case of the latter completely neglecting his duties.[41] As a result, the emphyteutical arrangement implied multiple rights to the land and stipulated a permanent, binding and complex relation between the original landowner, the planter and the vineyard.

By not involving such a relation, planting agreements of the western Peloponnese exposed both landowners and planters to greater risks, but also greatly broadened their economic perspectives. By ceding to the planters half of the vineyard, members of the local elite were withdrawing from the virtual monopoly they had acquired by concentrating most of the National Estates. Landowners were thus losing the security of permanent access to the labour force of the planter and of his family, which constituted a not insignificant advantage

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[40]On the type of arrangements prevalent in the province of Aigialeia (Northern Peloponnese), see Th. Kalafatis [1987]. A representative instance of usages in the Ionian Islands is offered by the emphyteutical agreements of the Geroulanos family from Cephalonia, covering the period 1822-1891; see "Archive of the Geroulanos family", National Literary and Historical Archives [ELIA] (Athens), file: "Land Property Deeds", n.17-22/10/1822, n.20-13/11/1825, n.33-16/9/1836, n.37-19/9/1876, n.41-24/11/1891, n.42 (list), n.43 (list), n.44-13/11/1859.

[41]See *ibidem*, n.41-24/11/1891.

in an environment of acute underpopulation and labour scarcity. In the above mentioned contracts, there are clear signs of the attempt of Papailiou to impose labour-tying agreements to the planters of his vineyard, when obliging them to clean the pathways and the threshing-floors of his farm yearly. However, the transfer of property to the peasantry could not fail to further aggravate the lack of manpower in agriculture.

On the other hand, full ownership rights of the peasantry were much more easily alienable than the permanent right stipulated by emphyteusis to cultivate and share the crop of the landowner's farm. Being obliged to borrow on usurious terms in the unofficial credit market in order to cultivate their farm, peasants risked seeing it seized by their creditor, either the original landowner himself or somebody else. For instance, the peasants who planted the farm of Papailiou risked losing any right over the vineyard they had created, if they did not reimburse their debt.[42] Had they performed the same tasks under a traditional emphyteutical agreement, they might have been obliged to reimburse the landowner by ceding a larger proportion of the produce, but they would never have lost their hereditary right to

[42]See p.182, below.

cultivate and share the fruits of the vineyard.[43]

Conversely, transferability of property deeds assisted wealthy and influential families when seeking to create large and consolidated currant farms. The exploitation of large contiguous vineyards was much more profitable than that of parcelled ones scattered around the village, because the infrastructure of a currant farm - buildings, fences, paths, threshing-floors, irrigation and draining facilities - as well as the costs of supervision of the vines and of those who cultivated them, presented considerable economies of scale. As already indicated by the study of the cession registers of Amalias presented in chapter II, farm consolidation was a primary objective for purchasers of National Estates.

Alienability of peasant rights over the land allowed wealthy farm owners to seek consolidation of their farms through seizure of the adjacent vineyards belonging to their debtors.[44] More often than not, such transfers of property appeared in the form of "voluntary" sales, at prices below those of the market; judicial seizures were less frequent,

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[43]Debts of planters under emphyteutical agreements were sometimes renewed over several decades. Document n.44 of the Geroulanos family archive registers the evolution of a peasant debt related to a vineyard held under emphyteusis over no less than 38 years.

[44]For an example from 20th century India of the moneylenders' strategy which consisted of granting usurious loans to peasants who possessed adjoining farms, in order subsequently to seize them, cfr. Bhaduri [1983] p.81-82.

though not altogether absent.[45] Besides seizures of mortgaged assets, another frequent practice was consolidation through exchange: landowners were often willing to substitute a small vineyard situated in a distant locality for one adjacent to their large farm.[46] Moreover, when the planting process was completed, owners sometimes used to offer to the planters a vineyard in another locality in exchange for the adjacent half of the newly planted one.[47]

j. Distribution of currant vineyard property.

Large consolidated estates belonging to wealthy and influential families, the outcome of practices of property concentration such as those described above, have left numerous traces in contemporary archival sources. Contracts of the Transcriptions Register offer plenty of information about the size and the form of such estates. Individual notables in Amalias, whose land concentration strategies were studied in detail, owned farms amounting to several hundreds

[45]See eg. the following purchases of adjacent pieces of property: TR 8/23-21/10/1863, TR 8/373, TR 8/416-8/10/1869, TR 10/32-2/11/1871, TR 14/19 (by Fassos brothers), TR 26/107-27/3/1883 (by the merchant Harvalos), TR 30/129-1/10/1885 (by the merchant G. Hr. Xidias).

[46]Eg. 26/21-11/1/1883.

[47]See eg. TR 68/149-7/12/1897.

of stremmata.[48] Another source is the correspondence of the Pirgos branch of the National Bank of Greece, whose customers offered mortgages on large currant estates, sometimes as large as 300 stremmata, as collateral for loans.[49] The existence of several big currant vineyard farms, two or three hundred stremmata large, was also confirmed by D.K. Psihogios during research in the Mortgage Hall of the neighbouring district of Lehena.[50]

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[48]The merchant Aristeidis Harvalos effected most of his national land purchases (220 stremmata) in the locality Sferdouklia of the village Kardamas (see TR 13/116-10/9/1874, TR 17/70-29/10/1876, TR 18/83-20/4/1877), most of which he planted with currant vineyards. He appears to have sold at various moments due to financial difficulties and for the endowment of his daughter for a total of no less than 239 stremmata in that same locality (see TR 22/91-1/10/1880, TR 22/92-21/10/1880, TR 27/118-14/3/1884, TR 29/99-18/6/1885, TR 33/167-30/4/1887, TR 20/160-24/12/1887). Later on he took care to exchange 10 stremmata of currant vineyard he possessed in another locality with 10 stremmata of currant vineyard and 10 stremmata of arable land in the locality Sferdouklia and to add to it by purchase another 3 stremmata of vineyard, 12 stremmata arable land, a small house and a well (see 26/107-27/3/1883). From his contracts, recorded in the estate transactions register of Amalias, we know that he also possessed in the same locality another two adjacent one-floor houses constructed in brick, other wells, another house, threshing-floors, an orchard, and sultana raisin vines.

In order to consolidate his farm, Th. Karanikolos, merchant from Pirgos, purchased in Amalias no less than 190 stremmata of land already surrounded by vineyards owned by himself (see TR 46/69-1/11/1890).

Similar policies were also followed by A. Dalianis, Hr. Xidias and P. Fassos.

[49]We thus learn that in 1870, the brothers A. & P. Papastathopoulos owned 192 stremmata of currant vineyards, 1,015 olive trees plus another olive garden of 13 stremmata, 69 stremmata of arable and 200 stremmata of unreclaimed land (see HANBG 17/10/1870, n.17); Th. Theodoridis had mortgaged to the Bank 347 stremmata of currant vineyards and 4,545 olive trees (*ibidem.*). In 1873, S. Spiliotis owned a currant vineyard of 100 stremmata (see HANBG 20/10/1873, n.11) and in 1877, Al. Vilaetis, of the famous family of Pirgos politicians, possessed a farm of 250 stremmata, adjacent threshing floors and orchards (see HANBG 15/3/1877). In 1884, the merchant I. Makris owned 320 stremmata of currant vines, valued at 100,000 drachmas (HANBG 5/9/1884, n.23); and if production figures are admitted as an index for the size of farms, Avgerinos owned more than 300 stremmata of vines, the mayor of Kalavrita Piohoritis more than 60 stremmata, and a certain Hrisantopoulos more than 200 stremmata (see HANBG 7/9/1886, n.24).

[50]According to D.K. Psihogios [1987] p.187:"*It seems that many followed [the way towards speculative agriculture]. There are contracts in the estate property transactions register of Lehena which speak about currant vineyards 200 and 300 stremmata large. The cheap price of the national land, its payment in the form of instalments, the high prices of currant fruit ... permitted the development of clearly speculative enterprises.*"
However, the clearly speculative character of these farms and the fact that they used to hire wage workers during the peak-periods of cultivation does not

(continued...)

But although the above examples prove that large estates were by no means an oddity in the western Peloponnesian countryside, any accurate assessment of the distribution of vineyards according to size would require detailed statistical confirmation. Unfortunately, such a task presents insurmountable barriers - at least to the possibilities of any single researcher - because of the lack of an organized cadaster.[51] Only indirect estimates are therefore possible.

One such estimate may be found in a letter of the director of the National Bank's office at Pirgos, stating that customers included in the approved credit list of 1885 possessed 80,000 stremmata of currant vineyards.[52] During the same period, the province of Ilia produced about 89,000,000 Venetian litres of fruit.[53] If the average product was 600 litres per stremma[54] - currant vineyards falling under the

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[50](...continued)
automatically indicate the prevalence of capitalist relations of production. First, because usually the permanent working force employed in the farm were not wage-workers, but peasant share-croppers - even if a limited number of farms might have been sporadically operated with salaried foremen. Secondly, because the day labourers employed were not proletarians, but rather peasants occasionally hiring their labour in order to round out their revenue (on this point, see also P. Pizanias [1985]).

[51]On problems caused by the defective organization of both sources and archives to research on land tenure and property, see above chapter II, n.32.

[52]HANBG 7/4/1885, n.12 (Director of the branch of Pirgos to the Headquarters in Athens).

[53]The production of the province of Ilia in 1884 was 89,000,000 litres and in 1887 86,000,000: see appendix IV, p.317 below.

[54]The vineyards of the Halikiopoulos' farm produced about 600 litres per stremma. According to HANBG 5/2/86, n.7, 90 stremmata usually produced about 70,000 Venetian litres, i.e. each stremma produced 777 litres. In that particular year, the vineyard produced 666 litres per stremma.

competence of the branch of Pirgos covered an area of 148,333 stremmata. That is, at that particular moment, about 54% of vineyards in Ilia appear to have belonged to customers of the National Bank. Since access to credit from the Bank was restricted to members of the local elite,[55] it may be deduced that peasant families in Ilia owned less than half the entire currant vineyard acreage of their district.

Another estimate of the distribution of currant vineyards by class of owner for the neighbouring province of Trifilia indicates, however, that the share of the peasantry was not much below 50%. The director of the branch office of the National Bank at Kiparissia, in a letter dated March 1894, reported that due to the crisis affecting currant trade in that particular year,

> "... *currant cultivation was limited to vineyards farmed personally by the owners and their families; the area of such vineyards, added to those which a few proprietors will be able to cultivate with the aid of workers, can by no means represent more than half the entire currant vineyard acreage.*"[56]

[55]See above chapter II, n.46.

[56]HANBG, series "products", "currant", file 2, Kiparissia, 12/3/1894.

It may rightly be concluded that the overall impact of planting agreements on the distribution of currant vineyard property was rather advantageous for the peasantry. Given that most of the distributed national land, on which the currant vines were planted, was concentrated within the local elite, the fact that almost half the vineyards belonged to peasants indicates that notables were obliged to pay a quite high price for creating their big, consolidated farms. It moreover indicates that procedures of landownership concentration and peasant expropriation did not go very far - although probably, most peasant farms were heavily mortgaged to merchants and money-lenders.[57]

k. The emerging pattern of social relations.

An important factor which permitted the development of a pattern of currant vineyard property so different from the one prevalent in the neighbouring Ionian Islands, was the relative availability and cheapness of the land in the large plains of the Western Peloponnese, due to under-population and to the existence of the National Estates.[58] As noted above, the cost of the land itself represented a minor

[57]See Evelpidis [1919].

[58]However, the custom of dividing the newly planted vineyard into two parts was older than the Law of 1871: see TR 3/220-4/3/1862.

expense for the initiator of a planting agreement. The Ionian Islands were on the contrary overpopulated and land there was scarce and expensive - they were typically characterized by outmigration, whereas the currant growing provinces of the Peloponnese, at least during the second half of the 19th century, were attracting large numbers of new settlers.[59] Ionian landowners had strong reasons to be less willing to cede to planters even part of their precious property.[60]

On the other hand, wealthy Peloponnesian landowners had greater difficulties in finding labour willing to plant their vineyards than their Ionian counterparts. It was probably this difficulty, together with the difficulty of finding long-term credit, which obliged them to offer to peasant planters full property rights on half the vineyard. And as argued above, in their turn, planting agreements offering to the peasantry access to vineyard property further accentuated the problem of labour supply.

The emerging pattern is therefore one of advancing

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[59]See eg. BRCREP Cephalonia 1867: "... *the capacity of production has long since reached its maximum*"; also BRCREP Cephalonia 1873: "... *there is not a single piece of ground capable of being cultivated which is not soon converted into a vineyard*".

[60]A similar trend in the evolution of planting agreements in Southern Italy was observed for the second half of the 19th century. Due to the increasing international demand for wine and citrus, enhancing the profitability of arboreous cultivations and permitting the realization of higher revenues, traditional arrangements such as the emphyteusis tended to be abandoned: landowners were urged to bring the land back under their full property as soon as planting was accomplished, in order to be able to gain immediately the maximum possible benefit (see G. Giorgetti [1974], p.231-232). The great difference is of course that in the Peloponnese, landowners were getting back only half of it.

commercialization of the land, combined with a perpetuation of the underdeveloped state of the labour market. Peasant families, favoured by general shortage of labour, got deeply involved in the strategies of local elites, and managed to retain and improve their position, not only by participating in the profits from currant commerce, but also by gaining access to scarce resources such as fixed capital in the form of vineyards.

Chapter V. The peasant character of currant cultivation.

A. The tasks of currant cultivation.

The currant plant is an artificially bred vine, requiring continuous human intervention in order to retain its precious characteristics and bear fruit. It is not only a question of providing it with the essential nutritive elements and humidity, but also of rationing and guiding its development. When abandoned to nature, the currant vine soon reverts to its primitive state of wildness (it becomes *akamatis* or *repsitis*). The grower needs to keep the plant within the narrow margin between excessive vitality and premature exhaustion, by following a rigidly prescribed calendar of tasks.[1]

The reconstruction of the currant grower's calendar attempted in the following paragraphs refers in particular to the period 1870-1890 and to the large and fertile plain of Ilia; that is, to the most vigorous period of expansion of currant cultivation and to the region where production rose more quickly and higher than in any other one, becoming in effect a monoculture and provoking the most rapid demographic

[1]The instability of the characteristics of the currant vine was also the main reason for its geographically confined expansion, which gave the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth and to the seaboard of the western Peloponnese a natural monopoly over the production of the small seedless grape (see above chapter I, n.5).

changes.

a. Round-digging (*xelakoma*) and manuring (*fouskisma*).

This was the first operation in the vineyard after the harvest, consisting of digging a shallow trench around and close to the stock of the vine, about 20 cm. deep. Round-digging aimed at airing the roots, collecting the rain-water and the falling leaves (which, when putrefied, become a useful and cost-free fertilizer) and facilitating the uprooting of weeds and suckers. But its most important function was the preparation of manuring, that followed immediately afterwards. In fact, if the vine did not need manuring, round-digging was usually omitted, so as to spare time precious for other tasks which would also be performed in early autumn, such as the preparation of fields for sowing winter cereals.

Manuring frequency depended on the quality of the soil. In heavy and fertile soils, too frequent manuring was not recommended, because it could render the vine wild and unproductive. In the province of Ilia, currant vineyards were

dug round and manured once every four years.[2]

The most appropriate moment for round-digging was mid-October, preceding the shedding of the leaves and the heavy winter rains.[3] According to the available estimates, a man needed one to one and a half full days to dig round one stremma (0.1 ha) of vines, while manuring needed a half-day's female work per stremma.[4]

b. Pruning (*kladokatharos*).

Pruning consisted of two similar but clearly distinct operations; the first, *katharos*, which might be translated as "cleaning", was the cutting away of superfluous branches; *klados*, pruning in the strict sense of the term, was the treatment of the useful branches remaining on the vine after *katharos*.

"Cleaning" was one of the most critical steps of currant cultivation: the number of branches chosen to be left on the

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[2]See cn.8831-19/8/1882; according to N. Branis, expert currant grower from the village of Havari (near Amalias), prior to the introduction of chemical fertilizers in the 1960s, round-digging and manuring of currant vines was performed once every three to five years (information collected locally during an interview in January 1989). See also Spiliotakis [1864] p.xxxix.

[3]See cn.8843-23/8/1882: "[the tenant] *is bound to start round-digging at the beginning or until the 15th of October*". According to N.Branis the best period for traditional round-digging and manuring was late October - early November.

[4]See Hairetis [1883] p.379; Kalafatis [1987] p.168; according to N. Branis, round-digging required one to one and a half days of male work per stremma and manuring required half a day of female work per stremma.

vine influenced not only the following crop, but also the long-term development of the plant. The more branches were left, the richer would be the harvest; but in the long run, the production of too much fruit exhausted the vine and rendered it sickly.

"Cleaning" was often a point of conflict between farm owner and share-cropper, since it was in the latter's interest to opt for quick returns, at the expense of the long-term profitability of the vineyard. For that reason, share-cropping agreements insisted strongly on the obligations of the tenant to "clean" properly and specified that if the owner was not satisfied with the quality of the share-cropper's work, he had the right to hire specialized "cleaners", at the share-cropper's expense.[5]

On the other hand, exaggerated "cleaning" rendered the vine too powerful and had effects similar to excessive manuring. Foliage was favoured over fruit bearing and the grapes risked containing seeds and becoming coarse-peeled. To recover equilibrium, after both excesses, required several years and considerable expense.

"Cleaning" needed much skill and experience; to do it properly, the grower had to take into consideration not only the quality of the soil and the general characteristics of

[5]See cn.2725-12/12/1877, cn.2790-2/1/1878, cn.8865-25/8/1882, cn.8935-3/9/1882.

the vineyard, but also the peculiarities of each individual plant. Careful observation all the year round and especially during the harvest was therefore an essential requisite.

Klados, pruning in the strict sense of the term, was the shortening of the unwanted upper part of the branches left on the vine after "cleaning". From the point of view of intensity, the impact of either excessive or defective pruning was analogous to that of excessive or defective "cleaning". However, in pruning, the most important parameter was the timing of the operation. Early pruning speeded up the growth of the shoots and the ripening of the fruit. This could be advantageous to the grower, both because early shipments of fruit obtained higher prices and because early drying minimized the risk of late August rains, which might impair the quality or even completely destroy the produce. But premature blossom might expose the vine to late winter frosts and thus be of much harm. On the other hand, delayed pruning exhausted the vine pointlessly, because it deprived it of that amount of sap which had already risen to the branches destined to be cut.

Katharos and *klados* together were the most important form of intervention in the life of the currant vine, enabling the grower to gear it to the purposes of commercialized

production.

"Cleaning" was ideally to be performed in autumn, before the complete shedding of the leaves; branches chosen to be left on the vine could thus benefit for a while from the circulation of the sap before it withdrew to the roots for the winter.

In Ilia and in other provinces of the Western Peloponnese which produced average qualities of currants, "cleaning" and pruning were performed simultaneously as a combined operation, called *kladokatharos*. This practice yielded poorer results than separate *katharos* and *klados*, but was tolerated because it could be performed in January, whereas *katharos*, when performed alone, coincided with the sowing of winter cereals in November. An experienced pruner needed about 1.3 days to "clean" and prune a stremma of currant vineyard.[6]

c. Propping up the stock of the vine (*fourkadiasma*).

The currant vine, especially when young, needed to be supported with sticks, in order to acquire and maintain a vertical position, facilitating the ventilation and ripening of grapes. Propping up consisted of piercing a piece of reed,

[6]See Hairetis [1883] p.378, Kalafatis [1987] p.168. But according to N.Branis, "cleaning" required two days per stremma and pruning 0.2 days per stremma.

adequately prepared, close to the stock of the vine, and in tying it to the plant with fibbers of osier. The first operation required about half or a third of a day's work per stremma and was usually performed by men. Tying was performed by women and required half a day's work per stremma.[7]

d. Hoeing the ground into sods (*skafi*).

Hoeing provided for the regeneration of the earth by bringing it into direct contact with the open air, the sun and the rain. It also destroyed weeds and buried fallen leaves, whose putrefaction enriched the nutritive elements of the soil. During the operation, particular attention was paid to cleansing the vine stock of suckers, especially when round-digging had not already taken place.

The hoeing of currant vineyards was performed in a very systematic way. Small conical pits were dug by the hoe, not deeper than 30 cm., in order to avoid damaging the roots. The dug-up ground was gathered into sods. Pits and sods formed an irregular surface, much larger than the levelled vineyard. This larger surface allowed an increased quantity of soil to come into direct contact with the atmosphere; furthermore, pits improved the irrigation of the vineyard by holding the

[7]Hairetis op.cit., pp.77-82; N. Branis; D. D. Psihogios, *Iliaka*, n.10, April-June 1979, pp.963-964.

rain water.

In hoeing, the working members of the peasant family were usually assisted by wage-labourers hired for that purpose; this operation needed much work and was efficiently performed only when several people were employed simultaneously -unlike most other tasks of currant cultivation which could be executed by a single person.[8]

According to Hairetis, during hoeing, workers were placed in lines, with one worker for each row of vines (*kavali*). The most able were put at either end of the line and advanced more quickly than those working in the middle of it, who followed them, thus forming a semicircular curve. The owner or share-cropper could thus oversee more efficiently the progress of the work, and could form a clearer idea of the worth of his workers. Each member of the team collaborated and followed the pace of his adjoining fellow. When the two leading workers finished their row, they started a new line and each of them took either end of it; those working in the middle, as soon as they finished, came successively to join them, taking the same position in the new line as in the

[8]Information confirmed by N.Branis.

previous one.[9]

During hoeing, besides overseeing the hired labourers, the share-cropper was bound to perform several specific tasks. According to a share-cropping agreement (*sempria*) contracted in Amalias in August 1882, the tenants were obliged "*to stand over the labourers in order to clean and cut-off the unnecessary parts of roots and other similar things emerging through hoeing* ...".[10]

Another share-cropping agreement, dating from September 1877, bears precious information about the labour input required by hoeing: "[the tenants] *promise and are obliged ... to perform digging with a double stroke of the hoe* (diploaxinia), *so as to spend at least three and a half day's wages per stremma* ...".[11] This figure is in agreement with the estimate offered by Hairetis, according to whom hoeing a stremma of currant vineyard required 3.5 days' wages.[12]

Hoeing was performed in late winter, but the exact moment was chosen carefully: the earth had to be sufficiently dry, especially when thick and naturally humid, otherwise it would

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[9]See Hairetis [1883], p.70-71. A worker's point of view on the procedure described by Hairetis was offered to me by D. Michelis, who was employed several times in the 1920s as a wage-labourer during digging in sultana vineyards in Crete. According to him, diggers placed on either side of line of vines were not "the most able", as reported by Hairetis, but agents of the foreman and of the landowner, paid to press the normal workers to work harder.

[10]cn.8843-23/8/1882, cn.8844-23/8/1882.

[11]Cn.2185-1/9/1877.

[12]Hairetis [1883], p.71.

come out in blocks and no effective mixing would take place.[13] The heavy winter rains should be over, because they might reduce the soil anew into a compact state. On the other hand, belated hoeing abbreviated the exposure of the soil to the open air, so decreasing its beneficial effect. In Ilia, it was usually performed in late February.

e. Harrowing (*skalos*).

Harrowing consisted of crushing the sods formed during hoeing and patiently pulverizing the soil until it was reduced into a sort of fine powder. Particular attention was paid to covering the roots and the lower part of the stock with fresh soil brought up to the surface and exposed to the open air. Conical hillocks were formed around the stocks, to protect them from the burning sun of the summer. Moreover, the complete levelling of the ground had a contrary effect to that of hoeing: by reducing the area exposed to the sun, it minimized the evaporation of humidity.

Harrowing had to be carried out with great caution, because its perfection was an essential requisite for a successful harvest. Defective hoeing could be rectified by attentive harrowing; but harm caused by defective harrowing

[13]See Hairetis [1883], pp.71-76; also, cn.8865-25/8/1882: "[the tenant] *promises and is obliged ... not to hoe when the weather is rainy ...*".

was irreparable. As a local proverb put it, "*even pigs may hoe, but harrowing must be done by the landlord himself*".[14]

The labour input for this latter operation depended on the quality of the soil. The rich and humid alluvial soil of Ilia was rather easy to harrow and did not require more than one to one and a half day's work per stremma.[15] But in other provinces, the same operation required more than two days' work per stremma.[16]

The time appropriate for harrowing also depended on the quality of the soil. In thin and arid grounds it was performed in late March or early April, though in thick and fertile soils it could take place in late April or even early May.[17]

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[14]Hairetis, op.cit, p.85.

[15]Cn.2185-1/9/1877. According to N. Branis, harrowing required no more than one day's work per stremma.

[16]Hairetis, referring rather to the Northern Peloponnese, estimates the labour input required by harrowing at 2.5 to 3.00 days per stremma (Hairetis, *op.cit.*, p.88). The "budget of the Alexandropoulos farm" in Aigio, referred to by Kalafatis [1987], p.168, gives an estimate of 2,27 days. Vourloumis [1943] p.28, gives an estimate of 2.5 days.

[17]See Hariton (M. Hairetis ?) [1889] p.40-41, also confirmed by N. Branis.

f. Sulphuring (*thiafisma*).

The spraying of vineyards with sulphur was intended to fight the "oidium Tuckeri" disease. The use of sulphur was generalized in 1855, when, after a series of crops destroyed completely by the disease, sulphuring turned out to be the only effective remedy.

The first and heaviest sulphuring was usually applied right after harrowing, when the branches were 10 to 15 cm. long; a man could sulphur up to three stremmata per day. But effective protection of the vineyard required daily supervision. If signs of oidium appeared after the completion of the first sulphuring, the grower had to repeat the operation a second time, or even a third, depending on the seriousness of the disease, which was capable of destroying the crop in a few days.[18] One can thus infer that action against oidium was more intensive in terms of surveying effort than in the labour required by sulphuring itself.

[18]See Hairetis [1883] pp.89-97; also, BRCREP 1855.

g. Ring-cutting (*haraki*).

Ring-cutting consisted of carving an annular incision around the bark of the stock, 2 cm. to 3 cm. wide. This operation was performed after the first sulphuring, when the vine blossomed in mid-May. It aimed at checking unwanted vegetation and at stimulating fruit formation by forcing the sap to stay longer in the upper part of the plant by retarding its natural flow from the branches to the roots of the vine.

The adoption of ring-cutting in the late 1840s was probably the most important innovation ever introduced in currant cultivation. It was solely due to the spread of this technique that the expansion of currant growing in the fertile plains of the Western and the Southern Peloponnese was rendered technically feasible; until then, the currant vine, as soon as it was transplanted to rich and humid soils, turned wild and gave no fruit at all.[19]

Ring-cutting was a difficult task which required considerable effort and skill. The ring-cutter (*harakotis*), often a specialized labourer, was obliged to work lying on the ground and to pay extreme attention to avoid damaging the inner part of the stock. In deciding on the width of the

[19]See also chapter I, p.23.

incision, he had to take into consideration both the age and condition of the plant and the type of the soil - generally speaking, the more fertile the land and the more powerful the vines, the wider should be the incision.

Wrong application could be very harmful both to the crop and to the vineyard. If excessive, ring-cutting would prematurely exhaust the vine; and if insufficient, it would not fulfil its purpose. As was the case with "cleaning", ring-cutting often constituted a point of conflict between farm owner and share-cropper, because the latter would rather opt for intense ring-cutting, favouring the short-term yield of the vine against its longevity.[20]

The time required to ring-cut a stremma depended on the number of the vines planted per unit area. In Ilia, an experienced ring-cutter could cut up to 1.3 stremmata a day on the average.[21] The operation had to be completed in less than ten days, as otherwise the ripening of grapes would not be uniform and problems would arise at harvest-time. For all these reasons, ring-cutting seems to have been, together with hoeing, one of the few tasks of currant cultivation typically

[20]cn.2561-8/11/1877, cn.2725-12/12/1877, cn.6461-14/12/1880.

[21]See D. D. Psihogios, *Iliaka*, n.13-14, March-June 1980, pp.1062. Confirmed also by N. Branis.

performed with the aid of hired workers.[22]

h. Lopping-off unwanted foliage and tops, supporting the fruit-bearing branches *(xefillisma, vlastologia, tsitisma)*.

Lopping-off unwanted leaves and shoots was often called "second ring-cutting" (*deutero haraki*), because it accomplished a function similar to that of the former operation: it constrained the sap to circulate only in those parts of the vine essential to the development of the fruit. However beneficial it might be to grape-formation, lopping needed to be practised with great caution; careless application would do much harm to the vine, since leaves and shoots were essential parts of it. Shoots were cut only at their top; unwanted leaves were only those located below the bunch; their cutting facilitated air-circulation, without leaving the bunch exposed to the direct effect of the sun.

Supporting the branches loaded with fruit with sticks of reed (similar but smaller than those used in propping up the stock in winter) was the last large-scale job before the harvest. It aimed at preventing the grapes from touching the

[22]It is typical that monetary advances promised by farm owners to share-croppers for hiring wage labour were to be paid in two instalments, the first right before the performance of hoeing and the second right before ring-cutting: see cn.2725-12/12/1877, cn.6401-1/12/1880, cn.6449-10/12/1880, cn.6459-10/12/1880, cn.8792-12/8/1882.

soil and facilitated ripening and picking.

Lopping-off unwanted leaves and tops and supporting the branches were performed by men and women alike in June and July, when the entire family of the cultivator was transferred in the *metohi* of the currant farm.[23] For that reason, although the labour inputs required were not insignificant (1.7 working days per stremma approximately),[24] they could easily be accomplished by the family labour force, without the aid of wage labourers.

i. Final preparations for the harvest.

But even after the completion of these operations, the grower could not take a rest; on the contrary, he intensified vigilance and watched carefully over his vineyard until the very moment of the harvest. He corrected the effects of faulty lopping, propping, weeding, sulphuring. The final weeks preceding the harvest were the most critical for the good and uniform ripening of the currant grapes; everything in the vineyard had to function perfectly, down to the last detail.

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[23]That lopping was a female job is also shown by the lists of employment of wage labourers in the "National Currant Vineyards" near Xilokastro in the summer of 1830 (see: Archives of the National Financial Society, ELIA, file n.5).

[24]Hairetis [1883], p.379; Kalafatis [1987] p.168.

The days immediately preceding the harvest were devoted to the ultimate preparations of the threshing-ground, which covered at least one-twentieth of the total area of the vineyard: it was carefully cleaned, levelled, weeds were burnt; the day before, the threshing-ground was coated with a solution of ox waste which polished its surface, and so were the baskets and other containers destined to carry the grapes.

j. Harvest, drying, cleaning, gathering (*trigos, xiransi, makkinarisma, mazema*).

Crop quality depended much on the maturity of grapes at the moment of the harvest. But the bunches of grapes in a vineyard
did not ripen simultaneously and optimum results would be obtained only if the harvest was carried out gradually, in several phases. However, very strong reasons compelled the grower to harvest in the shortest possible time, even at the cost of compromising the quality of a part of the crop. Most importantly, shorter harvesting and drying reduced the risk of rain, which could totally destroy currant grapes, especially those found on the threshing-ground. Moreover, harvesting required considerable labour inputs and waiting

for the full ripening of each separate bunch would further increase the cost of the operation.

Labour inputs required for the harvest were quite inflexible. Four female harvesters picked the grapes from the vines; the bunches were carried by two porters, usually men, to the threshing-ground, where one female worker laid them out. Thus, the full utilization of the labour force employed imposed the formation of harvesting teams composed of seven workers each. Such a team could harvest about two stremmata per day.

The harvesting did not last longer than a week, consisting of six working days. Thus, the seven members of the harvesting team could harvest up to twelve stremmata and a farm made up by twenty four stremmata required the simultaneous employment of no less than fourteen harvesters. Members of a single family could thus never perform harvesting on their own and needed to be assisted by wage labourers.

After the harvest, currant grapes laid stretched on the threshing-ground for a week or ten days, depending on the weather. Bunches were every now and then turned over, so as to dry in a uniform way, while the grower and his family remained on the alert in order to protect them in case of rain. But not too much could be done, because technically

available protecting devices were too expensive, such an expense only being worthwhile for some rare and expensive qualities of currants. The vast majority of growers were at the mercy of the weather, which, needless to say, often proved pitiless. Disaster caused by rain was recurrent in the currant-growing regions.[25]

After drying, currant grapes were separated from their stems and gathered. It is estimated that the total labour input required to harvest, dry, clean and gather from the threshing-ground the fruit produced by a stremma of currant vineyard amounted to 5 labouring days.[26] Harvesting was estimated at 3.5 labouring days per stremma; therefore, if this estimate is accurate, drying, cleaning and gathering required another 1.5 days.

[25]Many popular songs were devoted to disaster caused by August rains (see D. Zografos [1930] pp.94-101).

[26]Hairetis, *op.cit.*, p.378.

B. Form of exploitation and profitability of currant vineyards.

a. The nature of the labour requirements of currant cultivation.

The currant grower needed specialized knowledge not only of the techniques of cultivation, but also of the peculiar characteristics of the individual vineyard. In order to adapt cultivation to its needs, he needed to follow its development over a long time and have familiarized himself with the behaviour of the vineyard all the year round. Round-digging, manuring, pruning, ring-cutting, were interrelated operations with short and long-term effects on the profitability of the vineyard; decisions concerning their timing and intensity implied a long-term strategy, which could only be founded on a good knowledge of the individual farm.

Moreover, currant cultivation called for the personal care of the grower because most operations were very delicate and lacked any uniformity or standardization. Only somebody with a personal interest in the crop would perform them properly by giving them the required attention - either because he owned the vineyard or because he expected to receive a share

Table V.1
Tasks of currant cultivation: days of labour required per stremma

task	period	maximum duration	male labour	female labour	total
				(days)	
round-digging (once every 4 years)	October		[1.0-1.5]	*	[1.0-1.5]
manuring (ditto)	October		*	0.5	0.5
cleaning and pruning	January	15 days	1.3	*	1.3
propping up the stock	February		0.3-0.5	0.5	0.8-1.0
hoeing	March		3.5	*	3.5
harrowing	April		1.0-1.5	*	1.0-1.5
sulphuring	May		0.3-1.0	*	0.3-1.0
ring-cutting	May	7-12 days	0.77	*	0.77
lopping tops etc.	June and July		*	1.7	1.7
harvesting	August	7 days	1.5	2.0	3.5
drying, etc.	August	7-10 days	1.5	*	1.5
total (rounded)			10-12	5	15-17

of the produce.[27]

As against this, the successful establishment of

[27]To put it in other terms, currant cultivation involved high supervision costs. Following R. Pearce [1983] pp.59-60: "*Contracts vary in the difficulty with which they can be implemented. There will be costs involving the time and effort necessary for landowners to ensure an acceptable outcome. I refer to these as supervision costs ... If one makes a distinction between labour "effort" and labour "time" and where the quality of human labour is crucial to the out-turn of production, the ability to ensure the necessary standard of work may be pertinent. Such costs are likely to be most pronounced for the direct employment of labour, whilst any form of rental contract will provide "incentive" to the direct producer to carry out the requisite tasks satisfactorily.*" Also, p.60: "*The magnitude of these potential costs will ... vary with the labour process. In determining the type and range of product, together with how and when produced, the labour process will specify the level and range of skills requisite in production. Where it is such that a wide variety of skills is required - for example, where crop production is largely unmechanised and involves a large number of hand operations - then costs are potentially high. On the other hand, if only a few simple operations are necessary they will be of less significance. It can be argued that, as a general rule, the greater the quantity of labour-replacing capital per unit of direct labour characterising any labour process, the narrower will be the range of skills required.*"

capitalist farms, producing currants by employing wage labour, would have required a substantially different technology with less individual and more standardized and uniform tasks of cultivation. Technically feasible innovations which would have brought about the standardization of currant cultivation were the use of fertilizers and irrigation,[28] the use of the plough instead of the hoe,[29] sophisticated systems for giving a vertical position to the vine,[30] the use of devices protecting the fruit from rain.[31] But according to Hairetis, farm owners did not introduce these changes because they were too expensive and because they would have implied the commitment of considerable additional capital. In fact, it was very risky for any single farm owner to adopt expensive changes in the traditional labour process of currant cultivation. As already discussed in chapter III, the instability of the currant trade, made greater by the predominance and the opportunistic practices of merchants, was a deterrent against any innovative initiative; furthermore, capital could easily be used in alternative investments, such as money-lending,

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[28] See Hairetis, *op.cit*, p.222 ff.

[29] *ibidem*, pp.75-76.

[30] *ibidem*, pp.81-82.

[31] *ibidem*, pp.201-219.

commerce, or creation of vineyards, occupations with high and guaranteed profitability.

The peasant family, possessing the appropriate sort of labour force and ready to remain attached to the vineyard continuously over a period of several years, appeared therefore as the ideal currant grower. As suggested in the previous chapters, tendencies towards property concentration were strong and big ownership of currant vineyards was quite common.[32] But non-peasant vineyards were mostly farmed by peasant share-croppers. The cultivation of larger farms was assigned to several peasant families, through share-cropping agreements which carefully settled the limits of the plot assigned to each family.[33]

b. The prevalent form of share-cropping agreement.

The prevalent form of the share-cropping agreement stipulated that tenants should perform properly all the tasks required by currant cultivation, "*by their own labour and at their own expense*". The owner of the vineyard kept for himself the right to control the progress of cultivation and to correct any imperfection by deducting from the tenant's

[32]See chapters II and IV.

[33]cn.2185-1/9/1877, cn.8792-12/8/1882, cn.8843-23/8/1882, cn.8844-23/8/1882.

share. On the other hand, the owner was bound to contribute to the expenses of cultivation by supplying part or all of the sulphur for sulphuring and the reeds for propping up the vines and/or by advancing to the share-cropper the wages of labourers hired during hoeing and ring-cutting. The share-cropper would keep for himself half or two fifths of the produce, after having reimbursed at 20%-25% interest the advances made to him by the owner. Share-cropping agreements were usually expressly or tacitly renewed for several years, but the farm owner always had the right to evict the tenant if he was not satisfied with his performance.[34]

c. A comparison of share-cropping agreements with directly exploited farms.

The model budget presented by Hairetis, a farm owner himself and author of the most authoritative treatise on currant viticulture, can be considered as a representative assessment of the average profitability of large farms directly run by their owners with the employment of hired

[34]cn.2154-26/8/1877, cn.2185-1/9/1877, cn.2382-9/10/1877, cn.2515-30/10/1877, cn.2585-13/11/1877, cn.2640-21/11/1877, cn.2725-12/12/1877, cn.2790-2/1/1878, cn.4613-18/8/1879, cn.4614-18/8/1879, cn.6401-1/12/1880, cn.6449-10/12/1880, cn.6459-10/12/1880, cn.6462-15/12/1880, cn.8792-12/8/1882, cn.8831-19/8/1882, cn.8843-23/8/1882, cn.8844-23/8/1882, cn.8865-25/8/1882, cn.8873-26/8/1882, cn.8904-29/8/1882.

labour on a year-round basis.[35] According to his estimates, in a year of normal currant prices, the average output (gross) of a farm was 124.95 drachmas per stremma and the average expenses were 68.65 drachmas per stremma (amortization and interests not included). That is, gross revenue of the farm owner amounted to 56.3 drachmas per stremma, or 45.1% of the gross output of the farm.

In the case of share-cropped vineyards, the revenue of the farm owner depended on the gross income of the farm and on the part of the crop he was entitled to, reduced by the cost of sulphur and reeds. When the produce was equally divided between owner and share-cropper, the percentage of the gross income of the farm accruing to the owner was 50%; and if the tenant kept for himself only two fifths of the fruit, the respective percentage rose to 60%. The cost of sulphur and reeds did not exceed 5% of total output.[36] By assuming that productivity and gross output of share-cropped farms was the same as in those directly exploited, it may be inferred that in a year of normal currant prices there was no significant difference between the average profitability of these two forms of exploitation.

This conclusion is by no means contradictory with the fact

[35]Hairetis [1883] pp.378-382.

[36]See Hairetis, *ibidem*.

that share-cropping agreements were a much more common way of vineyard exploitation than the direct running of the farm by the owner. The principal characteristic of this type of arrangement between the farm owner and the direct cultivator was that, unlike share-cropping arrangements encountered in other countries or for other crops, only the output of production was here divided between owner and tenant, while the yearly inputs were exclusively the responsibility of the tenant - except for sulphur and reeds. Although the farm owner financed the monetary expenses of cultivation, at the moment of the division of the crop, his contribution, together with interest, was subtracted from the share-cropper's part. And if the output of the farm was not enough to reimburse the owner, the funds advanced were considered as a debt of the share-cropper.

The direct cultivator thus undertook the entire risk arising from currant production. Given the high instability of the currant trade and the relative inflexibility of cultivation expenses, this was a very considerable advantage for the farm-owner, and may easily explain the massive preference for share-cropping agreements. In years of low prices or of crop failures, when the gross income of the farm dropped vertically, the owner directly exploiting his farm was faced with the risk of serious losses, whereas the owner

renting out his vineyard to share-croppers only risked suffering a reduction of his income, and would in no case suffer any loss.

Moreover, the management of farms directly exploited with the employment of wage-labour presented serious difficulties. As stated above, the prevalent technology of currant cultivation was adapted to the skills and relative advantages of peasant family labour and not to that of wage labourers directed by foremen. In the case of vineyards belonging to the National Bank of Greece, share-cropped ones were clearly more profitable than those exploited directly.[37] Similarly, the accounts of monasterial currant vineyards in Aigion studied by Kalafatis reveal that direct exploitation of currant vineyards might prove a complete failure.[38]

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[37]For example, a document of 1891 presents the gross output and gross income of three farms owned by the National Bank of Greece in 1891. Those cultivated by share-cropping agreements yielded to the Bank a benefit amounting to about 50% of the produce, though the directly exploited one yielded only 31.8%. For that reason, the Bank always tended to avoid direct exploitation of its estates (see HANBG 5/11/1891, n.19a-b).

[38]See Kalafatis [1984] "Symmetohikes agrotikes ekmetalleuseis stin Aigialeia ...". The budget of the farm of the National Bank previously belonging to Alexandropoulos in Aigio, referred by Kalafatis [1987], p.168, presented very good results (revenue of the owner after deduction of expenses representing 61.3% of the total output), but profited from very low wages (2 drachmas per day for male labourers) and very high fruit prices (300 drachmas per Venetian litre) and should therefore be considered as exceptional.

d. The profitability of share-cropped farms in Amalias.

The profitability of vineyard farm property in Amalias in the period of reference of the share-cropping agreements presented above may be approximately calculated on the basis of information about prices of currants on the local market, on the average output of vineyards and on the average prices of farms. In 1877-1882, Amalias fruit was priced at about 180 drachmas per 1000 Venetian litres;[39] accepting an average output of 600 Venetian litres per stremma, we reach the conclusion that each stremma of vineyard would yield to the owner 51.2 drachmas, if the agreement was for an equal division of the produce between himself and the share-cropper, and 62 drachmas, if the share-cropper kept only two fifths of the produce.[40] During the same period, the average price of a mature vineyard in Amalias was 350 drachmas per stremma;[41] the annual return to the owner can therefore be estimated at 14.6% or 17.7% of capital value respectively.

But a large vineyard could also be presented as collateral

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[39]In 1877-1880 currants of the local description were valued in the market of Amalias at 140-220 drachmas (see chapter III, p.141).

[40]These figures are based on the assumption that the cost of sulphur (amounting according to Hairetis, *op.cit.*, p.379, at 2.8 drachmas per stremma) was borne by the farm owner. Similarly, the only agreement of rent of a currant vineyard against a fixed sum discovered among the consulted contracts stipulated that the cultivator should pay to the owner 57 drachmas per stremma yearly (cn.8935-3/9/1882).

[41]See chapter IV, p.185.

on the official credit market, offering the opportunity to obtain cheap credit which could be profitably employed in loans to peasant growers. Consequently, the total income derived from the ownership of a vineyard can be considered quite satisfactory.

e. The part of the share-croppers.

The fact that in years of normal fruit prices and under efficient management, currant farms exploited with the employment of wage-labourers yielded to the farm owner almost as much as share-cropping agreements, indicates that share-croppers were remunerated for their labour in the vineyard at the same level as wage-labourers - all other costs of cultivation remaining the same in both cases. Since wages in the currant sector were notoriously high throughout the 19th century,[42] it may be deduced that in a year of normal prices, share-croppers' earnings were quite satisfactory by local standards.

Of course, this was not true in years of unfavourable prices, when share-croppers risked not only not receiving anything for their labour in the vineyard, but also suffering losses. However, share-cropping agreements presented other

[42]See chapter VI, below.

advantages for peasant families which probably counterbalanced this risk.

First of all, share-croppers might sell their part of the crop in advance to currant merchants in exchange for loans, under the same terms as petty owners of currant vineyards did.[43] Even if it can be assumed that had share-croppers sought wage employment they would have earned the same, it would have been impossible for them to receive money in advance.

Besides, a peasant family undertaking a share-cropping agreement secured employment for its members even during the slack periods of the year. This was quite difficult if they were sent out to work for a wage, because demand for wage labour was high only during the stress periods of cultivation. Moreover, a farm share-cropped by the family could employ even women and children, who would difficultly

[43]See eg. cn.2571-9/11/1877, cn.4459-25/5/1879, cn.6517-4/1/1881.

find wage employment or would receive lower wages.[44]

On the other hand, as will be suggested in the following paragraphs, the employment of wage-labourers during the peak operations in the vineyard, financed by the farm-owner, allowed the share-cropper to maximize farmed area - which signified higher revenue and more abundant employment during the low intensity operations - though in the meantime he dedicated the autumn and part of the winter to the cultivation of winter cereals.

It may therefore be anticipated that share-cropping arrangements present a common element with anticipated sales of the crop on "open" price as well as with planting agreements: in all three cases, peasant families accepted to undertake obligations bearing risk, in exchange for increased revenues. This is an atypical attitude, which will be discussed into detail in the final chapter of the thesis.

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[44]According to the somewhat simplistic, but interesting testimony of the British consul at Patras: "*The peasants, who 20 or 30 years ago almost all led a pastoral life, inhabiting villages in the interior of the Peloponnesus, where, during the summer and autumn, they pastured their flocks on the high table lands of Arcadia and on the slopes of Erymanthus, Taygetus, Hyllene, and other high mountains, have mostly now become landed proprietors as well, for the Government wisely granted great facilities to all Greek citizens for acquiring Government lands in the plains of Achaia, Elis, Messenia, Argolis, & c., which had been lying fallow for years.*

These facilities were largely availed by the mountain peasants and shepherds, and large tracts which had been long waste and unprofitable have been turned in a few years by these indefatigable workers into flourishing currant and grape vineyards, which all the members of the family, men, women, and children, cultivate on odd days and holy days, when employment is not easily obtained elsewhere, *and thus the amount realised for their produce is almost all profit.*" (emphasis added) (BRCREP 1891).

f. A note on the distribution of tasks of currant cultivation over the year and winter cereal cultivation.

According to the sequence of tasks of currant cultivation discussed above, growers were employed in the vineyards on a full-time basis from January to August. But in the period from September to early January, they intentionally avoided performing any important job in the vineyard - except round-digging and manuring, which took place in October only every fourth year.

Even if most tasks of currant cultivation could only be performed on pre-established dates, two details show clearly that this four-month period was deliberately kept free: first, if round-digging in October had been carried out on a yearly basis - which would in any case have benefited the vines[45] - hoeing would have required less effort and labouring days in February; on the other hand, if separate "cleaning" had been carried out in autumn, time would have been spared in January, when *kladokatharos*, combined cleaning and pruning, was performed. But in neither case did this normally happen in practice.

As already argued in chapter I, the peasantry kept this time free from any duty in the vineyards in order to

[45]See Hairetis, *op.cit.*, pp.40-41.

cultivate winter cereals. Wheat, barley and oats, ploughed and sown in October and harvested in June, did not coincide with any of the peak moments of currant cultivation: September and October tasks were postponed to the end of the winter; in June most of the spring tasks in the vineyards were already finished, and those remaining until the preparations for the harvest (lopping-off unwanted foliage and tops, propping up the fruit-bearing branches) were usually performed by the female members of the family.[46]

It should be noted that the employment of wage-labourers during hoeing, and sometimes even during pruning, at the charge of the share-cropper but with cash advanced by the farm owner (who would keep it from the share-cropper's share in August, increased by 20-24% interest), greatly facilitated these modifications in tasks of cultivation. If share-cropping families were obliged to do all the work on their own, more strenuous hoeing in March because of omitted round-digging in October would reduce the total vineyard area they could farm during the rest of the year.

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[46] See also G. Delille [1977] p.119: "[c' è una] *perfetta complementarità tra coltura della vigna e coltura del grano i cui lavori si svolgono in periodi deversi, il che basterebbe a spiegare la loro frequente associazione nel quadro della piccola proprietà contadina*".

g. The use of wage-labour in peak operations.

Wage labour employed on a large scale in specific operations, hoeing, harrowing and harvest, did not in any sense contradict the overwhelmingly peasant character of currant cultivation, nor did it constitute any development towards the establishment of capitalist relations of production in the 19th century Peloponnese. On the contrary, the employment of wage-labourers during peak periods of cultivation allowed share-croppers to maximize the area they cultivated, thereby reinforcing the productivity of family labour and increasing its revenue.

According to table V.1, yearly cultivation of a stremma of vineyard required 15 to 17 labour-days. However, the distribution of these labour-days over the year was unequally and rigidly structured. As suggested above, all tasks, except round-digging and manuring, were concentrated in the eight months' period from January to August, and none of them could be extended too much in time, either because they had to be performed at a specific moment of the development of the plant and under given climatic conditions, or merely because they could not overlap with the operation following afterwards. Currant cultivation was, besides, overwhelmingly a man's occupation, and therefore the area which could be

farmed was determined by the available adult male labour of the family.[47]

As is clear from table V.1, the heaviest task in winter was hoeing, and the harvest in summer. This plainly explains why it was precisely in those operations that wage-labour was massively employed. According to estimates, without the aid of wage-labourers, a peasant family with two adult working members would not be able to hoe more than 10 stremmata.[48] It is obvious that to prune 30 stremmata of vines during January or ring-cut them during May would have been meaningless, if in February the family did not manage to hoe more than 10 stremmata. By contrast, the same family helped by wage-labourers in hoeing could normally farm about 30 stremmata, provided its working members were fully occupied with currant cultivation.[49]

High profitability of currant viticulture was of course

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[47]Kalafatis [1987] states that in Aigio even heavier work, such as hoeing, was sometimes carried out by women. But this does not seem to have been the rule, at least during the 19th century. For instance, the lists of employment of wage labourers in the "National Currant Vineyards" near Xilokastro in the summer of 1830 register a very neat distinction between male and female tasks and wages. Moreover, no female name is found among the list of workers performing male tasks, nor the opposite (see: Archives of the National Financial Society, ELIA, file n.5). Also, Anagnostopoulos & Anagnostopoulos [1939] p.21, state that in the interwar period, workers from Beotian villages moving to the plain Vocha of Corinth in order to hoe the currant vineyards were only male. Information about the employment of women in heavy duties exists only for the early 20th century, when massive emigration to the USA created extremely acute labour shortages: see BRCREP 1906, quoted in n.77, p.248 below.

[48]See also Psihogios [1987] p.180.

[49]This indirect calculation based on the data presented on table V.1 was fully confirmed by the currant grower N. Branis.

an indispensable condition for the employment of wage labourers.[50] In its turn, the employment of wage labourers contributed to raising productivity by rounding the stress points of labour requirements of currant viticulture - the only alternative would have been that of introducing technological innovation.[51]

The use of migrant labour did not increase production per work-day, which could be the definition of labour productivity under conditions of an integrated and flexible capitalist labour market; it increased production per adult male member of the peasant family, which is a far more relevant definition of labour productivity under conditions of a peasant economy. Moreover, it was not the surplus-value created by the labour of the migrants that increased the profitability of the peasant farm; it was its high "marginal yield", due to the fact that it allowed the members of the family to be fully employed in currant viticulture during the

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[50]High revenues because of intense urban demand is the main explanation offered by Chatelain for the use of migrant wage labourers in viticulture (p.109): *"D'autre part, la vigne est une culture riche qui généralement "paye" bien car le vin est recherché par les consommateurs urbains en un siècle où les villes se développent; la vente est facilitée aussi par les nouveaux moyens de transport, chemins de fer surtout. Aussi le vignoble attire le numéraire; non seulement le vigneron ne sera pas ou rarement un migrant temporaire, mais le vignoble est à l'origine de la formation d'une classe rurale aisée, une sorte d'aristocratie dans le monde paysan. Cette class sociale, pourvue de numéraire, n'hésite donc pas à faire appel à certaines époques de l'année à de gros contingents de travailleurs assez bien rénumérés puisque le profit le permet; ainsi, le grand vignoble devient un facteur de migrations temporaires régulières."*

[51]On technically feasible innovation, see p.222 above.

less demanding, in terms of labour, tasks of cultivation.[52]

h. Seasonal migrants.

Not surprisingly, most of the labourers hired during hoeing and harvest were seasonal migrants. This was a result of the advanced specialization of the population in currant growing: since most peasant families preferred (and were offered the opportunity) to own or share-crop currant vineyards, no additional labour force was available locally during the peak periods of cultivation and wage labour had therefore to be provided from other regions.[53]

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[52]On the problem of rounding the stress points of labour requirements of agriculture, similar to the problem of "bottlenecks" in modern economics, see Gérard Delille [1977], p.121-122: "*Il numero di giornate lavorative traduce dunque, in modo generale, un valore massimo della produttività, mentre il numero di giornate ai momenti più cruciali delle operazioni agricole ci dà un valore minimo. E questo secondo risultato è certamente quello più vicino alla realtà. Siamo nel cuore del problema; il progresso, per quanto riguarda la produttività consiste, in un primo momento, nel rompere queste punte acute che mobilitano un gran numero di uomini: la falce al posto del falcetto, l' aratro al posto della vanga, il bue al posto del uomo, il cavallo al posto del bue... .Si tratta di un problema capitale in quanto, ci sembra, è l' esistenza di queste variazioni che spiega, nel quadro di un certo tipo di agricoltura, l' esistenza dei diversi rapporti di produzione, la strutturazione sociale e i comportamenti demografici.*"

[53]Interesting comparisons could be attempted on the subject of temporary migration with French viticulture of the 19th century. Abel Chatelain, in his *Les migrants temporaires en France de 1800 à 1914*, p.108, confirms that "[les progrès de la culture de la vigne] *s' accompagnent d' un besoin accru de main-d' oeuvre. En effet, la vigne est une culture absorbante, exigeant beaucoup de bras. Or, les tâches sont intermittentes, ce qui pose alors un problème de migrations temporaires de travailleurs si les régions viticoles n' ont pas des densités humaines suffisantes.*" Chatelain specifies that in the French case we can distinguish between two major kinds of vine migrations (p.109): "*On y distingue d' ailleurs deux sortes de migrants saisonniers: les "montagnols" ou défricheurs dont le séjour, en hiver, est le plus long et les vendangeurs appelés en septembre ou en octobre.*" In the case of currant culture, there is an analogous distinction between late winter-early spring migrants - those coming to hoe and harrow the vineyards, and August migrants - those coming for the harvest. Unfortunately, no information is available about possible differences in the origins of hoers and harvesters.

The seasonal migration of labourers was a regular phenomenon in the Peloponnesian countryside, favoured by the very proximity of the fertile coastal lowlands to arid mountains and land-thirsty islands. In 1855, *Efimeris tis Ellinikis Georgias* [Journal of Greek Agriculture] complained that nowhere in the lowlands were there sufficient labourers to perform the necessary tasks of agriculture, except in the mountain provinces, where population was dense.[54]

Already at that date, currant viticulture attracted a great part of the overall seasonal migration, and wages depended to a great extent on labour demand in the currant sector: according to the author of the article, a relative abundance of labourers had prevailed only in the years when the blight (oidium) destroyed the currant vineyards; and as soon as sulphuring spread and currant cultivation resumed, it was not long before wages doubled and the acute labour shortage reemerged.

Of at least equal importance to the highland provinces of the Peloponnese, were the Ionian Islands, another traditional point of departure for several thousands of seasonal migrants. As stated by the local British authorities, seasonal migrants moving to the continent participated in cereal cultivation as well as in the hoeing of vineyards in

[54]"Peri tis Georgias", *Efimeris tis Ellinikis Georgias* vol.A, n.2, November 1855, p.132.

spring and in the harvest in August, and usually brought back the fruit of their earnings in the shape of corn, which was a valuable contribution to the deficitary grain balance of the Islands.[55]

Although the currant growing provinces experienced rapid population growth,[56] the number of seasonal migrants gradually increased and they began to come from further afield.[57] There is information about the arrival of Italian families coming from the east coast of Italy in 1878.[58] In 1886-1890, when several thousand labourers attracted by the construction of railways and of the Corinth canal came from as far as Montenegro, Dalmatia and Turkey, they were easily able to find seasonal employment in digging the vineyards.[59]

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[55]See BRCREP Cephalonia 1864. The report from the same island for the following year 1865 stated that "*the greater or lesser numerical concourse of agricultural labourers to Continental Greece is determined by the demand for hands required for the cultivation of the grain and currant crops*", and that "*the annual demand in this way is ... increasing*" (BRCREP Cephalonia 1865). Similar observations were made by consul Woodhouse for the island of Zante in 1865: "*The grain grown in the island is good, and suffices for about three months, being principally consumed by the rural population, but the labouring classes usually subsist for two months more on the corn which they receive in the Morea in exchange for their labour during the spring and autumn ...*" (BRCREP Zante 1865). The same view is confirmed on the continental side: "*The vine-culture is chiefly carried on by Cephaloniotes and peasants from Zante, who live frugally, and carry back the reward of their labour in kind.*" (BRCREP Athens 1859); "[great] *number of Ionians come over every year to the Morea during the fine season. At Patras alone as many as 2500 come during the year, and return to their homes after a few months.*" (BRCREP 1859).

[56]See chapter I, above.

[57]Cfr. also A. Chatelain, *op.cit.*, p.113: "*Par suite de l'extension des vignobles et malgré l'accroissement de population dans les pays viticoles,* [les migrations temporaires viticoles] *ne cesseront de se développer dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle.*"

[58]See BRCREP 1878.

[59]See p.245, below.

The increasing requirements of currant viticulture for seasonal migrant labour confirms that there was no tendency towards the formation of a local labour force depended on wage employment. Most families settling in the lowlands planted or share-cropped additional vineyards; as a result, they could fully employ their members in the family farm, and were not seeking wage-employment. On the contrary, they too called on migrant labourers during the periods of hoeing and harvesting, as native growers did; for each additional family of currant growers, more than one islander or mountaineer were added to the seasonal migrant labour force.[60] A multiplier effect was thus created, and instead of relieving the shortage of labour, population growth, together with the expansion of vineyards, generated increasing needs for external labour during the peak periods of cultivation.

On the other hand, recourse to seasonal migrants, in addition to easing the wage-labour shortages of the currant growing provinces, also constituted a solution for the labourers' regions of origin, which suffered from lack of land and capital resources. The high wages offered in the currant growing provinces constituted a valuable additional revenue for mountaineers and islanders, and probably critical

[60]There are no positive proofs that peasants permanently settling in the currant growing provinces were ex-migrant labourers. The fact that both movements originated from exactly the same regions (the Ionian Islands and the mountains of the Peloponnese), reinforces, however, such an assumption.

to the equilibrium of their households. As a result, lasting patterns of complementarity were created between the plain on the one hand, the mountains and islands on the other, and movements of seasonal migration survived until well into the 20th century.

As late as in the inter-war period, when the impetus of currant expansion had long since died down, 10% of the peasant population of Domvraina and other villages of Beotia (about 700-800 labourers in all) continued to move in spring to the plain of Vocha in the opposite shore of the Gulf of Corinth in order to hoe currant and grape vineyards. Immediately afterwards they would go back in order to hoe their own vineyards, which, located at a greater altitude, required hoeing somewhat later:[61] an instance of the fact that seasonal migrants were peasants seeking to arrange their activities so as to complement their meagre revenue, rather than proletarians.[62]

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[61]A similar pattern of a cycle of peasant migrations rendered possible by the different timing of tasks of cultivation in plots situated in different altitudes is described by O. H. Hufton [1974].

[62]Anagnostopoulos & Anagnostopoulos [1939] p.21. As I was told by N. Branis, currant vineyards in Amalias were dug until the 1960s by workers coming from the nearby highland villages Divri, Achladitsa, Kerpini, Simopoulo, Kakotari.

i. Expensive and unforeseeable wages: a factor favouring the reproduction of the peasant character of currant cultivation.

As a result of the structure of labour supply, the wages of agricultural workers were high and had a tendency to increase. According to the agricultural census of 1860 the average remuneration of agricultural wage labour in Greece was 1.66 drachmas plus meals, though at the same time the respective figure for France was 0.81 francs (equivalent to 0.91 drachmas). At the same date, wages in the currant growing provinces were decisively higher than the average. In Patras, the maximum was 2.80 drachmas and the minimum 1.70, in Aigion 2.50 and 2, in Ilia 3 and 1.50 drachmas, in Corinth 2.50 and 1.80.[63]

According to the data presented on graph V.1, based on the annual reports of the British consul at Patras, wages in the northern-western Peloponnese rose considerably together with the expansion of currant viticulture.[64] A figure already

[63]See Spiliotakis, *op.cit.*, p. xxvi and p.87. His figures for France are taken from the French agricultural census.

[64]Although the series is very patchy, the trend represented on graph V.1 is fully consistent with general information from the same source. See eg. BRCREP 1864: "*There is little chance of Greece growing large quantities of [cotton], unless the price in England keeps above 10 d. per pound, or the country become more populated, so as to lower the present high rate of wages.*"; BRCREP 1878: "*The cost of labour continues very high ...*"; BRCREP 1881:"*The price of labour is the same as previously reported ...*"

graph V.1. Evolution of average wages, 1859-1891.



considered very high in 1859, increased by 50% until 1884, though neither the average price of currants, nor that of foodstuffs followed any similar trend.[65]

In addition to being high, agricultural wages were also characterized by their variability and unpredictability, precisely because they depended on the arrival of labourers from distant regions. As commented by the author of the above mentioned article in *Efimeris tis Ellinikis Georgias* of 1855, wages were not proportionate to demand - depending on the annually cultivated area - but were determined by the massive or gradual, sufficient or insufficient arrival of temporary

[65]Data on the evolution of wheat prices at Piraeus from 1867 to 1905, taken from an unpublished paper of Mitrofanis & Pizanias, are reported on graph III.2.1. of Psihogios [1987] p.177.

migrants to the one or the other province. For instance, random factors such as the precipitation of rain increased wages by postponing cultivating work; farmers were obliged in that case to pay not only for the travel costs of the workers, but also for the weather inconveniences and the lost day's wages.[66]

The movement of wages in the years 1884-1891 is characteristic of the precipitous influence that conjunctural events might have on a labour market which depended on irregular supply. Following the agreement between the Greek government and its foreign debtors in 1879, the Greek state was again able to contract loans in the European capital markets.[67] This permitted the undertaking of considerable public works which aimed at the improvement of infrastructure. The most important of them, the construction of the railway linking Athens, Corinth and Patras and the excavation of the canal of Corinth, started in 1882.[68]

Public works resulted in an increased demand for wage labour and could not fail to produce an increase in the already high agricultural wages, notwithstanding the increase in labour supply by several thousands of workers attracted

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[66]Same reference as n.54, above.

[67]On the relations of the Greek state with its foreign creditors, see chapter II, p.86 above.

[68]See BRCREP 1882.

from the most remote places: Italia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Turkey.[69] In spring 1883, a newspaper of Pirgos reported that as a consequence of a variety of public and municipal works carried out in Ilia, wages for digging the vineyards reached as high as 7.50 drachmas a day.[70] High wages continued until 1886. But in 1887, most public works slowed down due to various reasons.[71] In that year, perhaps for the first time since the establishment of the Greek state "*the price of labour has been cheap, say 1s6d to 2s per day for agricultural labourers, in consequence of those men who had been working at the Corinth canal being temporarily dismissed.*"[72] And although public works resumed, this exceptional conjuncture continued until 1890, due to the

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[69]See BRCREP 1883:"*The railway from Athens to Patras is making fair progress ... The cutting of the Isthmus of Corinth canal is being carried on, but the undertaking is a very arduous one and it will require much time and capital before it is completed.*" Meanwhile " *A* [new] *Government loan of 170,000,000 of new drachmas has passed the Chamber of Deputies ...*"; similarly, BRCREP 1884 reported that railway construction continued and the works in the canal were going on; according to BRCREP 1885, a breakwater was under construction at Patras and works in the canal were progressing; also according to BRCREP 1886, the above works were continuing and "*several thousands of labourers came from Italy, Montenegro and Dalmatia to work at the Corinth canal and the railway.*" However, "*wages were high and workpeople scarce*".

[70]*Alfeios*, 2nd period, n.7, Pirgos 14/4/1883. A month later, the same newspaper reported, however, that wages were finally less high than farm owners had feared (n.10, 26/5/1883).

[71]According to BRCREP 1887, the breakwater at Patras was making only slow progress, due to disputes between the contractor and the Harbour commission. Meanwhile "*the original contractors for the canal ceded to Banque d'Escompte de Paris*" and works would not resume before the constitution of the new company. On the other hand, the railway from Athens to Patras was completed, and the projected railway from Patras to Pirgos had not commenced yet.

[72]BRCREP 1887.

arrival of numerous Turkish and Bulgarian peasants, who sought employment in the currant vineyards.[73] However, it was not due to last for long: by 1891, agricultural wages rose again, and almost reached their pre-1880 levels. The British consul could optimistically comment:

> "*The conditions of the labouring classes and peasantry in the Peloponnesus are very satisfactory. Poverty is unknown to them, for, owing to the sparse population and the large amount of labour required for the cultivation, preparation and shipment of currant crop, wages are very high.*"[74]

After 1893, due to the currant trade crisis, wages declined again.[75] But massive emigration to the USA - the main reaction of the peasantry to the fall in its revenues due to the currant crisis[76] - did not take long to push them to their

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[73]BRCREP 1888: "*Price of labour continues cheap, say, 1s.6d. per day for agricultural labourers, as many peasants from Bulgaria, Montenegro, and even Asia Minor have found their way to Greece.*"; BRCREP 1889: "*It is reckoned that 7,000 Bulgarians and Turks have come to the Morea to dig the vineyards, and this has cheapened labour, which is at 1s3d per day*"; BRCREP 1890: "*Many come from Italy to work on the railways, and Bulgarians and Turks come to dig up the vineyards, so that the average price of a day's work was 1s. 8d. per day.*"

[74]See BRCREP 1891.

[75]See eg. BRCREP 1894: "*The consumption of salted codfish had increased rapidly during the years of prosperity amongst currant growers, but latterly, in* consequence of the reduced wages of labourers *and of the rise on exchange, the article has been beyond the reach of the poorer class*" (emphasis added).

[76]As A. Kitroeff [1990], p.14-15, rightly points out,"*the currant crisis of the 1890s did not manifest itself as a sudden crash. Rather, it was a long, drawn out process that lasted almost a decade, as government promises to guarantee prices, plans to encourage local wine production and other ways of using currants shored up hopes of a long term solution*"; thus "*the permanency of the problems was confirmed at the turn of the century*". In fact, emigration "took off" after 1902 (see *ibidem*, table 1, p.7) and most migrants originated from the Peloponnese. It should be noted, however, that according to the data furnished by Kitroeff, the primacy did not belong to the currant growing regions themselves, but rather to the regions which used to send out seasonal migrant (continued...)

traditionally high levels.[77]

It may rightly be concluded that high agricultural wages were a long term characteristic of Peloponnesian agriculture, and that exceptions like that of the years 1887-1890 merely confirm the rule, by demonstrating that only the arrival of migrants from very distant regions might ease local labour shortages - a solution only sustainable under very particular circumstances, such as was the construction of public works.

In its turn, underdevelopment of the labour market, the deeper causes of which will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter, greatly favoured the reproduction of the peasant character of currant viticulture. As long as labour supply was expensive and wages in the season to come were completely unpredictable, wealthy farm owners had obviously no alternative but to entrust planting and cultivation of

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[76](...continued)
labourers. The nomos of Arcadia - which included the bulk of the mountainous regions of the Peloponnese, sent thousands of seasonal migrants to the lowland vineyards but did not produce any currant at all - was the Greek region which registered the highest percentage of emigrants in comparison to its population: no less than 15.10% between 1890 and 1911. The southern Ionian Islands, a currant growing region but also a major point of departure for seasonal migrants, was second, though the *nomos* of Achaia & Ilia, which included the most important currant growing provinces, those of Aigion, Patras and Ilia, was only eighth, with 6.11%.

[77]See BRCREP 1905: "*The cost of labour ... owing to the ever-increasing emigration of the agricultural classes to the US has not declined at all*" in nominal terms, and therefore in real terms it increased considerably, since the value of the drachma increased by 30% in 1901-1905; BRCREP 1906: "*The cost of labour has risen 25% to 50% and in many districts is not obtainable at all, being supplied by the women and by the gangs of Albanians, Ghegs, & c., who cross the frontier during the spring months, cultivate the vineyards, and return to their country with their earnings*"; BRCREP 1909: "*the absence of workmen and labourers of all descriptions caused a great increase in the price of labour*" Also HANBG, file 14, 17/3/1909: Branch of Amalias to central administration of the National Bank of Greece (farm owners complaining about exorbitant wages).

their farms to peasant families.[78]

[78]On high labour remunerations and defective labour supply, see also G. B. Dertilis "Les capitaux entre l'industrialisation et ses alternatives" in Dertilis (ed.) [1988], pp.201-207: "Petite propriété, émigration et manque de main-d'oeuvre".

Chapter VI. Labour productivity, capital accumulation and the dowry.

A. A model of peasant economy in the Peloponnese.

As noted in the introduction, D. K. Psihogios was the first scholar to try to provide a comprehensive explanation for the behaviour of the peasantry in currant growing provinces.[1] The guiding assumption of his analysis is that peasants never reason in terms of commodities, but always in terms of use-values.[2] Unlike many other Greek historians, who accept that a limited degree of market involvement was desirable as a means of diversifying the activities of the family,[3] Psihogios's view is that commercialization of the output of peasant labour could only occur through extra-economic coercion (taxes and duties), or out of sheer hunger, and that the principal objective of the peasant family was to secure subsistence through autarky, in particular by producing enough grain to cater for its own consumption.[4]

On the grounds that currant vineyard acreage never exceeded 25% of the total cultivated area, and that peasants

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[1] See p.8, above.

[2] His main theoretical references on this point are Chayanov, Polanyi and Sahlins. See Psihogios [1987] pp.163-166.

[3] See introduction, p.3.

[4] Psihogios [1987], p.125.

produced grain, wine and olives in addition to currants, Psihogios refuses to accept that currant cultivation ever became a "monoculture".[5] He suggests that currant cultivation was an answer to declining cereal yields per unit area and that it finally led to an improvement of cereal productivity, because cash income from the sale of currants allowed peasant families to introduce the use of horses and iron ploughs in cereal cultivation.[6] The pursuit of autarky is also the main explanation he gives for the colonization of the Peloponnesian plains: while accepting that there is an association between provincial rates of population growth and regional development of currant viticulture, he considers that grain exerted a stronger influence on the decisions of migrants than did currants.[7]

As regards the structure of the peasant family, Psihogios argues that the prevalent pattern in the Peloponnese and in Continental Greece was virilocal establishment of the young couple and that the complex household thus created split

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[5]Psihogios [1986] p.157 and [1987] p.40. Cfr. however n.61, p.54, chapter I, above.

[6]Psihogios [1987], p.39. A similar view is encountered in the account by Lampe & Jackson [1982] p.186: "*Southern Greece ... suffered from the greatest shortage of arable land ... Witness the minuscule grain yields recorded within the small southern state in 1860 ... Although no census was taken, other sources indicate a growing subdivision of holdings already under 5 ha in the face of increasing population and no primogeniture. The uncontrollable tendency of southern Greek smallholders to convert as much of their land as possible to vineyards for the raisin market can easily be understood: their plots would not yield enough grain or support enough livestock for subsistence anyway.*"

[7]Psihogios [1986] pp.153-156, n.16 and [1987] p.122, n.8. Cfr. however n.65, p.59, chapter I, above.

apart into nuclear households at the death of the family head and with the division of the inheritance.[8] Essential to the reproduction of this family structure was the institution of the dowry, in the absence of which marriage was unthinkable in 19th century Greece. As the person responsible for the arrangement of the dowries of his children, the family head was able to control their marriages and to keep the elementary families of his married sons tied to the paternal household.[9] And since the larger a household, the more adapted it would be to the pursuit of self-subsistence, the aggregative effect of the dowry might be evaluated in positive terms - were it not for its serious negative aspects in that the bride's family lost both resources and a productive worker, without receiving anything which could compensate this loss. In addition to this shortcoming, there is the fact that after the death of the father and the division of the inheritance, no son wished to contribute to the accumulation of the dowries of his brothers' daughters, and for this reason the same institution led to "premature"

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[8]His argument is based on qualitative documentation by folklorists and anthropologists. As the author himself admits (Psihogios [1987] p.111), this argument lacks almost any quantitative confirmation, apart from the conclusions of research in Sirako by Naoumi & Kautantzoglou [1985] and a reinterpretation of Couroucli's [1981] data of the village Episkepsi in Corfu. However, supporters of the contrary (neolocal establishment) thesis (eg. Panagiotopoulos [1984]) lack quantitative data as well: as pointed out by Psihogios, the average number of family members constitutes no argument in favour of the nuclear family view.

[9]*op.cit.* pp.130-133.

division of the complex household. Psihogios uses as a term of comparison the *zadruga*, where marriage is attended by bridewealth, not by dowry.[10] The latter system is considered more efficient, both because bridewealth compensated the family of the bride for the loss of a productive worker and because it led to larger, and therefore more economically robust households.

During research in the archives of Lehena village, Psihogios discovered that the value of dowries had a tendency to increase throughout the second half of the 19th century - especially of those dowries concluded between peasant families. The element which increased was usually cash, or rather the monetary debt of the bride's father to the groom.[11] The effort to provide for ever increasing and progressively monetized dowries is held to have led to a further enfeeblement of the "household mode of production" and to its

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[10] *ibidem*, p.151. On the *zadruga*, see Byrnes (ed) [1976].

[11] Psihogios conducted an inquiry on 106 dowry contracts found in the Mortgage Hall of Lehena village (near Amalias), dating from the period 1857-1905 (Psihogios [1987] pp.172-183). As he points out, dowries registered in the Mortgage Hall correspond to no more than a small fraction of the total number of marriages which occurred during the respective period, probably because most families judged private agreements in front of a teacher or priest sufficiently authoritative and preferred to avoid notarial expenses and stamp duty. In several cases, dowry contracts were signed and registered in the Mortgage Hall several years after the marriage had occurred (*op.cit.* pp.172-180). In Amalias too, it was a frequent practice to omit the registration of a dowry agreement in a formal document at the moment when marriage occurred: see eg. TR 29/129-4/9/1885, TR 3/44 (later series: Elissis) - 9/12/1909. This practice was not seldom followed even by elite families: TR 31/27-3/4/1886 (Fassos family). Psihogios did not take such delayed agreements into account, because they were often dictated by irrelevant purposes and were therefore subject to biases. In particular, the inalienable quality of dowry property was an effective weapon against confiscation.

final subsumption to capitalism, effected through the increasing transfer of resources to money-lenders for the payment of interest on dowry loans and through the "*transfer of surplus in the form of manpower through transatlantic migration*".[12]

B. An alternative model.

a. Why do the peasants usually avoid markets ?

A more qualified explanation for the widespread tendency of peasants to avoid markets is offered by M. Aymard in his article "Autoconsommation et marchés: Chayanov, Labrousse ou Le Roy Ladurie ?".[13] Criticizing the assumption that pre-capitalist rural economies moved gradually from autarky to fully-fledged commercialization, Aymard stresses that neither of these two opposite poles ever existed, and that peasants, although they probably considered autarky as an ideal situation, always found themselves obliged to pass through at least four distinct markets in order to secure subsistence:

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[12] *ibidem*, p.14.

[13] M. Aymard [1983]. This article is often referred to in recent Greek historiography as being relevant to the notion of "subsistence through multiple activities" (see introduction, p.3). Aymard's remarks are very probably appropriate to Greek subsistence agriculture in the 19th century. But as I try to show in the following paragraphs, they do not apply to export-oriented currant monoculture.

the market for agricultural products, the land market, the money market and the labour market.[14] But rather than to any obstinate *a priori* rejection of the acquisition of use-values through exchange with commodities, the negative attitude of the peasantry towards markets is ascribed to the fact that the latter's hierarchical and monopolistic structure usually imposed very unfavourable terms on direct producers and deprived them from drawing any benefit from participation in market relations.[15]

In its turn,

> "... *la place faite à l'autoconsommation oriente un ensemble de comportements des chefs de famille / chefs d'exploitation qui jouent de façon convergente contre une amélioration de la productivité passant par la comparaison attentive des coûts et des profits et par les choix*

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[14] *ibidem*, p.1392.

[15] Cfr. *ibidem*, p.1397: "*la relation négative* [des couches moyennes de la paysannerie] *au marché*, quand elles n'ont pas pu développer des cultures plus spécialisées et mieux assurées de leurs débouchés et de leurs cours, *fait pour elles l'autosuffisance l'idéal, une fois payées toutes les redevances dues aux propriétaires, à l'Eglise, aux seigneurs et à l'Etat*" (emphasis added). Also, p.1409:"[la masse de la paysannerie] *n'accroît ses livraisons et ses prestations que pour voir lui échapper* une monnaie qui lui permettrait à la fois de se libérer des liens de dépendance dans lesquels elle se trouve entravée, de faire face à ces besoins, et d'améliorer ses consommations. *Contrainte de vendre pour payer, plus que pour pouvoir acheter, nul doute qu'elle ait préféré, chaque fois qu'elle l'a pu, limiter ses ventes, donc sa peine. Malgré les sollicitations de l'économie monetaire, le malthusianisme des individus et des "entreprises" vient confirmer la rigidité et l'inélasticité d'ensemble du système*" (emphasis added). It may be assumed that the author does not preclude the possibility of a more positive attitude of the peasantry towards markets if - and when - accumulation was feasible to it.

économiques correspondants, et contre un plein ou meilleur emploi des facteurs de production (terre et main d'oeuvre) permettant à la fois une accumulation et une croissance de la production."[16]

But this was by no means the case in Peloponnesian currant viticulture - as it was not in French peasant farms specialized in wine production.[17] It is true that village merchants and exporters controlled the commercialization of the crop and often managed to draw considerable benefits by speculating with prices, dates of delivery and quantities of currants; it is also true that the structure of the credit market did not favour peasant growers, who were obliged to pay usurious rates of interest on loans backed by undervalued collateral securities. However, the exceptional conjuncture of increasing international demand for a commodity which was a natural monopoly of the Peloponnese, the production of which required the employment of large amounts of -

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[16]*ibidem* p.1397.

[17]Cfr. G. Delille, *op.cit.* p.122: "*Fattori esterni possono anche influire profondamente sulla produttività. E il caso, per esempio ... del grado di sviluppo del mercato interno ed estero e dei profitti o dei danni che cagiona all' economia globale di un paese. Il Mezzogiorno francese si è trovato integrato in un mercato nazionale che ha favorito le sue colture arbustive ... Lo sviluppo della rete stradale nel '700 e della rete ferroviaria nell '800 hanno dunque permesso uno sviluppo accelerato e di notevoli proporzioni della vigna (fino ad arrivare a una vera monocultura nella Linguadoca) per rifornire tutto il mercato interno ... Cosi, anche senza nessun cambiamento al livello delle tecnniche agricole propriamente dette, il Mezzogiorno francese ha potuto aumentare la produttività globale della sua agricoltura.*"

preferably peasant - labour in an environment of acute labour shortages, increased the productivity of the peasant families and allowed them to obtain not insignificant benefits from their involvement in the market economy.[18]

As a result, Peloponnesian peasant agriculture, instead of under-employing available factors of production as is usually the case in subsistence economies, not only tended to fully utilize its own labour and capital resources in currant

[18]As noted above, Psihogios suggests that the expansion of currant cultivation was not a positive response to market opportunities, but rather a reaction to declining land productivity. This argument is based on the detection of a decline in cereal yields per unit area between 1860 and 1875. However, data on cultivated area are not accurate enough to support any conclusion on land productivity. It should be recalled that accurate data on acreage are scarce even for an entirely commercialized crop such as were currants (see chapter I, above). National figures of cultivated area - and of output - for a produce such as grain, largely consumed at home, should be considered still less reliable. The study of the evolution of grain yields would require detailed studies, at a level of aggregation much lower than the national one. Psihogios's hypothesis is also weakened by the fact that rapid currant growth preceded 1860 by at least thirty years. Moreover, in the years 1860-1869, that is, during most of the period of the presumed decline of cereal yields, currant cultivation expanded at the slowest rates recorded for the entire era of currant growth (1830-1893).

The second part of the argument is that income from the sale of currants served principally to finance technological improvement of grain production. But this suggestion does not conform well to the existing historical evidence either. Already in the early 19th century, peasants are reported to have been using manure exclusively in currant vineyards and not for cereal cultivation (see n.6 p.19 above). At the end of the century, contemporary observers still deplored the low technological level of arable agriculture in the Peloponnese. See eg. BRCREP 1892: "*It is much to be desired that greater thought and attention be directed towards the growing of cereals in this district; but, as stated before, the peasantry have devoted all their energies to the growing of currants, and all other branches of industry and husbandry are neglected*"; BRCREP 1893: "*No steam ploughs or other improved agricultural implements are employed in the Morea, the cultivation of grain crops being carried on very much in the same style as was no doubt practised in the days of Hesiod*"; BRCREP 1894: "*The cultivation of cereals in this country is carried on in the most primitive way, and is, therefore, not remunerative*". If the peasantry had cultivated currants in order to finance improvements in cerealiculture, after several decades of currant growth, such improvements would have been at least perceptible. It is not altogether to be excluded that the expansion of currant viticulture was associated with some change in cereal cultivation, in particular in the arable fields privately owned and situated close to the vineyards. In those fields, it was necessary to apply some practices providing for the maintenance of the natural fertility of the soil, which no doubt represented a shift from former practices of wild cultivation. But this was a side effect of currant expansion rather than its cause. Moreover, it does not seem to have had any particularly decisive impact on technological improvement and yields.

specialization, but also attracted additional manpower from surrounding communities and credit from the international money market. Moreover, these resources were committed in a way which rendered Peloponnesian agricultural production internationally competitive, by financing the conversion from technologically backward and unproductive cerealiculture to profitable currant viticulture, which enjoyed an expanding international demand.[19]

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[19]Rather than taking into account considerations about relative advantages and disadvantages, Psihogios argues, considering it as an important reason for currant expansion, that the creation of currant farms was more feasible for peasant families than the acquisition of a pair of oxen required for cereal cultivation (*ibidem* p.40 and Psihogios [1986] p.157). But a pair of oxen did not cost more than 260 drachmas (see Psihogios [1987] p.48, n.9 and p.49). This was not an insignificant sum, but it was incomparably lower than 2,500 drachmas which was the minimum value of an hectare of currant vines (an hectare being the area which could be cultivated by a peasant family, with two male adult members, without the use of hired labour in hoeing). Psihogios himself admits in several parts of his exposition that to plant a currant vineyard larger than two or three stremmata and to wait until it came to produce fruit involved considerable expense (eg. Psihogios [1987] p.125, p.187).

Ignorance of the technology of currant cultivation (partly justified because of the lack of publications on the subject) also led Lampe & Jackson [1982] to regard the conversion of arable land into currant vineyards as a relatively easy venture which could be afforded by the peasantry: "*Urged on by the extensive Greek commercial network between major European ports, southern peasants planted more and more vineyards in the hopes of supplying European wineries with grapes if not the finished product. The greatest expansion took place during the 1870s, at the time that the Mediterranean phylloxera epidemic struck, even reaching the fledging vineyards in southern Serbia. Inexplicably, Greece was left untouched. When French cultivation recovered by the early 1890s, the numerous Greek vineyards expanded the drying of their grapes into raisins* [sic]. *The process posed no technological problems, took only ten to twelve days, and required skilled labor but no machinery*" (p.178).

a quite different matter.

Conversion to commodity production is a family decision which may depend on short and middle term expectations regarding the profitability of market relations. But as long as the family keeps working together, the way back to autarky always remains open as a last resort. By contrast, a decision of the family head to do without his sons and to rely on the work of servants and wage-labourers, or a decision of the sons to leave the paternal household and hire out their labour for a wage, requires considerations of a much more general order and of a much longer term.

In an article of 1978, F. Mendels suggested that when the remuneration of labour is lower than its average productivity, it is profitable for the head of the family to substitute servants, or day labourers, for family work.[20] His conclusion arises from the assumption that the profits of the farm are equally divided between the members of the family, and therefore that the exclusion from the farm of some of them would increase the benefits of those who remain. The additional labour required to replace those who left, would cost less, because of relatively low wages ruling on the

[20]See Mendels [1978] p.785. This model reflects the household formation system of North West Europe - the article itself refers to France - and does not claim universal validity. However, I suggest that its problematic may also prove useful for the study of quite different societies, provided of course that it is not mechanically applied.

market.[21] Conversely, when wages are higher than labour productivity, the family head is expected to face considerable difficulties in trying to convince his children to stay on the farm.[22]

Mendels recognized however that quite often, even though substitution of hired labour for children might be more convenient,

"*Si les mentalités, le sentiment, les attitudes, la*

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[21]This model gives a reasonable explanation for the North West European phenomenon of rural families who employed servants, while at the same time sending out their children to work for wages elsewhere (*ibidem*, p.786). On this point, see also Kussmaul [1981].

[22]*ibidem*, p.786:"*Considérons maintenant le cas où la droite horizontale des salaires est située au-dessus de la courbe de productivité moyenne. Cette situation, tolérable à court terme, est intenable dans la longue durée selon la théorie de l'*homo oeconomicus. *En effet, elle signifie que le paysan, gagnant moins que ses ouvriers, devrait non seulement s'abstenir d'en engager, mais meme abandonner ou, du moins, vendre son exploitation et s'engager à son tour comme ouvrier. Or, comme on le sait, le modèle de maximisation s'applique souvent mal aux paysans, surtout à ceux qui s'accrochent à leur ferme, malgré des gains médiocres ...* " And p.787:"*Dans le cas où les salaires sont élevés (ou bien la ferme produit médiocrement), les enfants répugnent à rester. Le chef de ménage doit faire face au problème de l'exode de la nouvelle génération, qui préférerait plutot partir que partager la maigre pitance qui lui échoirait à la ferme. On a donc, strictement parlant, une pénurie de main-d'ouvre, où la répugnance des enfants exacerbe encore le dilemme posé au paysan par la cherté des salaires.*

Même la promesse d'une succession non partagée ne suffit plus toujours à garder un héritier dans ces conditions, car la concurrence entre frères et soeurs change d'objet. L'héritage de la ferme, au lieu d'etre un objet de convoitise et la récompense du gagnant, devient au contraire le triste sort réservé au perdant. La main-d'ouvre familiale nécessaire à l'exploitation de la ferme ne pourra etre ajustée à la dimension de l'entreprise que si l'autorité du paterfamilias et les solidarités traditionnelles parviennent à bloquer l'"esprit d'individualisme".

Plutot que d'utiliser des pressions morales, les chefs de ménage peuvent aussi induire leurs enfants à demeurer, en constituant avec eux des communautés légales et égalitaires qui leur assurent l'avantage de la copropriété ainsi que du partage du pouvoir à la ferme. Comme l'avait déjà proposé Jean-Louis Flandrin, dans un livre récent, [Flandrin (1976) p.86] *la constitution de communautés aurait été*

> *une manière de se procurer de la main-d'ouvre dans les provinces où la terre était pauvre et particulièrement en des temps de basses eaux démographiques at de hauts salaires. Inversement, là où la terre était riche, il était rentable d'employer une main-d'oeuvre salariée, particulièrement aux époques d'essor démographique et de bas salaires."*

tradition, ou autres considérations non monétaires l'emportaient, les enfants qui entraient dans l'âge adulte gardaient leur place dans le ménage même si, le cas échéant, la famille en devenait "trop nombreuse" ou l'exploitation "trop petite"."[23]

Developing on the considerations presented above, we might suggest a further, "economic", factor, in addition to the moral and ideological ones proposed by Mendels: even though, in the short run, the substitution of wage labour for children might appear profitable to the head of the family, or high wages might on the other hand exert a strong attraction on younger members of the farm, modes of economic development based on wage labour might nevertheless not yet have convinced the peasantry of their solidity and long-term reliability.[24]

The predictions of Mendels' model, in cases where, although the farm was profitable, the family head decided to keep the children with him, is particularly relevant to our case study. If the family continued to increase in size, per

[23] *ibidem*, p.786.

[24] This suggestion is by no means contradictory with the empirical index of "distance from a pole of economic development" used by Mendels for measuring the influence of the "traditional morality" factor in his multiple regressions: *ibidem*, p.792. On reasons for peasants to "*hold and work land at returns below those paid in the labour market*", see also G. Grantham, "Scale and Organization in French Farming, 1840-1880" in Parker & Jones (eds.) [1975], pp.309-311.

capita income would after a certain point start to fall. Therefore,

> "*A long terme, les paysans adoptaient alors certains remèdes. Ils tentaient d'augmenter la taille de leurs fermes en achetant ou en louant de la terre ... Ils pouvaient adopter de* nouvelles cultures qui, en répartissant l'intensité du travail au cours de l'année de façon plus uniforme, pouvaient augmenter la productivité du travail, *sinon par heure, du moins par personne*" (emphasis added).[25]

Although neither of the versions of Mendels's model presented above may fit Peloponnesian agriculture exactly, his considerations touch on very significant aspects of the currant economy. As noted in chapter V, wages in the Peloponnese were high; so was the profitability of the peasant farm. Any suggestion as to which was higher would be no more than a guess, based on assumptions about cyclical variations of farm profitability and of wages which cannot be checked with the empirical data available.

It may however be suggested that neither the temptation of young adults to abandon the farm in order to seek wage

[25]Mendels, *op.cit*, p.786.

employment, nor that of the head of the family to expel some of his offspring would be unfounded from an economic point of view. Wages were high, employment abundant, and young people - especially males - would not encounter great difficulties if they decided to settle on their own and enjoy freedom from family hierarchy and obligations. On the other hand, family heads, even if it would be difficult and costly to replace the labour of departing children with that of hired labourers, might continue to farm the same area of vineyard and employ their additional revenue in money-lending operations, which were highly profitable in the context of an expanding economy.

Why neither of these tendencies developed, not even in part, is probably - among other factors - due to the unpredictability of the long term evolution of the currant sector - a factor which falls under the heading of "economic" motivations for keeping the family farm intact.[26] As stated in several parts of this thesis, the currant trade was often struck by cyclical crises, and more than once no recovery was in sight. The speculative practices of merchants were particularly effective in reinforcing this feeling of uncertainty.

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[26] See p.263 above.

e. Dowry as a regulating mechanism leading to accumulation.

At the same time, a mechanism of adjustment between the number of working members of the family and farm size was badly necessary in order to keep the peasant farm from becoming "too crowded" or "too small" to provide for an adequate level of living of its members; since in any case, if the average labour productivity in the farm fell, the temptation of young males to abandon it would become stronger, as their remuneration would have fallen considerably lower than wages prevailing on the market.

The need to adapt resources to population is of course common to all human societies and is critical for their reproduction. What varies considerably from a society to another and across history are the specific solutions given to this question, and the degree to which they are successful and capable of ensuring the reproduction of the social structure specific to each period and to each country.

19th century Greece was typically a society of smallholders. Therefore, the equilibrium was sought after mainly at the level of the peasant family. As will be argued in the following paragraphs, the principal mechanism of adjustment between population and resources was provided in the Greek case by the dowry, a traditional institution deeply

rooted in the customs of Greek families. Such a mechanism should not, however, be considered as ensuring adjustment between men and resources only within a given family during its life-cycle, but rather as operating across generations and at the level of the peasant community as a whole.

f. The main characteristics of the institution of the dowry.

The main characteristics of the dowry which emerge from the study of Psihogios in the Mortgage Hall of Lehena are very similar to those recorded by sociologists, anthropologists and ethnographers in case studies referring to other Greek regions: the dowry was probably the strongest and most widespread institution of Greek communities. One is therefore justified in completing the information supplied by Psihogios with that provided by authors who have studied the institution of the dowry in other parts of Greece.[27]

[27]On the research conducted by Psihogios on the dowry in Lehena, see n.11 above. The other references on the topic of the dowry used in this chapter are the following: E. Friedl [1962], "Some aspects of dowry and inheritance in Boeotia" in J. Pitt-Rivers [1963] (by far the most relevant and helpful to our purpose), "Kinship, class and selective migration" in J. G. Peristiany [1976]; J. K. Campbell [1964], "The kindred in a Greek mountain community"; M. Couroucli, "Dot et Société en Grèce moderne" in Ravis-Giordani [1987]; J. Lampiri-Dimaki "Dowry in Modern Greece: An Institution at the Crossroads Between Persistence and Decline" in M. Kaplan [1985]; P. S. Allen "Internal Migration and the Changing Dowry in Modern Greece" in Koumoulides (ed) [1980], pp.255-284.

(1) The provision of the dowry as an imperative and legally established obligation of the bride's father.

According to the Civil Code of 1945, which followed the principles of earlier Byzantine-Roman law and applied until very recently in Greece "*the father is obliged to provide his daughter who is about to get married with a dowry proportionate to his wealth, to the number of his children, to his social position, as well as to the social position of the future husband*". Dowry is the property "*given to the husband in order to alleviate the burdens of marriage*".[28]

But law appears to have done no more than crystallize what was a norm deeply embedded in the people's minds and in social relations. E. Friedl observed that in Vasilika,

> "*The villagers feel a particular obligation to marry off their daughters. It is among the most important of parental obligations, and one frequently discussed by the entire elementary family...*"[29]

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[28]The translation is by Lampiri-Dimaki, *op.cit*, pp.166-167.

[29]Friedl, "Dowry and Inheritance ..." p.127. Illustrative of the strong moral obligation felt by fathers towards the endowment of their daughters is also the case of Aristeidis Harvalos, one of the richest merchants in Amalias. The financial position of Harvalos, so enviable until the end of the 1870s, subsequently deteriorated in a spectacular way. Among other things, in September 1887, 30 stremmata of currant vineyard from his property, as well as his shares of a big water-mill, were sold in auction, following judicial seizure by creditors from Patras against a debt amounting to 16,120 drachmas (TR 34/126-20/9/1887). But financial hardship did not hamper him from marrying his daughter Eugenia to another merchant in Amalias, to whom he offered a dowry valued at (continued...)

As confirmed by J. Lampiri-Dimaki, in the 1970s, the majority of the Greek farmers, working and lower-middle classes still continued to regulate property relations between parents and daughters and between husband and wife on the basis of the rules which emanated from the institution of the dowry.[30]

(2) Composition and inalienability of the dowry.

According to Psihogios, dowries registered at the Mortgage Hall of Lehena, even those between peasants, included land, currant vineyards, trousseau and cash, of a total value equal to the living expenses of a family over several years.[31] Currant vineyards, arable land, trousseau, cash, were also included in all dowry contracts consulted in the archives of Amalias.[32] Land and cash are reported to have been indispensable elements of dowries in other Greek agricultural regions as well; there is no doubt that new couples in Greece

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[29](...continued)
16,356 drachmas (TR 30/160-24/12/1887). The value of the dowry was the same as the debt which constrained him to undergo judicial seizure: however, a good dowry was the utmost duty of a family head, and its importance in terms of prestige and alliances was not comparable to any loss of material property.

[30]*op.cit.*, p.168.

[31]He calculated that dowries between peasants amounted to the subsistence expenses of a family with seven members over four years (*op.cit.*, p.180).

[32]See eg. cn.6535-10/1/1881, TR 87/30-15/11/1881, TR 33/125-24/7/1886, TR 31/146-19/9/1886, TR 49/120-29/8/1890, TR 71/149-30/9/1898.

usually got at marriage substantial pieces of property, and essential means of production in particular.[33]

A characteristic which clearly distinguishes the economic significance of the dowry from that of inheritance is that the means of production which constituted the dowry are removed from the bride's family at a moment when the parents are still active producers,[34] though this dispersal is under no circumstances counterbalanced by the dowries brought into the household by the sons' wives.[35] Although in complex households based on virilocal establishment - as were those observed by Friedl in Vasilika and as were most probably also those of currant growers in the Peloponnese[36] - revenues from

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[33]Friedl, "Dowry and Inheritance ...", p.122. Lampiri-Dimaki *op.cit.* p.169, M. M. Couroucli *op.cit.*, p.331.

[34]"... *the carrying out of obligations to daughters does result in the dispersal of property owned by the elementary family in the course of the adult life of the parents.*" (Friedl, *op.cit.*, p.131).

[35]"*Even those fortunate enough to have an equal number of sons and daughters cannot replace what they give in dowries by what the boys bring in from their wives. Certainly, if the son lives in town, income from his wife's dowry does not contribute directly to the standard of living of his parents back in the village. When a son stays on the farm, the revenue from his wife's dower properties may replace the loss of income from the property given with a daughter's dowry, but the advent of grandchildren soon adds to the household's expenses and there is, in the long run, a net loss*" (*ibidem*, p.131).

[36]During research in Amalias, it proved impossible to discover any source on residence patterns; as a result, the present thesis is unable to bring any substantial contribution to the discussion on the prevalent type of household. The only relevant fragments of evidence are: a) a contract indicating that the husband of a rich politician's daughter and his wife were living together with his father-in-law (TR 33/125-24/7/1886); b) an inter-vivos transmission of property from a retiring father to a son, under condition that the son would live together and take care of the old man (TR 13/29-8/9/1873); c) an agreement between two married brothers who decided to live together and share their properties in common. On the other hand, information from contracts of planting and share-cropping agreements indicate that brothers or cousins frequently collaborated in agricultural tasks, and the findings on the common boundaries of members of the same patrilineal kin presented in chapter II point in the same direction.

I think, however, that the thesis of Psihogios on the prevalence of complex

(continued...)

dower property were not set apart from the overall income of the family, they were to a great extent used for the upbringing of the children of the new couple.

On the other hand, neither the estate nor the monetary part of the dowry could ever be sold or otherwise alienated by the groom's family.[37] Not even the groom himself could dispose of the dowry as he wished, without the consent of his wife.[38] As a result, the dowry brought in by a son might never be used to endow any of his unmarried sisters.[39] It ensues that a dowry, apart from being a transfer of property between different lineages, is principally one between succeeding generations.[40]

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[36](...continued)
household patterns (see p.251, above) is the most valid suggestion from those available, and I agree with him that the conclusions of Panagiotopoulos [1984] on the prevalence of nuclear households are unfounded. This latter view is shared by an increasing number of Greek historians (see eg. Petmezas [1990] p.30, n.39).

[37]"*... the income from the young wife's dower property is likely to be pooled with that of the paternal holdings ... Under no circumstances is it considered proper to sell dower lands to supply money for ordinary living expenses. Nor should the dowry monies be used for such purposes. In whatever form, the dowry is considered capital which may be invested or saved to add to the estate available for the newly married couple's children ... After the death of the groom's father, the farming sons divide the patrimony ... Once the division of the property has taken place, each brother is free to exploit, in his own way, an estate derived ... from two sources; from the patrimony that fell to his lot at the division, and from his wife's dowry, with any accrued increase...*" (Friedl, *op.cit.*, p.125).

[38]The wife's father and her brothers had also the right to be consulted about the management of her dowry: see *ibidem*, p.127.

[39]Psihogios's conclusions are similar (*op.cit*, p.150), although he interprets the effects of the inalienability of the dowry in a quite different manner. See also Couroucli, *op.cit.*, p.328.

[40]Cfr. also P. S. Allen, "Internal Migration and the Changing Dowry", p.255.

(3) Order and age at marriage.

Any possibility of dowries circulating between members of the same generation was also precluded by the imperative obligation of male children to remain single until all their sisters got married.[41] This restriction, probably the most significant of all the dower rules, achieved several objectives at one stroke.

The most immediate one was that as long as a son remained single, he contributed to the formation of his sisters' dowries. The postponement of the son's marriage extended the period during which the producer / consumer ratio in the household was favourable to saving. Because as soon as a new bride was brought in, children would follow, and this favourable ratio would be overturned. The income from the dower property would be added to that of the family; but since it could not be alienated, it is doubtful whether it might contribute at all to the accumulation of extra property.[42]

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[41]see Psihogios *op.cit.* p.151.

[42]Psihogios *op.cit.* p.150-152 maintains that the combination of patrilocal establishment with delayed marriage of sons was an impediment to marriage. In order to prove his conclusion, he examines first the case of a family where the eldest child is female, and suggests that the easiest in that case would be either to bring in a groom for the daughter or to marry a son before marrying the daughter, and so attract an additional worker, either the groom or the bride (plus dower property in the second case). In the case of a family where the eldest child is a son, he concludes that marriage of his sisters would be easier if he could marry first and bring in an additional female worker and dower property: although he argues on the basis of the ratio of consumers to producers, (continued...)

On the other hand, brothers had an explicit moral obligation to contribute to the formation of their sisters' dowries, or even, should the father die or be unable to work, to assume on their own the responsibility for their marriage.[43] Moreover, according to Friedl, it was in the brother's interest that his sister married well, because in that way the prestige of the whole family increased, and as a result he was able in his turn to marry a girl with a substantial dowry.[44] By contrast, unmarried sisters were a serious disadvantage on the marriage market, because the family of the future bride would fear that the groom might spend a considerable portion of his property in dowries.[45]

At the same time, female priority at marriage attached sons to the paternal household and encouraged them to remain loyal to their father even beyond marriage. It should be noted here that the person responsible for a young male

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[42](...continued)
it is clear that he omits the impact of the birth of additional children. On the other hand, any attempt to prove that marriage customs in Greece rendered marriage difficult, should also explain why marriage was practically universal and the rate of definitive celibacy was so low. Sereléa [1978] p.50, who analyzed the data offered by the census of population of 1879, found that definitive female celibacy was 3.3%, the lowest recorded for Western and Mediterranean Europe.

[43]On this point, see Friedl [1962] p.66 and "Dowry and inheritance ..." p.132, Campbell [1964] p.44, Lampiri-Dimaki *op.cit.* p.173, Couroucli *op.cit.* p.332. This rule could be transgressed only if a son was so much older than his sister, that if he waited until her marriage, he risked celibacy (Psihogios *op.cit.*, p.159).

[44] Friedl [1962] p.66.

[45]Friedl, "Dowry and Inheritance ...", p.123.

adult's marriage and for the dowry his wife was going to receive from her family was the father, not the young man himself.[46] If a son could marry and receive a dowry before his sisters, he might decide to settle on his own and evade his obligations towards the family, even at the cost of being disinherited. But if he was obliged to contribute first to the formation of dowries, it was in his interest to continue to stay in the household after his marriage and work together with his father until the latter's retirement or death, so as to benefit from a fair part of the inheritance.[47]

Linked to the established order of male and female children at marriage was also the question of the age at marriage considered desirable for each sex. Generally speaking, it appears that a woman expected to marry between 20 and 25, though her husband should not be younger than 25 and not much older than 30.[48] The belief that men should marry later than women was well suited to the rule of the priority of sisters at marriage; in particular, it rendered long years of work for the sisters' dowries more acceptable for sons.

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[46] Psihogios *op.cit.* p.159.

[47] Psihogios *op.cit.* p.152.

[48] See Campbell [1964] p.82-85, Psihogios *op.cit.* 150-151. Sereléa, by applying Hajnal's technique [1953] to the data offered by the census of population of 1879, calculated the mean age at marriage of females at 23.47 years (Sereléa [1978] p.44).

(4) Dowry as surplus and as saving.

As suggested above, the resources which make up part of a dowry were taken away from the household and irrevocably devolved to subsequent generations at a moment when parents were still fully active, though dowries brought in the household by sons could not be considered as integral parts of the paternal property. As a result, resources destined to become dowries should be in excess of the requirements of those remaining in the bride's parental household, both in terms of revenue and in terms of working capital.[49] In that sense, dower resources constituted a surplus, over and above subsistence needs.

The surplus character of the dowry is clearly illustrated when compared to inheritance. Inheritance cannot be *a priori* considered to be a surplus: a man may very well accumulate wealth in order to fulfil his (socially determined) obligations towards his children during life. But although the equitable and efficient disposal of property at death is always an important concern, there are no accounts of any widespread moral obligation upon anybody to produce something in excess of his needs in order to bequeath it at death. By contrast, dowry formation automatically involves

[49] See Psihogios, *op.cit.* p.167.

accumulation.

A related question is that concerning the size of the dowry. According to sanctioned custom, it should be proportional to the family property. However, there are several reports on "dowry inflation" in various periods and places.[50] As reported above, Psihogios found that the value of dowries in Lehena had a tendency to increase throughout the second half of the 19th century.[51] Friedl observed a similar phenomenon in Vasilika. She considered it a sequel of the pursuit of hypergamy, which in that case was connected with urban occupation and residence:

> "... *the dowry comes into the consciousness of the villagers more often as a property requirement for marrying off their daughters than as a means of transmitting the inheritance. When, in addition, the high value placed on social mobility is translated into an effort to find urban sons-in-law for one's daughters, the dowry emerges as a mechanism for increasing the social prestige of the family. Farmers are willing to give more material property in exchange for the greater satisfaction*

[50]Besides the examples by Psihogios and Friedl reported below, see also Lampiri-Dimaki *op.cit.* pp.175-176 and Couroucli *op.cit.* p.340 and Allen, *op.cit;* a short oral intervention by J. Peristiany on increasing dowries in Cyprus is reported in Ravis-Giordani [1987] p.401.

[51]See p.252, above.

to be derived from arranging a hypergamous union for a daughter."[52]

Since this tendency was universal, and since the "supply" of grooms was by definition inelastic, continuously increasing dowries were required to get the same type of husband.

"*Such inflation has had several consequences. The value of dowries is no longer necessarily limited to the share of the inheritance to which the daughter is entitled. Farming sons are willing to give up some portion of their shares to add to the prestige and influence of the family...*"[53]

Did the pursuit of hypergamy account for dowry inflation in 19th century Lehena as well? Very probably, but it is not

[52]"Dowry and inheritance ..." p.127.

[53]*ibidem* p.128.

possible to find positive confirmation for this assumption.[54] In any case, this recurrent phenomenon clearly illustrates the vigour of the dowry as an institution, which in 1985 Cyprus was still strong enough to compel parents "*to spend a whole life in order to constitute a dowry*".[55]

In manifest contrast with what is supposed to be the typical behaviour of producers in peasant societies,[56] Greek families seeking to provide dowries for their daughters seem to have striven strongly for accumulation of property above their subsistence needs, either by trying to fully exploit their productive capacity or by compressing their levels of consumption.[57]

The institution of the dowry imposed hard work not only on prospective brides, but on both males and females during

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[54]At that date, much before the start of rural exodus from the Greek countryside, the search for urban sons-in-law was of course restricted only to elite families (see Psihogios *op.cit.* p.182; a few similar examples for Amalias are mentioned in chapter II, above). For peasant families living in currant growing villages, hypergamy would have probably consisted of finding a groom from a family who possessed a substantial vineyard. During my research visits in Amalias, I was told that until World War II, the owner of a currant vineyard large enough to fully employ the members of a family had high chances on the local "marriage market" and was considered a groom more desirable than a low-level civil servant. In fact, as late as the 1960s, Friedl observed a quite similar rank order in Vasilika: farmers who possessed sufficient land to avoid wage labour or share-cropping were ranked at the same level with prospective sons-in-law employed in middle-level civil service or equivalent post, higher than a low-level civil servant (see Friedl "Kinship, class and selective migration", p.365).

[55]Peristiany, *op.cit.*

[56]See eg. Chayanov [1966], Sahlins [1972].

[57]Cfr Lampiri-Dimaki *op.cit.* p.170: "*The existence of the institution of the dowry creates strong incentives, especially among the poorer Greek families, to save money over a long period of time, to emigrate and to work*".

most of the productive period of their life. A single adult male was obliged to produce above what was required for subsistence in order to contribute to the formation of his sisters' dowries; a single adult female was obliged to work for her own dowry; and both married men and women alike should work to create the dowries of their daughters.[58]

[58]This strong imperative to accumulate could not fail to deeply influence the way of life and the values of Greek villagers. Let me quote the lively and beautiful evocation by Friedl:"... *another component of the concatenation of values among the people of Vasilika is a feeling that whether or not the eventual advancement of the family is a realistic possibility, it is necessary to be continually energetic - really to exert one's vitality - in an effort to improve the family's economic and social position. The farmers believe that satisfaction can be derived from the effort alone, and a hard-working man is admired for his energy regardless of its outcome. Dr. Peristiany has declared that social relations among the Cypriots he studied have the quality of* agonia, *by which he meant a struggle in which there is intense feeling without personal antagonism. In the same vein, the villagers of Vassilika see life itself a struggle. "*Palevoume *- we are wrestling", they say. An outsider can abstract from much ordinary behavior in Vasilika the further generalization that unless a man participates in that struggle he is not considered fully masculine. He is not a whole man. Life in the community seems charged with tension, with a nervous vitality, partly caused, I believe, by the fear that circumstances may drive men to abandon the perpetual wrestling-match with life . The* tempelis, *the loafer who drinks too much, or sits in the coffee house all day and squanders his income in the process, constitutes a problem for some families, and also exemplifies a culturally recognized form of personal maladjustment. Both the villagers who have tendencies in that direction, and the generalized concept of the idler, are subjects for jesting in the village. The high frequency with which laziness is joked about and the quality of the laughter evoked may perhaps be understood best as an expression of a particular kind of ambivalence. On the one hand, the villagers are strongly tempted to abandon the combat, to retreat to irresponsibility, for it is only in that way that they can achieve a semblance of peace. On the other hand, to succumb to such a temptation would mean the loss of all vital masculine force. They both envy and hate the lazy drunkard and, therefore, they laugh at him, albeit uneasily*" ("Dowry and Inheritance ..." p.118).

g. The dowry and its role in social reproduction.

(1) Some tentative comparisons.

i) Greek dowry and English "portion".

A. Macfarlane, in his account of the English marriage pattern in the period from 1300 to 1840, notes that "*unlike the dowries of many Mediterranean societies*", in England "*the girl was not expected to provide a house, nor did she usually bring tools or livestock*", though "*land was an optional extra*".[59] In fact, there seem to have been significant quantitative differences between the "portion" to be brought by the girl in England and the Mediterranean dowry.

According to Macfarlane, the "portion" of a girl in the lower half of the population was of the order of money and goods worth between £10 and £30.[60] Since the average yearly wage of a female servant was about £10, this sum corresponded to one to three years' wages and could relatively easily be saved by a girl during a reasonable period of time before marriage, even without help from her parents. This resulted in a relatively weak parental control over marriage; as the

[59] Macfarlane [1986] p.266.

[60] *ibidem*, p.268.

author puts it, "*an active labour market provided an alternative to inherited wealth*".[61] On the other hand, if the Mediterranean dowry constituted the main "brake" on marriages, in England this brake was mainly the "*pervasive social rule that a man should not marry until he was able to earn an independent 'living' sufficient to maintain his family at a reasonable standard*".[62] In its turn, the capacity to earn a decent "living" depended mainly on the acquisition of a skill, permitting a reasonably favourable assimilation of the individual within an economy characterized by an advanced division of labour.

Psihogios calculated that the average value of the peasant dowry at Lehena amounted to 2,209 drachmas in 1857-1879, 2,520 drachmas in 1880-1892 and 3,142 drachmas in 1900-1905.[63] The smallest dowry I encountered in Amalias, offered by a doctor to his female servant, amounted to 1,000 drachmas.[64] These sums were much more substantial than those recorded for England. First, they corresponded to more than three years'

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[61] *ibidem*, p.267.

[62] *ibidem*, p.278.

[63] Psihogios [1987], table III.2.1, p.173.

[64] TR 54/44-20/5/1891.

wages, not only of female, but also of male servant labour.[65] It should be recalled that Greek wages were notoriously high, and therefore the possibility that the discrepancy emerging from this comparison is due to a difference between Greek and English servants' wages is very reduced. Moreover, as noted above, the value of an average peasant dowry corresponded to the living expenses of a large family over several years.[66]

It is evident that the accumulation of the resources required to form a Greek dowry necessitated the involvement of the entire household and allowed for a very strong parental control over marriage. The contrast with the English case is exemplary: in England, a relatively modest "portion" and a developed labour market rendered marriage largely an individual decision, though the expectation that a man should earn a decent "living" stimulated the formation of a skilled labour force. In Greece, a large dowry in a context of an economy based on household production rendered marriage a collective concern of the family members, imposed strict parental control over individual decisions and reinforced the solidity and the productive capacity of the household.

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[65]Yearly remunerations recorded on the four contracts of hiring of servants which I found in Amalias varied between 124 drachmas and 360 drachmas. The lowest one referred to a female servant (cn.2566-8/11/1877); a cook received 180 drachmas (cn.8797-13/8/1882) and two male agricultural servants received 300 drachmas (cn.4731-16/9/1879) and 360 drachmas respectively (cn.2423-17/10/1877).

[66]See p.269, above.

ii) Greek dowry in a South European context.

The impact of transfers of property upon marriage on social reproduction emerges also in a comparison within South European peasant societies.[67] Fontelas, the hamlet in North-east Portugal studied by B. J. O'Neill, might be considered as an extreme limiting case in a South European context, since it is found in "Atlantic" rather than in "Mediterranean" Portugal. In Fontelas, the dowry, or any other form of property transfer upon marriage is completely absent. Property transfer occurs at the death of the parents, which implies a very authoritarian relationship between generations. Absence of dowry and, more in general, prevalence of *patrimony* over *matrimony* is associated with a "repression of marriage", very high rate of illegitimacy and preferential inheritance.[68] This combination of kinship relations - property relations, aiming at maintaining viable

[67]Dowry is considered to be a typical Mediterranean phenomenon. But as is revealed by anthropological inquiries conducted in a multitude of villages, patterns of transfer of property at marriage vary very widely across the Mediterranean Sea. Unfortunately, these inquiries do not follow any homogeneous methodology and do not use uniform terminology, so that any effort to provide a consistent outline turns out to be very difficult. A comprehensive survey is provided by Davis [1977] pp.180-195, who discusses the problems arising from the inaccurate use of terms for property transfers and suggests a uniform terminology.

I think that an attempt to provide a general scheme for the geographical distribution of property transfers at marriage and for their possible association with historical or anthropological parameters might turn out to be very fruitful. But this is would be a separate endeavour, falling outside the scope of the present study.

[68]O'Neill, [1987] p.346.

landholdings, generated a social structure characterized by pronounced differentiation and economic inequality.[69]

A contrasting example - much closer to Greek experience - is offered by an article of J. Schneider on Sicilian trousseaus. Schneider suggests that dedication of Sicilian women to embroidery during the 19th century aimed at the creation of exchange value and associates this practice with "*the long-run viability of Sicilian families and their defense against proletarianization*" which "*necessitated possession of mobile wealth as well as productive resources, so much that the marriage exchange system gave equal weight to both.*"[70]

What is relevant for our purpose here is the parallel way in which the dowry seems to have been associated with social reproduction in both cases: the absence of dowry in Fontelas is linked to social differentiation and inequality, whereas in Sicily, its forceful application is a check to proletarianization. In the 19th century Peloponnese, where the dowry was probably still more powerful and universal than in Sicily,[71] procedures of social differentiation seem to have

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[69] *ibidem*, p.346.

[70] J. Schneider, "Trousseau as Treasure: Some contradictions of Late Nineteenth-Century Change in Sicily" in Kaplan (ed) [1985], pp.111-112.

[71] As pointed out by Schneider (*op.cit*, p.86), in Sicily, "*one could always marry without land, houses or money, but never without trousseau*". As noted above, in Greece, dowry included necessarily not only trousseau, but also essential means of production.

standard of the groom's parents to be lowered. As regards other members of the family, i.e. daughters, they should normally have already married out.

Moreover, even if the bride had only sisters, it should not be thought that her family enjoyed no counterpart for the dowry they have given out. According to Friedl,

> "*the control of the property establishes social links between a man and his wife's close parental kindred*".[78]
>
> "*Each elementary family develops a new network of affinal kin relationships in each generation. These relationships are maintained for at least some years after a marriage, and frequently throughout life, partly as a result of the residual interest a girl's family has in her dower property. Affinal relatives as well as lineal kin and close collaterals are considered available as possible sources of aid and influence for job-getting, for hints on land opportunities, for suggestions for good marriage possibilities and the like ...*".[79]

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[78] "Dowry and Inheritance ...", p.127.

[79] *ibidem*, p.134.

(4) Dowry and transatlantic migration.

Most probably, "dowry inflation" in the late 19th-early 20th century was also closely connected with the massive migration to the USA in 1893-1924.[80] Since migration is usually interpreted as the debacle of the peasantry, the fact that young males migrated in order to earn the dowry of their sister (so as to be themselves able to marry afterwards) is believed to be one of the most evil impacts of the dowry institution. My suggestion is that the connection between dowry and migration constitutes rather an illustration of the role of the dowry in reinforcing the reproduction of the household and of its values and in avoiding proletarianization.

First of all, it should be noted that the original cause for migration was the currant crisis, not the "dowry inflation";[81] the latter phenomenon was a sequel of the high demands of returning migrants. Of course, in its turn, the pressure over families with unmarried daughters incited them to send some of their members to the USA in order to collect the resources needed.[82]

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[80]Psihogios (1986), Couroucli *op.cit.*, p.342, Fairchild (1911) p.39, Saloutos (1964) p.31, Andreadis (1917) p.98, p.116.

[81]Kitroef (1990) p.15.

[82]Psihogios (1987) p.195.

In addition, it is not clear whether the pattern of Greek transatlantic migration really disintegrated households or whether it was rather inscribed into a household strategy of defense against the risk of disintegration. As pointed out by Kitroef,

> "*historical work in the last quarter-century has moved away from the older line of explanation that regarded migration as an uprooting and a breach in the lives of those who moved across the Atlantic. Emigration is now being seen more as a process of collective transformation in which Old World norms adapted to the new environment, having been transplanted rather than uprooted.*"[83]

The findings of Kitroef, following research on original documents never before used in the study of Greek migration, are clearly in favour of this view.[84] It is observed that those who left were not necessarily the poorer peasants, but rather those who were able to finance the travel costs and

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[83]Kitroef [1990] p.4. References offered by Kitroef on this subject are: J. Bodnar, *The Transplanted; A History of Immigrants in Urban America*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985 and C. Tilly, *Transplanted Networks* CSSC, New School for Social Research, New York, Working Paper No.35, October 1986.

[84]Of particular interest is the use of passenger list of vessels arriving in New York, containing detailed information on the origin, the sex and the marital status of migrants.

whose families could replace their labour in the farm.[85] There are in addition strong indications that the migration of Greek peasants was not a desperate exodus, but that it was planned by the family and that it followed a carefully articulated path: for instance, those who left after the pioneers were often going to join a relative; also, an increasing participation of women is recorded for after 1915, who probably followed the successful establishment of male members of their households in the new environment.[86]

On the other hand, migration is reported to have had significant positive repercussions on relatives who remained at home. Remittances of migrants not only assisted them in redeeming their land from debt,[87] but also caused a considerable decline in the ruling rates of interest.[88] And this is a meaningful illustration of the positive impact of family-planned migration on the well-being of the peasantry.

Hence, the association between the institution of the dowry and migration, instead of being a proof of its detrimental impact, seems to have been a further indication

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[85]Kitroef, *op.cit.* pp.25-29. It should be noted that this suggestion does not conform well to the fact that the highest rates of migration were recorded for the provinces which were places of origin of seasonal migrants (see chapter V, n.76 above). This question needs further discussion and additional evidence, in particular as regards differentiation within the peasantry.

[86]*bidem*, pp.30-37.

[87]See eg. BRCREP 1908.

[88]Kitroef [1990] p.40.

that the dowry was an integral part of the peasant family efforts to defend the household mode of production against disintegration and proletarianization and that it greatly assisted the survival and adaptation of a "familistic" way of life under the most adverse circumstances.[89]

[89]Following a different approach, that of "modernization theory", Lampiri-Dimaki (*op.cit.* p.172) reaches a similar conclusion: "*It is of interest to note that, ironically enough, it is the existence of a traditional institution - that of the dowry - which encourages female emancipation, for it is very often in order to meet the demands made by tradition that Greek women have to follow a nontraditional way of living, that is, to work outside their own homes either in this country or abroad. At the same time, however, the very fact that such emancipation is used to reinforce traditional norms - i.e., the wages earned are used to form a dowry - leads to a more rapid acceptance of social change than would have been the case in the opposite instance.*"

Conclusion.

Rather than recapitulate the main arguments of the thesis - which, I hope, are exposed in the respective chapters in a sufficiently clear manner - let me here attempt to put the most important of them in a more general, comparative and theoretical perspective.

The thesis aims principally at studying peasant agriculture and peasant family strategies. But these can not be examined in isolation from trade and the strategies of merchant capital. This combined approach is first of all imposed by the geographical and temporal context: the 19th century experienced an unprecedented development of international trade; moreover, the Mediterranean is a geographical area which has since very old times been characterized by intense exchange and deep penetration of market relations.

The predominance of merchant capitalism over the Greek economy in particular seems to have been exceptionally strong. As is pointed out by G. Dertilis,

> *"Il s'agit ... d'une économie dominée, pendant près de deux siècles (XVIIIe-XXe), par un ensemble de réseaux financiers, opérant sur trois niveaux hiérarchsés et distincts, qui correspondent aux horizons géographiques*

established in the exporting cities and ports, who were in direct contact with the foreign markets of consumption.

On the other hand, the relevance of merchant strategies for the development of currant viticulture is also illustrated by their negative impact. As was shown in several parts of the thesis, the overwhelming domination of merchants over the currant sector imposed on it very restrictive conditions: in particular, merchants altogether avoided granting long-term loans to the growers and discounting commercial risks. These practices seriously limited the benefits which might have accrued to the Greek economy from the currant sector.

Of course, the negative association between merchant ascendancy over the economy and development is not peculiar to Greece. To quote here K. Marx:

> "... *wherever merchant's capital still predominates we find backward conditions. This is true even within one and the same country, in which, for instance, the specifically merchant towns present far more striking analogies with past conditions than industrial towns.*
>
> *The independent and predominant development of capital as merchant's capital is tantamount to the non-subjection of production to capital, and hence to capital*

developing on the basis of an alien social mode of production which is also independent of it. The independent development of merchant's capital, therefore, stands in inverse proportion to the general economic development of society."[4]

However, the "*non-subjection of production to capital*", a condition which is perfectly valid for the case of peasant agriculture, does not necessarily imply independence of peasant producers from capital. As argued by M. Aymard, peasants always found themselves obliged to pass through several distinct markets in order to secure subsistence: the market of agricultural products, the land market, the money market and the labour market.[5] These markets were often conditioned to a large degree by merchant capital.

Rather than with independence of peasant producers, the "non-subjection of production to capital" was in several cases connected with an aversion of merchants to undertake organization of production and its risks, as long as their commercial activities offered them high and relatively secure profits. Of course, under these circumstances, the traditional role of the peasant family as a producer was

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[4] *Capital*, vol.III, p.327-328.

[5] See p.254, chapter VI, above.

reproduced without contestation.

Currant viticulture is a typical instance of this. Although production was entirely commercialized, although it was developed with credit of merchant origin, the prevalent unit of production always remained the peasant family, even on the big farms of non-peasant ownership.

Thus, the ambiguous attitude of Greek merchant capital towards production does not seem to have been exceptional. In contrast, the attitude of the Greek peasantry was certainly not typical. As shown by the prevalent type of anticipated sales of fruit, of planting and of share-cropping agreements, peasant growers undertook most of the risk involved in the creation of currant vineyards, in yearly cultivation and in the commercialization of the crop. As was argued, this was connected with an income-maximizing attitude of the peasantry. This attitude offered to the currant sector a badly needed flexibility and was the main factor of its rapid expansion: if it was not for the "nervous vitality" characterizing Greek peasant communities,[6] it is difficult to understand how currant viticulture could ever have expanded at such impressive rates, under the unfavourable conditions which ruled in the credit and labour markets. The peasant family was eager to provide dowries for its daughters - and

[6]See E. Friedl, quoted above in n.58, p.278, chapter VI.

in general, to endow the younger generation with resources sufficient to maintain and improve the productivity of labour in the family farm and to guarantee the reproduction of the material and spiritual conditions of peasant life. And it was the only social entity which possessed a reserve of labour, skill and forbearance adequate to face the difficulties of recurrent crises, destructions of the crop by bad weather or disease, lack of any insurance for the prices of the next season.

At the same time, the speculative practices of the merchants, aiming at quick profits with low risk, do not seem to have been very efficient in absorbing the entire surplus produced by the currant economy. Peasant farms, able to endure crises - even at the cost of falling heavily into debt - could obtain substantial benefits in years of strong demand and rising prices, and compete successfully with larger farms using hired labour.

On the other hand, the prevalence of small farms, lacking adequate resources, perpetuated their dependency on the merchant capital. Moreover, the readiness of the peasantry to assume production under conditions which could not be tolerated by bigger farms allowed the merchants to expand their activities without effecting any change in their practices.

A peculiar compatibility appears therefore to have existed between the domination of the merchants over the sphere of circulation (and over the economy in general) and the prevalence of peasant family farms in the production of currants. This combination of course limited any possibility of development of capitalist agriculture. The capacity of the peasant family to maintain the productivity of its labour at competitive levels within the family farm checked almost completely the development of the labour market. In turn, scarcity of wage labourers consolidated the competitive position of the family farm.

In order to better understand and define this "strange compatibility", it may be helpful to compare it with the two opposite, more widespread and much more theorized situations of subsistence agriculture and of capitalist agriculture. In subsistence agriculture, such as that studied by Chayanov,[7] to which Aymard mainly refers,[8] and which might be perfectly outlined by the second version of F. Mendels's model mentioned above,[9] the typical producer is the peasant household, oriented towards autarky. The relations of the peasants with the markets are negative. As producers, they

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[7] Chayanov [1966].

[8] *op.cit.*

[9] See n.22 p.262, chapter VI.

produce in excess of their needs only if compelled to do so because of "external" pressure. When the prices of their crops increase, they tend to sell less, since less is sufficient to provide for their fixed monetary needs. Similarly, peasants hire out their labour only in order to complete their inadequate revenue from the family farm. If wages increase, they rather tend to work less outside the farm, since less days' wages are enough to provide what is needed. In terms of economic theory, elasticities of both product supply and labour supply are negative to price.

Capitalist agriculture is the extreme opposite. Capitalist producers and labourers are not the same physical persons, as is the case in peasant agriculture. The typical unit of production is no longer the family farm producing for subsistence, but the enterprise, producing for profit. Elasticities of product supply and labour supply are positive: capitalist farms are ready to produce more when prices are higher, whereas workers whose revenues depend mainly on the labour market will work more if wages are higher.

The case of currant viticulture does not correspond to either of these models, but has characteristics in common with both. There is no doubt that currant growers reacted positively to the incitations of the market: the more

currants they were able to sell, the more they produced. The curve of product supply was positive, as in capitalist agriculture. However, since the main productive unit remained the family farm, and since peasants preferred working on the farm rather than seeking wages elsewhere, the supply of labour reacted in a negative way to wages and was similar to that in subsistence agriculture.

Essential to the coherence of this model is the assumption that peasant families do not *a priori* reject the acquisition of use-values through exchange with commodities, and that their negative attitude towards markets in the case of subsistence agriculture is due to the hierarchical and monopolistic structures of the latter, which usually impose very unfavourable terms to direct producers and deprive them from any benefit from participation in market relations.[10] According to this assumption, if the peasant families are allowed to benefit from market relations, they do not hesitate to participate in them and try to accumulate.

On the other hand, voluntary peasant participation in market relations does not include the labour market. The reasons for the insistence of peasants on the family organization of production are discussed in chapter VI.[11] As

[10]See p.254, chapter VI, above.

[11]See p.263 above.

argued, this insistence may be put down to economic as well as to ideological factors. But what appears to be critical for the coherence of the family unit is the level of labour productivity in the family farm in comparison with the level of wages. In particular, if labour in the family farm is considerably less productive than wages offered on the labour market, male children will be strongly tempted to abandon it. Thus, accumulation of productive resources sufficient to maintain a competitive level of labour productivity in the family farm becomes an imperative for the reproduction of peasant productive units.

What I consider to be particularly interesting in the type of peasant agriculture discussed here is its intrinsic tendency to reproduce itself, as long as powerful external changes do not intervene. Specialization and production for the market increases the productivity of family labour. This renders the resort to the labour market less necessary and less desirable for the members of the family. In turn, the underdevelopment of the labour market renders more difficult the development of non-peasant enterprises, and thus consolidates the relative position of the family productive unit.

On the other hand, the ability of the peasant family to keep its productivity at competitive levels, and therefore

maintain its coherence, may be seriously reduced if accumulated capital is massively invested in the economy, as occurs in many countries in the industrial era. In that case, in several sectors, non-peasant enterprises become incomparably more productive and peasant families lose any chance of competition with them for the allocation of the labour force of the younger generations.

Conversely, as long as accumulated capital avoids undertaking the organization of production, the prevalence of family productive units is reproduced. And as noted above, when the dominant form of accumulated wealth is merchant capital, it often tends to abstain from productive investment. Developing on these considerations, there might be an intrinsic association between merchant capital ascendancy over the economy and family organization of production.

Let me conclude with a suggestion for further research: if the considerations presented above turn out to be valid, they might be particularly relevant to the study of Mediterranean societies. In fact, trade in the Mediterranean has been very important since a very early date, and merchants have been exceptionally powerful. At the same time, the Mediterranean is often considered as an area with a very strong family tradition, particularly in the economic

sphere.[12] It might prove worth-while to investigate the possible relationship between the two phenomena.

[12]See the observations of J. Davis [1977] p.167 ff.

Appendix I. Interest rates and risks.

A contract of anticipated purchase of currant fruit like those described above may be considered as a bond; the creditor advances to the debtor the sum A, which in the absence of usury should be equal to the estimated value of the bond at the moment of issue (Y_{t_1}).

$$A = Y_{t_1} \qquad (1)$$

The estimated value of the bond at the moment of issue depends on the future nominal value of the bond at the moment of discharge (Y_{t_n}), the general rate of discount ruling on the market (i) and the estimated probability of default (p):

$$Y_{t_1} = [\ Y_{t_n} * (\ 1 - p\ )\ ] \ /\ (\ 1 + i\ )^t \qquad (2)$$

The nominal value of the bond at the moment of discharge will be equal to:

$$Y_{t_n} = A * (\ 1 + r\ )^t \qquad (3)$$

where A is the sum originally advanced, r is the rate of interest per unit of time recorded on the contract and t is

the duration of the loan. By substituting Y_{t_1} in (2) according to (3) we arrive at the equation:

$$Y_{t_1} = [\ A * (\ 1 + r\ )^t * (\ 1 - p\ )\ ] / (\ 1 + i\ )^t \qquad (4)$$

But if condition (1) is true, (4) may be written as follows:

$$Y_{t_1} = A = [\ A * (\ 1 + r\ )^t * (\ 1 - p\ )\ ] / (\ 1 + i\ )^t \qquad (5)$$

and therefore:

$$(\ 1 + r\ )^t = (\ 1 + i\ )^t / (\ 1 - p\ ) \qquad (6)$$

That is, in the absence of usury, or, in other words, if the credit market was working as a perfect competitive market, the rate of interest applied to any loan should only depend on the general rate of discount ruling on the market and on the risk of non-repayment of the loan.

If village merchants and currant growers were borrowing in a unified market, then the value of i would be universal and the difference in the rate of interest on merchants' and growers' loans would be justifiable only by the difference in

the respective probabilities of non-repayment of the loans. In the case of loans to merchants, function (6) should be:

$$(1 + r_m)^t = (1 + i)^t / (1 - p_m) \qquad (7)$$

where r_m is the rate of interest of loans accorded to merchants and p_m is the average probability of non-fulfilment of the obligation; and respectively in the case of loans to currant growers, function (6) should be:

$$(1 + r_g)^t = (1 + i)^t / (1 - p_g) \qquad (8)$$

For the sake of simplicity, let us admit that in both cases $t = 1$, i.e. that the duration of loans is equal to the unit of time to which r and i are expressed. Therefore:

$$(1 + r_m) * (1 - p_m) = (1 + r_g) * (1 - p_g) \qquad (9)$$

and:

$$(1 + r^m) / (1 + r_g) = (1 - p_g) / (1 - p_m) \qquad (10)$$

If we assume that the rates of interest recorded on the contracts studied in Amalias are representative - in fact, a wide range of sources confirm this assumption - then the rate that forms the left side of the equation (10) may be given a

numeric value. If 12% was the regular rate of interest on the advances to village merchants and 24% the rate of interest on the advances to currant growers, then:

$$(1 - p_g) / (1 - p_m) = 1.12 / 1.24 \qquad (11)$$

where we arrive at the equation:

$$p_g = 0.0967741 + (0.9032258 * p_m) \qquad (12)$$

Equation (12) expresses the relationship between average risk of non-repayment of merchant debts and average risk of non-repayments of peasant debts that would justify rates of interest of 12% and 24% respectively, on loans contracted on a unified market.

However, the level of average risk accepted by creditors is by no means unlimited: nobody lends money if he believes that such an operation is so risky that there is no hope of realizing any profit and that the probability of suffering losses is high. In a given productive environment, creditors would stop issuing loans at a given interest rate r if they realized that $1 - p$ was too low to guarantee the "just" recompense of their capital, represented by i. The expected future value of the issued bonds may not be smaller than the

value of the advanced capital, increased by ***i***:

$$A * (1 + r) * (1 + p) \quad A * (1 + i) \qquad (13)$$

and therefore:

$$p \quad (r - i) / (1 + r) \qquad (14)$$

If ***i*** were equal to 8%, the general rate of discount practised by the National Bank of Greece, acting as central bank of the country, then p_m could not be higher than 0.036 and p_g would be rather lower than 0.129.

Let us assume that the average risk accepted for loans to merchants at 12% interest was 0.03 (in other words, that the creditors expected that 3% of the loans to merchants were not going to be reimbursed). If the equation (12) were true, the respective average risk of loans to peasants at 24% interest should have been 0.124, i.e. creditors should have granted loans to peasants up to the point of expecting that 12.4% of these loans were never going to be reimbursed. That is, only an average risk of loans to peasants 4.13 times higher than the average risk of loans to merchants would confirm the validity of equation (12).

An analysis exactly equivalent to the above is presented

(in order to be criticized as irrelevant) by Bhaduri [1983], p.74.

Appendix II. Currant production of the Peloponnese, 1830-1893 (thousand Venetian litres).

1830	5,161	1851	55,554	1872	118,408
1831	2,610	1852	15,746	1873	121,819
1832	4,164	1853	5,961	1874	129,247
1833	5,919	1854	6,506	1875	127,073
1834	4,729	1855	9,112	1876	150,902
1835	7,441	1856	39,905	1877	138,801
1836	6,597	1857	39,467	1878	175,421
1837	7,007	1858	52,751	1879	167,726
1838	6,590	1859	54,083	1880	169,963
1839	8,718	1860	78,903	1881	222,880
1840	10,132	1861	69,040	1882	197,832
1841	9,967	1862	76,153	1883	212,269
1842	12,012	1863	90,912	1884	236,539
1843	14,059	1864	81,191	1885	209,388
1844	16,671	1865	82,046	1886	237,697
1845	18,526	1866	93,072	1887	235,114
1846	24,786	1867	104,220	1888	285,192
1847	30,739	1868	93,116	1889	285,778
1848	32,363	1869	87,161	1890	275,210
1849	34,446	1870	89,189	1891	301,630
1850	41,273	1871	134,207	1893[a]	334,000

a. For 1892 and 1893 there is no information on the production of the Peloponnese as separate from that of the Ionian Islands. The figure presented here is an estimate derived from the detraction of the (estimated) production of the Ionian Islands from the total production.
Sources: Pizanias [1988], table I, pp.128-131 (reproduced here with the kind permission of the author).

Appendix III. Total currant production and exports of Greece, 1865-1912 (thousands Venetian litres).

	output	export		output	export
1865	109,341	111,340	1889	321,140	346,930
1866	122,564	126,195	1890	316,413	300,839
1867	137,613	135,517	1891	342,954	378,095
1868	118,649	120,173	1892	245,000	252,874
1869	110,651	112,472	1893	377,002	294,713
1870	114,693	101,925	1894	323,001	322,127
1871	171,955	150,196	1895	350,001	310,060
1872	149,653	138,920	1896	325,002	338,279
1873	150,781	153,697	1897	245,000	222,068
1874	161,433	161,315	1898	325,000	247,788
1875	154,393	154,541	1899	305,000	251,784
1876	184,050	184,179	1900	100,001	148,386
1877	174,085	174,017	1901	295,000	219,055
1878	211,332	212,335	1902	322,944	239,852
1879	195,405	201,750	1903	379,896	238,260
1880	195,463	195,339	1904	310,000	224,875
1881	258,380	258,274	1905	342,000	225,101
1882	230,516	231,600	1906	288,000	250,443
1883	243,671	243,455	1907	332,000	247,239
1884	278,646	273,516	1908	398,000	201,933
1885	241,808	239,856	1909	393,000	210,997
1886	274,154	269,917	1910	253,000	225,130
1887	269,020	276,333	1911	334,000	249,883
1888	327,500	283,780	1912	345,000	225,908

Sources: Pizanias [1988], table I and II, pp.128-133.

Appendix IV. Regional production of currant fruit, 1784-1912 (millions of Venetian litres).

	Patras	Aigialeia	Corinth	Ilia-Olimpia	Trifilia	Pilia	Messinia-Calamata
1786	4.0	*	*	*	*	*	*
1794	3.6	1.8	0.3	*	*	*	*
1814	6.0	2.0	0.7	*	*	*	*
1821	4.0	4.4	0.5	0.2	*	*	*
1833	0.2	*	*	*	*	*	*
1839	0.7	*	*	*	*	*	*
1840	1.3	*	*	*	*	*	*
1842	1.5	*	*	*	*	*	*
1843	3.0	*	*	*	*	*	*
1850	8.7	*	*	*	*	*	*
1851	12.7	*	*	*	*	*	*
1852	1.5	*	*	*	*	*	*
1853	1.0	*	*	*	*	*	*
1855	0.28	0.6	0.05	5.0	1.5	*	0.2
1860	15.0	11.62	10.5	23.3	8.1	1.6	3.8
1865	16.3	9.5	6.5	26.3	11.0	*	*
1878	23.4	17.0	8.9	59.6	29.8	7.4	19.8
1880	*	*	*	*	*	*	18.1

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Appendix IV (continued)

	Patras	Aigialeia	Corinth	Ilia-Olimpia	Trifilia	Pilia	Messinia-Calamata
1884	23.0	24.0	14	89.0	39.0	13.5	29.5
1885	26.5	21.5	13.5	77.0	29.5	17.5	27.5
1886	26.0	21.5	12.5	75.0	44.0	33.0	33.0
1887	27.0	17.0	11	86.0	33.0	32.0	32.0
1888	30.0	24.0	19	116.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
1891	*	21.0	23	*	*	27.0	25.0
1894	26.6	23.4	19.2	86.2	36.2	25.5	28.7
1895	31.9	24.5	19.2	92.6	41.5	25.5	43.6
1896	30.9	23.4	20.2	90.4	40.4	26.6	44.7
1897	19.6	23.4	20.2	99.0	39.4	24.5	46.8
1898	30.3	21.3	19.7	111.7	40.4	22.3	54.3
1899	25.5	14.9	13.8	110.7	35.1	19.2	57.5
1900	4.3	19.6	21.3	14.9	6.4	4.3	12.8
1901	24.5	20.2	22.3	92.6	33.0	28.7	51.1
1902	26.6	19.2	21.3	100.0	38.3	29.8	57.5
1904	21.3	19.2	23.4	104.3	25.5	27.7	57.5
1906	17.0	17.0	25.5	89.4	27.7	27.7	51.1
1907	19.2	21.3	25.5	100.0	31.9	27.7	52.1
1908	21.3	20.2	26.6	131	41.5	40.4	62.8

Sources: For 1786, 1794, 1814: Lamprinidis [1905] p.8,9. For 1821: GSA, K.47, file IX, manuscript n.4, entitled "Tableau synoptique des productions de la Morée, redigé en 1821 d'après une [...] resultant des plusieurs années de récolte". For Patras, 1833-1853: Bakounakis [1988] p.139. For 1855: *Efimeris Ellinikis Georgias*, June 1856. For 1860, 1865, 1878, 1894-1908: BRCREP. For 1884-1888: "Currant in 1884-1888", *Economic Journal*, n.155, December 1889, p.436; total production according to this series presents some differences with the information offered by BRCREP and Pizanias [1988]. For 1891: Reports of directors of provincial agencies of the National Bank of Greece to the headquartes in Athens, HANBG, series "products", "currant", file 1.

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Appendix V. Currant exports and total exports of Greece, 1865-1877 (thousand drachmas).[a]

	(1) currant exports	(2) total exports	(3) (1)/(2)
1865[b]	17,988	41,463	0.433
1866	20,432	41,586	0.491
1867	21,077	48,863	0.431
1868	13,499	40,576	0.332
1869	20,247	46,669	0.433
1870	17,309	37,956	0.456
1871	30,326	62,236	0.487
1872	25,472	56,201	0.453
1873	35,647	64,483	0.552
1874	37,225	57,981	0.642
1875	37,813	67,430	0.560
1876	39,037	53,479	0.729
1877	41,690	52,454	0.794
1881	48,062	69,887	0.688
1882[c]	49,185	76,334	0.644
1884	36,600	73,621	0.497
1885	47,500	76,337	0.622
1886	55,200	79,096	0.698
1887	61,701	102,657	0.601
1888	52,389	95,654	0.548
1889	55,509	107,778	0.515
1890	48,124	95,792	0.502
1891	60,495	107,490	0.563
1892	40,460	82,261	0.492

Appendix V (continued)

	(1) currant exports	(2) total exports	(3) (1)/(2)
1893	47,154	88,034	0.536
1894	22,549	74,241	0.304
1895	21,704	73,170	0.300
1896	26,698	72,477	0.367
1897	33,300	81,709	0.401
1898	36,168	88,222	0.421
1899	37,768	93,803	0.403
1900	52,553	102,339	0.514
1901	40,807	93,994	0.434
1902	22,405	79,663	0.281
1903	24,779	85,924	0.289
1904	28,334	90,579	0.313
1905	33,540	83,691	0.401
1906	42,575	123,526	0.345
1907	39,558	117,620	0.337
1908	29,280	110,713	0.265

a.These figures are furnished by the Ministry of Finance and are based on custom receipts. They may serve only as rough a indication.

b.Exports of the regions included in the frontiers of 1864 (Ionian Islands included).
c.Annexation of Thessaly.

Sources: Pizanias [1988], table III, pp.124-135.

Documentary sources.

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- [Referred in the text as **HANBG**]: Series XXI. Allilografia, D. Eggrafa emmiston ipokatastimaton tis ETE, branch office of Pirgos, vol.63-65, 2/12/1866 - 6/4/1896.

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NIKOLOPOULOS ARCHIVE.

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AMALIAS TRANSCRIPTION REGISTER (VIVLIO METAGRAFON).

Official register kept since 1857 in the Mortgage Hall of Amalias (Ipothikofilakeion) with copies of all contracts affecting legal rights on estate property in the region. Referred as **TR** (Transcription Register), followed by the number of the volume, the number of transcription and the date of the contract (not the date of its transcription).

LISTS OF CESSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ESTATES.

Series reporting the main data of all the individual certificates of cession of national land to citizens. It includes about 200 big volumes, ordered by law authorizing the issue of the cessions. Most of them refer to laws No 386 and No 431 of 1871. The series is available in microfilm in the HANBG, edited by Eve Karousou.

ACCOUNTS OF THE GREEK STATE.

Yearly series presenting the expenditure and the receipts of the Greek treasury. Fiscal receipts are recorded on

separate tables for each kind of tax. Rows of the table correspond to provincial treasuries. Columns report separately the collectible, collected and due amounts. Available in microfilm copies located in the Research and Education Institute of Commercial Bank of Greece.

GENERAL STATE ARCHIVES, ATHENS.

K.47, file IX, n.4: Manuscript entitled "Tableau synoptique des productions de la Morée, redigé en 1821 d'après une [...] resultant des plusieurs années de récolte".

Ms 224, Report of Alexandre de Toujoux, ministerial counsellor, Director of the Office of Public Economy.

JOHN PAPADIAMANTOPOULOS ARCHIVE.

Three files with commercial and political correspondence of J. Papadiamantopoulos, dating from 1800-1826, loan contracts, property certificates, and a short biography. Location: Benaki Library of the Parliament, Athens, section of manuscripts, files 7872-7874.

ARCHIVE OF THE GEROULANOS FAMILY.

One file including land acquisition and planting contracts of the family Geroulanos in Cephalonia. Location: "National Literary and Historical Archive" (ELIA), Athens.

"ELLINIKI CHRIMATISTIKI ETAIREIA" ARCHIVE.

Rolls of payment of workers employed in 1830 in the state-owned currant vineyards in the province of Corinth. Location: "National Literary and Historical Archive" (ELIA), Athens.

BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS: CONSULAR REPORTS FROM GREECE (**BRCREP**).

- Reports from the consul in Patras [referred in the text only as BRCREP];

for the year:	volume number:	for the year:	volume number:
1854	LV of 1855-54	1886	LXXXIV of 1887
1855	LVII of 1856	1887	CI of 1888
1857	XXX of 1859	1888	LXXIX of 1889
1858	XXX of 1859	1889	LXXV of 1890
1859	LVIII of 1862	1890	LXXV of 1890-91
1860	LVIII of 1862	1891	LXXXII of 1892
1861	LIX of 1862	1892	XCIV of 1893-94
1864	LIV of 1865	1893	LXXXVI of 1894
1865	LXX of 1866	1894	XCVIII of 1895
1866	LXVIII of 1867	1895	LXXXVI of 1896
1867	LXVIII of 1867-68	1896	XCI of 1897
1868	LX of 1868-69	1897	XCVI of 1898
1869	LXV of 1871	1898	C of 1899
1870	LXVI of 1871	1899	XCIV of 1900
1871	LVIII of 1872	1900	LXXXIII of 1901
1872	LXIV of 1873	1901	CVII of 1902
1873	LXVI of 1874	1902	LXXVII of 1903
1874	LXXV of 1875	1903	XCIX of 1904
1875	LXXV of 1876	1904	LXXXIX of 1905
1876	LXXXIII of 1877	1905	CXXV of 1906
1877	LXXIII of 1878	1906	XC of 1907
1878	LXX of 1878-79	1907	CXII of 1908
1879	LXXIII of 1880	1908	XCV of 1909
1880	LXXXIX of 1881	1909	XCIX of 1910
1881	LXX of 1882	1910	XCIX of 1911
1882	LXXII of 1883	1911	XCVII of 1912-13
1883	LXXIX of 1884	1912	LXXI of 1913
1884	LXXVII of 1884-85	1913	XCII of 1914
1885	LXV of 1886	1914	XXIV of 1916

-British consular reports from places other than Patras;

Ionian Islands for the year:	volume number:
1850	XXXIV of 1851
1851	XXXI of 1852
1852	XCIX, LXII of 1852-53
1853	XXXVI of 1854-55
1857	XL of 1857-58
1858	XXI of 1859, XLIV of 1860
1859	XL of 1861
1860	XXXVI of 1862
1861	XXXIX of 1863
1862	XL of 1864

Cephalonia for the year:	volume number:
1864	LXIX of 1866
1865	LXVII of 1867
1866	LXVIII of 1867-68
1867	LX of 1868-69
1868	LXIV of 1870
1870	LXVI of 1871
1871	LXIV of 1873
1873	LXVII of 1874
1874	LXXVII of 1875
1877	LXXV of 1878
1878	LXXIII of 1880
1879	LXXXIX of 1881

Zante for the year:	volume number:
1865	LXVII of 1867
1866	LXVIII of 1867-68
1870	LXVI of 1871
1872	LXV of 1873
1873	LXVII of 1874
1879	LXXXIX of 1881

-British consular reports from places other than Patras (continued);

Santa Maura for the year:	volume number:
1877	LXXIII of 1878
1878-79	LXXXIX of 1881

Pirgos for the year:	volume number:
1884	LXXVIII of 1884-85
1894	XCVIII of 1895

Athens for the year:	volume number:
1859	LXIII of 1861

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CORRIGENDA

p. 3, l. 8-9: "The thesis in hand rather aims . . ."

p. 21, l. 5-6: "Part of this increase was doubtlessly due to . . ."

p. 26, l. 15: ". . . although they gave lower quality fruit . . ."

p. 26, fn. 15, l. 5-6: ". . . against five thousand in Patras . . ."

p. 27, fn. 17, l. 9: "The older is the one supplied . . ."

p. 32, fn. 28: "See table I.5, below."

p. 46, fn. 53, l. 10: "In order to render comparable tax receipts of different years . . ."

p. 47, graph I.2: Not to be taken into account, because the names of the provinces do not appear in the right place.

p. 49, table I.4, l. 1 of column 3: "receipts per capita"

p. 68, table I.7, fn. a, l. 10: "on population figures, see table I.6, p. 61 above"

p. 73, fn. 58, l. 4: ". . . labour cost to currant farm owners less than . . ."

p. 91, graph II.2: The correct position of the horizontal line which divides "currant-raising provinces" from "other provinces of the Peloponnese" would be between "mantineias" and "korinthias".

p. 106, l. 21-22: ". . . that kin groups of average size were not more numerous than . . ."

p. 112, fn. 50: "See above, p. 95."

p. 140, fn. 28: "See above, p. 136."

p. 191, fn. 42: "See p. 181, above."

p. 195, fn. 51, l. 2: ". . . see above, chapter II, n. 35."

p. 196, fn. 55: "See above, chapter II, n. 47."